¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016, at 2 (May 2017), available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/diaepcb2017d1_en.pdf.

² Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Transparency Rules), Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Forty-Sixth Session (July 8–26, 2013), Gen. Assem., Supp. No. 17, para. 128, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf. The Transparency Rules only apply to disputes under treaties concluded after April 1, 2014 and pursued under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, or in cases in which the treaty parties or the parties to the dispute have opted into the Transparency Rules. As such, the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention), adopted by General Assembly Resolution 69/116 (December 10, 2014; entered into force October 18, 2017), establishes a mechanism pursuant to which all parties to existing investment treaties can efficiently and effectively implement the Transparency Rules to automatically apply to disputes that arise under treaties that were in force prior to April 1, 2014, and also to disputes under all treaties including those conducted under rules other than the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. As of June 28, 2018, four states are parties to the Mauritius Convention, bringing its overall effectiveness into question. See Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment [formerly named Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment], Center for International Environmental Law, and International Institute for Sustainable Development, New UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on Transparency: Application, Content and Next Steps (Aug. 2013), at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/UNCITRAL_Rules_on_Transparency_commentary_FINAL.pdf; See also Lise Johnson, The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the Treaty and Its Role in Increasing Transparency of Investor-State Arbitration (CCSI Policy Paper, Sept. 2014), available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/10.-Johnson-Mauritius-Convention-on-Transparency-Convention.pdf.

³ Joerg Weber & Catherine Titi, UNCTAD’s Roadmap for IIA Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD Issue Note (Dec. 2015), available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/Joerg%20Weber%20Cath%20Titi%20article_with%20copyright.pdf.

⁴ Joachim Pohl, Societal Benefits and Costs of International Investment Agreements: A Critical Review of Aspects and Available Empirical Evidence (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2018:1), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/e5f85c3d-en; see also Johnson, Lise, Sachs, Lisa, Güven, Brooke & Coleman, Jesse, Costs and Benefits of Investment Treaties: Practical Considerations for States (CCSI Policy Paper, 2018)Google Scholar, available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/04/07-Columbia-IIA-investor-policy-briefing-ENG-mr.pdf.

⁵ International Institute for Sustainable Development, UNCITRAL and Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement, at http://www.iisd.org/project/uncitral-and-reform-investment-dispute-settlement.

⁶ Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1959), available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1387.

⁷ Johnson, Sachs, Güven & Coleman, supra note 4.

⁸ Sachs, Lisa E. & Sauvant, Karl P., BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview, in The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Sauvant, Karl P. & Sachs, Lisa E. eds., 2009)Google Scholar

⁹ See, e.g., Mark Mangan & Henry Defriez, How to Protect Investments in Indonesia Despite the Termination of Its Bilateral Investment Treaties, Dechert On Point (Sept. 8, 2015). This note states that, even if Indonesia were to terminate its BITs, investors could still seek investment protection through its multilateral investment treaties (MIT) or free trade agreements (FTA) with investment chapters. It further states: however, not any BIT, MIT or FTA will do. They each vary according to their terms. Dechert's international arbitration team is available to advise investors on which investment treaties provide the optimal range of protections for a particular investment depending on the jurisdiction in which the investment is made and the types of disputes that the investor is likely to encounter. Id. at 6.

¹⁰ Johnson, Sachs, Güven & Coleman, supra note 4, at 8.

¹¹ Id. at 9.

¹² See, e.g., Glamis Gold v. United States; Lone Pine v. Canada; Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic; HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic; Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada.

¹³ See, e.g., Renco v. Peru; Gold Reserve v. Venezuela.

¹⁴ See, e.g., Copper Mesa v. Ecuador; Bear Creek v. Peru; Metalclad v. Mexico; RDC v. Guatemala.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Mobil v. Canada; Occidental v. Ecuador; Federal Elektrik Yatirim v. Uzbekistan.