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The Likelihood Principle and the Reliability of Experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Andrew Backe
Andrew Backe*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
*
†Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.
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Abstract

The likelihood principle of Bayesian statistics implies that information about the stopping rule used to collect evidence does not enter into the statistical analysis. This consequence confers an apparent advantage on Bayesian statistics over frequentist statistics. In the present paper, I argue that information about the stopping rule is nevertheless of value for an assessment of the reliability of the experiment, which is a pre-experimental measure of how well a contemplated procedure is expected to discriminate between hypotheses. I show that, when reliability assessments enter into inquiries, some stopping rules prescribing optional stopping are unacceptable to both Bayesians and frequentists.

Type
Probability and Statistical Inference
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1999 , 1999 , pp. S354 - S361
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This paper developed out of discussions with Deborah Mayo. I thank both her and Merrilee Salmon for commenting on earlier drafts. I also thank Teddy Seidenfeld for his comments and guidance on recent drafts.

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