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Authorship and Purpose

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Henry S. Leonard
Henry S. Leonard*
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Abstract

This paper approaches a theory relating authorship, meaning and purpose by semiformalized developments of two “presupposed theories”: of purposeful behavior and of sign-reading.

The theory of purposeful behavior is made to rest upon two undefined predicates. 'Wt(a,p,q)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a works at bringing it about that p in order to bring it about that q. 'Bt(a,p)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a brings it about that p. A number of definitions and laws are based upon these two predicates. One practical utility of the symbolism is a constraint to symbolize differently a purpose, according as what is intended is a purposing or a thing purposed.

The theory of sign-reading undertakes to assimilate sign-reading to inference. The theory proposes ‘Rt(a,p,q)‘ as a basic undefined predicate, abbreviating the claim that at time t, person a reads that p as a sign that q.

The theory of deliberate sign-production, and more particularly of authorship, is approached by permitting the two above sets of symbols to supply arguments one for the other. Specifically, making a deliberate or a candid sign is defined as bringing about a state of affairs in order that an addressee will read the bringing about by the sign-maker of that state of affairs as a sign that such and so.

The laws of the two first parts of the paper are then appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid (defined in the paper), the such and so mentioned above must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what in this total signified purpose of the sign-making might be indentified by reference to the conventional sign-type (sentence) presented. Thus “meaning” of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , October 1959 , pp. 277 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association

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References

1 “Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity and Lies,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 26, no. 3 (July, 1959), pp. 173-185. Further references to that article will be made by the abbreviation IITFL.

2 Laws and definitions are numbered without parentheses and have a whole number indicating the part of this paper in which they are first presented. The subsequent “decimal numbers” are in fact integral numbers that order these formulas in any one part in the order of their presentation. There is no attempt to arrange these formulas in an axiornatized system, although some deductive relations are pointed out.

Formulas that are not proposed as laws or definitions, are independently numbered in parentheses. Cf. Formula (1) on p. 279.

3 These three laws present some problems relative to their reconciliation with the “time law” stated in Formula (1). For example, let t′ and t″ be the dates internal to p and q, and let t < t′ < t″. Then the right hand members of all three laws are consistent with Formula (1), but the left hand member of 1.9 is inconsistent with it. However, by 1.8, the left member of 1.9 may be replaced by “Wt[a,Bt(a,p), Bt(a,q)], which is consistent with Formula (1). Replacing 'p' and 'q' by 'Bt(a,p)' and 'Bt(a,q)' seem to be harmless ways of ”predating“ p and q. But this question should be investigated further. These three laws, however, are not used in the sequel.

4 Discussions and illustrations of the varied situations here mentioned appear in IIFTL. p. 175. One is tempted at this point to indulge in a digression, exploring the extent to which and manner in which the symbolism being developed will provide an instrument for explicating Dewey's discussions of the means-ends continuum. But space considerations force a resistance to the temptation.

5 Cf. John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, Holt, New York: 1938, p. 46.

6 Principles of Right Reason, Holt, New York: 1957, pp. 92 ff. Cf. also IITFL, pp. 173 ff.

7 On this distinction between truthfulness and honesty, cf. IITFL, pp. 181 ff.

8 Cf. IITFL, pp. 175 f.

9 By Definition 1.11, Formula (14) entails Bt(a,Sx).

10 Interpret 'Ay,t′' as equivalent to 'It is raining in and around y during an interval that includes time t′.' A characteristic inadequacy of this kind of substitute for 'q' in 'cPt,t′(a,Sx,b,q) has been mentioned just above and will be explained in Part VI, below.

11 Talking to a young child, still hardly aware of the conceptual contrast between good-will and ill-will, or more particularly contrasts between honesty and dishonesty and between truth and falsity, should probably be analysed in terms of (19); while saying the same things to an older, or more sophisticated, person for whom those contrasts are actively operating, should be analysed in terms of (26). But the exploration of this issue would demand another paper.

12 Cf. IITFL, esp. pp. 177 f, but 177-184 passim.

13 IITFL, passim, offered illustrative analyses applying the theory summarized here.