Political scientists commonly use their courses to emphasize the pervasive nature of collective action problems, whereby group interests are undermined by individual incentives to “defect” or “free ride.” In a graduate seminar a faculty member may have students read classics in this area, such as Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965). Graduate students are often expected to model a collective action problem as a prisoner's dilemma and be able to understand the implications in such areas as establishment of interest groups, voting turnout, budgeting, and military relationships among nations. Even in lower division undergraduate courses political science instructors may integrate concepts from collective action theory. This orientation is also evident in some textbooks. Thus in their introduction to American politics, Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson (2003) offer an extensive discussion of collective action problems and the role of government, and return repeatedly to this topic throughout their book. Similarly, a focus on collective action problems is at the heart of Walter Stone's introductory American politics text, Republic at Risk (1990).