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“Saving the Phenomena” Today

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

Bogen and Woodward argued the indirect connection between data and theory in terms of their conception of “phenomena.” I outline and elaborate on their presentation. To illuminate the connection with contemporary thinking in terms of models, I distinguish between phenomena tokens, representations of which can be identified with data models, and phenomena types that can be identified with relatively low-lying models or aspects of models in the model hierarchy. Throughout I stress the role of idealization in these considerations.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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