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One Causal Mechanism in Evolution: One Unit of Selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Carla E. Kary*
Affiliation:
Moncure, North Carolina

Abstract

The theory of evolution is supported by the theory of genetics, which provides a single causal mechanism to explain the activities of replicators and interactors. A common misrepresentation of the theory of evolution, however, is that interaction (involving interactors), and transmission (involving replicators), are distinct causal processes. Sandra Mitchell (1987) is misled by this. I discuss why only a single causal mechanism is working in evolution and why it is sufficient. Further, I argue that Mitchell's mistaken view of the causal mechanism in evolution prevents her from resolving the conflict between Dawkins and Brandon. I conclude that the unit-of-selection question remains very much alive.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCE

Mitchell, S. D. (1987), “Competing Units of Selection?: A Case of Symbiosis”, Philosophy of Science 54: 351367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar