The United States faces a monumental challenge to the practice of democratic governance. This challenge stems, in part, from significant changes in the conceptualization and practice of political campaigning and from the revolutionary effects of the technology deployed in contemporary campaigns (see Abramson, Arterton, and Orren, 1988). Two of the main forces behind this transformation are the rise of professional political consultants and the technology that they deploy in pursuit of electoral success (see Sabato, 1981 and Luntz, 1988). Even before the new president has a chance to settle into the office attention is being focused on the 1990 congressional mid-term elections and on the presidential election in 1992. Indeed, the “permanent campaign” now characterizes the essence of American electoral politics in the final quarter of the 20th century (Blumenthal, 1982).

Despite the meteoric rise to prominence ot political consultants in American political campaigns, political scientists have devoted surprisingly little attention to their analysis. This oversight is difficult to comprehend given the extraordinary penetration of consultants into the primary fabric of the American electoral system, the vast sums of money spent on consultant services by candidates, and the assumptions that we have about the considerable influence they wield. This analytic silence may be attributable to a number of factors. First, compared to voters, PACs, or interest groups, consultants are far more difficult to study. There are no readily available data sources to either identify consultants or document their activities.