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Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Jonathan Wand
Jonathan Wand*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Encina Hall West, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. e-mail: wand@stanford.edu
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Abstract

Testing the fit of competing equilibrium solutions to extensive form games crucially depends on assumptions about the distribution of player types. To illustrate the importance of these assumptions for differentiating standard statistical models of strategic choice, I draw on a game previously analyzed by Lewis and Schultz (2003). The differences that they highlight between a pair of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium models are not produced by signaling and updating dynamics as claimed, but are instead produced by different assumptions about the distribution of player types. The method of analysis developed and the issues raised are applicable to a broad range of structural models of conflict and bargaining.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , Winter 2006 , pp. 101 - 120
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

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