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True Theories, False Colors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Austen Clark
Austen Clark*
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
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Abstract

Recent versions of objectivism can reply to the argument from metamers. The deeper rift between subjectivists and objectivists lies in the question of how to explain the structure of qualitative similarities among the colors. Subjectivism grounded in this fashion can answer the circularity objection raised by Dedrick. It endorses skepticism about the claim that there is some one property of objects that it is the function of color vision to detect. Color vision may enable us to detect differences in spectral composition without granting us the capacity to detect identities.

Type
Color and Color Vision
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S143 - S150
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Department of Philosophy U-54, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06279.

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