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The New Theory of Reference Entails Absolute Time and Space

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Quentin Smith*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Antioch College
*
Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Antioch College, Yellow Springs, OH 45387.

Abstract

The New Theory of Reference (NTR) of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others is a theory in the philosophy of language and there has been much debate about whether it entails the metaphysical theory of essentialism. But there has been no discussion about whether the NTR entails another metaphysical theory, the absolutist theory of time and space. It is argued in this paper that the NTR carries this entailment; the theory of time is the main focus of the paper and it is argued that the NTR entails the absolutist theory that times are event-independent moments.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

I am grateful to a referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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