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A Representation Theorem for Absolute Confirmation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michael Schippers
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Abstract

Proposals for rigorously explicating the concept of confirmation in probabilistic terms abound. To foster discussions on the formal properties of the proposed measures, recent years have seen the upshot of a number of representation theorems that uniquely determine a confirmation measure (up to ordinal equivalence) based on a number of desiderata. However, the results that have been presented so far focus exclusively on the concept of incremental confirmation. This leaves open the question whether similar results can be obtained for the concept of absolute confirmation. This article closes the gap by providing a representation theorem for absolute confirmation measures.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , January 2017 , pp. 82 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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