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Kelly on Ockham’s Razor and Truth-Finding Efficiency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Simon Fitzpatrick
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Abstract

This article discusses Kevin Kelly’s recent attempt to justify Ockham’s Razor in terms of truth-finding efficiency. It is argued that Kelly’s justification fails to warrant confidence in the empirical content of theories recommended by Ockham’s Razor. This is a significant problem if, as Kelly and many others believe, considerations of simplicity play a pervasive role in scientific reasoning, underlying even our best tested theories, for the proposal will fail to warrant the use of these theories in practical prediction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 2 , April 2013 , pp. 298 - 309
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Earl Spurgin, Harry Gensler, and the referees for Philosophy of Science for helpful criticisms and suggestions. Research for this article was supported by a Summer Research Fellowship from John Carroll University.

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