According to Hempel, all scientific explanations and predictions which are produced exclusively with deterministic laws must be deductive, in the sense that the explanandum or the prediction must be a logical consequence of the laws and the initial (and boundary) conditions in the explanans. This deducibility thesis (DT) has been attacked from several quarters. Some time ago Canfield and Lehrer presented a “refutation” of DT as applied to predictions, in which they tried to prove that “if the deductive reconstruction [DT for predictions] were an adequate reconstruction, then scientific prediction would be impossible” ([2], p. 204). Their argument seems to have been uncontested except for an inconclusive rejoinder by Beard (cf. [1]). Moreover, Stegmüller has recently argued that “it may turn out that all or at least most of the so-called deductive-nomological explanations are in truth inductive and not deductive arguments, in view of the difficulty which has been pointed out by Canfield and Lehrer” ([3], p. 7). It seems it would be worth investigating whether Canfield and Lehrer's argument is, indeed, correct.