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Descriptions in Nonextensional Contexts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Gustav Bergmann
Gustav Bergmann*
Affiliation:
The State University of Iowa
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Abstract

1. In his paper “On Denoting” Russell points out what he calls a puzzle every satisfactory theory of denoting will have to solve. Of the three sentences

  1. (A) George IV. wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley

  2. (B) Scott is the author of Waverley

  3. (C) George IV. wished to know whether Scott was Scott the first two, (A) and (B), are presumably true, while the third, (C), is presumably false. The reason given for considering this arrangement of truth values a puzzle is (1) that the ‘is’ in (B) signifies identity; (2) that the proper name ‘Scott’ and the descriptive phrase ‘the author of Waverley’ denote the same object; and that, therefore, (3) if the latter is replaced by the former in the true sentence (A), the resulting sentence, (C), should again be true. Yet (C) is false, or, as one also says, the context considered is nonextensional with respect to this replacement.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , October 1948 , pp. 353 - 355
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1948

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References

1 Mind, XIV, 1905, 479–93.

2 Meaning and Necessity, Chicago, 1947. (p. 136 ff.)

3 By applying directly what Quine calls the substitutivity feature of identity to the incomplete symbol I have not violated the precautions necessary in such cases. It is easy to prove (E).

4 This does of course not refer to the rather minor difference due to the fact that Carnap adopts Frege's proposal of a conventional referent if (G) is false.