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Causation and Gerrymandered World Lines: A Critique of Salmon

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sungho Choi
Sungho Choi*
Affiliation:
Programs in History and Philosophy of Science, Seoul National University
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Programs in History and Philosophy of Science, College of Natural Sciences, Seoul National University, San 56–1, Sillim-dong, Kwanak-gu, Seoul, 151–742, Korea choise80@snu.ac.kr.
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Abstract

In this paper I examine Salmon's response to two counterexamples to his conserved quantity (CQ) theory of causation. The first counterexample that I examine involves a time-wise gerrymandered world line of a series of patches of wall that is absorbing energy as a result of being illuminated in an astrodome. Salmon says that since the gerrymandered world line does not fulfill his “no-interaction requirement,” his CQ theory does not suffer from the counterexample. But I will argue that his response fails both at a theoretical level and at a practical level. In so doing I point out a problem for CQ theorists’ definition of a causal interaction. The second counterexample is concerned with a time-wise gerrymandered world line of a series of patches that are in shadow, in Hitchcock's well-known example. Salmon's response is based on a principle that Salmon thinks is derivable from the concept of a conserved quantity. However, I argue that the principle has a counterexample.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue 1 , March 2002 , pp. 105 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

The ideas in this paper have come to me in discussion with Inkyo Chung. I am much indebted to him. I am also grateful to Bosuk Yoon, John McGuire, Inrae Cho, Sangwook Yi, Sungsu Kim, and two anonymous referees for their helpful advice. I owe a substantial debt to one referee, in particular, for his extensive and valuable comments.

References

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