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The Limits of Democratizing Science: When Scientists Should Ignore the Public

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2022

S. Andrew Schroeder Open the ORCID record for S. Andrew Schroeder [Opens in a new window]
S. Andrew Schroeder*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, CA, US
*
E-mail: aschroeder@cmc.edu
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Abstract

Scientists are frequently called upon to “democratize” science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the nonepistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit the scientist to accepting the public’s objectionable values, or may she veto them? I argue that there are a limited set of cases in which scientists can, consistently with a commitment to democratized science, set aside the public’s judgments.

Type
Symposia Paper
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 89 , Issue 5 , December 2022 , pp. 1034 - 1043
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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