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Countering a Counter-Intuitive Probability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Lynn E. Rose
Lynn E. Rose*
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Buffalo
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Extract

Professor Copi provides us with the following example:

Remove all cards except aces and kings from a deck, so that only eight cards remain, of which four are aces and four are kings. From this abbreviated deck, deal two cards to a friend. If he looks at his cards and announces (truthfully) that his hand contains an ace, what is the probability that both his cards are aces? If he announces instead that one of his cards is the ace of spades, what is the probability then that both his cards are aces? (These two probabilities are not the same!) ([1], p. 433)

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , December 1972 , pp. 523 - 524
Copyright
Copyright © 1972 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Copi, I. M. Introduction to Logic. 3rd edition. New York: Macmillan, 1968.Google Scholar
[2] Spielman, S. “Assuming, Ascertaining, and Inductive Probability.” American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1969): 143–161.Google Scholar