The question concerning the origin and nature of the so-called impersonals is one of great interest to the philosopher as well as to the philologian; for it is here where logic and grammar meet to solve a problem that belongs to both of these sciences. The impersonals and the sentences formed by them, seem to present an exception, if not a contradiction, not only to the syntactical rule that every sentence should consist of a subject and a predicate, but also to the law of logic, according to which a judgment is composed of two members. A linguistic investigation of this problem can, therefore, not be made without seeking aid from logic and psychology, and the results of such an inquiry may help to throw light on the relation of grammar to logic, and on the psychological basis of language. We could, of course, also proceed exclusively according to the historical method by inquiring after the origin of the impersonals in general as well as in particular cases. But such an investigation, too, would have had to be assisted by psychological and logical considerations without which it would scarcely rise above a mere collection of material Before we attempt, however, an explanation of this apparently irrational linguistic phenomenon we may do well to cast a glance at the history of the various attempts made in the direction of a solution of the problem.