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The cost of misinformation in deadly conflicts: Hawk-Dove games and suicidal terrorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

James E. Hanley ,
John Orbell  and
Tomonori Morikawa
James E. Hanley
Affiliation:
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408 james@jhanley.net
John Orbell
Affiliation:
Political Science Department & Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403 jorbell@oregon.uoregon.edu
Tomonori Morikawa
Affiliation:
Center for International Education, Waseda University, 1-7-14-404, Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-0051, Japan goducks1221@hotmail.com

Abstract

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The hijacking and purposeful crashing of airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, prompts questions about why the passengers and crew of those airplanes did not act to prevent these attacks, as did at least some passengers on a hijacked flight that crashed in Pennsylvania. We argue, first, that humans have an evolved cognitive bias that leads to the expectation that antagonists hope to survive conflict and, second, that highly credible information to the contrary is needed to overcome this bias. Absent such information, the passengers on at least two airplanes incorrectly interpreted the game being played as a hawk-dove version of a conflict-of-interest game, when it was actually a “suicidal terrorism” variant of that family. Given that other terrorists may have been in the air and ready to act, the airlines' policy of not informing passengers about such events could have risked disabling them from reacting forcefully when force alone was advisable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , March 2002 , pp. 13 - 18
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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