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In Defense of Comparative Statics: Specifying Empirical Tests of Models of Strategic Interaction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Clifford J. Carrubba ,
Amy Yuen  and
Christopher Zorn
Clifford J. Carrubba
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. e-mail: ccarrub@emory.edu (corresponding author)
Amy Yuen
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. e-mail: ayuen@emory.edu
Christopher Zorn
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208. e-mail: zorn@sc.edu
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Abstract

Beginning in 1999, Curtis Signorino challenged the use of traditional logits and probits analysis for testing discrete-choice, strategic models. Signorino argues that the complex parametric relationships generated by even the simplest strategic models can lead to wildly inaccurate inferences if one applies these traditional approaches. In their stead, Signorino proposes generating stochastic formal models, from which one can directly derive a maximum likelihood estimator. We propose a simpler, alternative methodology for theoretically and empirically accounting for strategic behavior. In particular, we propose carefully and correctly deriving one's comparative statics from one's formal model, whether it is stochastic or deterministic does not particularly matter, and using standard logit or probit estimation techniques to test the predictions. We demonstrate that this approach performs almost identically to Signorino's more complex suggestion.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , Autumn 2007 , pp. 465 - 482
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

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