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A Reinstatement, in Response to Gillies, of Redhead's Argument in Support of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

I. J. Good*
Affiliation:
Departments of Statistics and Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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