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From the Pessimistic Induction to Semantic Antirealism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Greg Frost-Arnold
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Abstract

The Pessimistic Induction (PI) states: most past scientific theories were radically mistaken; therefore, current theories are probably similarly mistaken. But mistaken in what way? On the usual understanding, such past theories are false. However, on widely held views about reference and presupposition, many theoretical claims of previous scientific theories are neither true nor false. And if substantial portions of past theories are truth-valueless, then the PI leads to semantic antirealism. But most current philosophers of science reject semantic antirealism. So PI proponents face a difficult choice: accept either semantic antirealism or an unorthodox position on reference and presupposition.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 1131 - 1142
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to audiences at the University of Utah; the University of California, San Diego; and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, for very helpful comments on earlier versions of the ideas presented here.

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