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3. Scottish Vital Statistics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2014

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Extract

It is frequently remarked that the science of statistics, in its various branches, is, like the law, “gloriously uncertain,” and accordingly, it is alleged that, from the same set of figures, two intelligent men can draw very different conclusions. The same assertion may, perhaps even more truly, be made regarding facts, which, although considered somewhat “sair to ding,” are very differently interpreted by different individuals. Interested motives, preconceived opinions, and illogical conceptions constitute some of the principal causes of perverted conclusions; and both facts and figures are very liable to misrepresentation. Hence the tendency in many quarters to distrust the deductions drawn from figures of almost every kind, more especially in the columns of official reports and the prospectuses of commercial enterprises. Even among intelligent and educated men, some strangely confused ideas prevail respecting statistics, many such persons erroneously supposing that every class of numerical facts ought to possess an equal amount of certainty and precision, similar to what is produced by the abstract figures of an arithmetical process.

Type
Proceedings 1882-83
Copyright
Copyright © Royal Society of Edinburgh 1884

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References

* In one of his papers in the Spectator on “The Uncertainty and Absurdity of Public Reports,” Steele refers to the very limited number of persons who can see or hear–that is, who can accurately report what they have seen or heard–either through incapacity or prejudice. After stating that he despises the man given to narration under the appellation of “a matter of fact man,” he defines him as “one whose life and conversation is spent in the report of what is not matter of fact.” Probably the ordinary estimate of the individual in question is somewhat different; but it cannot be denied that in many instances the force of a verbal description depends more upon the look, the voice, and the gesture than upon the words themselves, and accordingly a very erroneous impression may sometimes be derived from a colourless and undiscerning narration.