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Theory Change and Degrees of Success

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Ludwig Fahrbach
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Abstract

Scientific realism is the position that success of a scientific theory licenses an inference to its approximate truth. The argument from pessimistic metainduction maintains that this inference is undermined due to the existence of theories from the history of science that were successful but false. I aim to counter pessimistic metainduction and defend scientific realism. To do this, I adopt a notion of success that admits of degrees and show that our current best theories enjoy far higher degrees of success than any of the successful but refuted theories of the past.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 1283 - 1292
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Claus Beisbart, Hasok Chang, Martin Carrier, Thomas Müller, Theo Kuipers, Hannes Leitgeb, Gerhard Schurz, Mark Siebel, and Paul Thorn for helpful discussions.

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