Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-xq9c7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-16T17:51:02.821Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Covering Law Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Thomas Nickles
Thomas Nickles*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

A serious problem for covering law explanation is raised and its consequences for the Hempelian theory of explanation are discussed. The problem concerns an intensional feature of explanations, involving the manner in which theoretical law statements are related to the events explained. The basic problem arises because explanations are not of events but of events under descriptions ; moreover, in a sense, our linguistic descriptions outrun laws. One form of the problem, termed the problem of weak intensionality, is apparently solved by a simple logical move, but in fact the problem arises in a new, strong form. It is found that Hempel's model for deductive explanation (to which this discussion is confined) requires modification to handle the weak intensionality problem but then is faced with the problem of strong intensionality. In consequence, it is suggested that Hempel's important concept of explanation sketch is not as widely applicable as usually claimed, especially for explanations in the behavioral and social sciences and history. Reason is found to reject the covering law thesis that every scientific explanation must contain at least one law statement. An important feature of the discussion is that some of the main reasons given for altering the deductive model and for considering other forms of explanation are internal to the covering law theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 38 , Issue 4 , December 1971 , pp. 542 - 561
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Professor C. G. Hempel for encouragement and helpful criticism of an early version of some of these ideas. I also wish to thank several colleagues and students.

References

[1] Brodbeck, M. “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’ Knowledge.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3. Edited by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell. Minneapolis: 1962.Google Scholar
[2] Bromberger, S. “Why Questions.” Mind and Cosmos. Pittsburgh: 1966.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Danto, A. Analytical Philosophy of History. Cambridge: 1965.Google Scholar
[4] Hempel, C. G. “The Function of General Laws in History,” reprinted in [8], (Originally published in 1942.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Hempel, C. G. “The Logic of Functional Analysis,” reprinted in [8]. (Originally published in 1959.)Google Scholar
[6] Hempel, C. G. “Deductive-Nomological Vs. Statistical Explanation.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3. Edited by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell. Minneapolis: 1962.Google Scholar
[7] Hempel, C. G. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation,” in [8].Google Scholar
[8] Hempel, C. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: 1965.Google Scholar
[9] Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P. “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” reprinted in [8]. (Originally published in 1948.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[10] Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: 1970.Google Scholar
[11] MacIver, A. M. “Historical Explanation.” Logic and Language. Second Series. Edited by A. G. N. Flew. Oxford: 1961.Google Scholar
[12] Morgenbesser, S. “The Deductive Model and Its Qualifications.” Induction: Some Current Issues. Edited by H. Kyburg and E. Nagel. Middletown: 1963.Google Scholar
[13] Nagel, E. The Structure of Science. New York: 1963.Google Scholar
[14] Nagel, T. “Physicalism.” Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 339.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[15] Nickles, T. “Causal Explanation of Behavior: Some Comments.” Mimeographed.Google Scholar
[16] Nickles, T. “Explanation, Causation, and Description,” in preparation.Google Scholar
[17] Pap, A. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe: 1962.Google Scholar
[18] Popper, K. R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: 1959.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[19] Quine, W. V. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: 1960.Google Scholar
[20] Scheffler, I. The Anatomy of Inquiry. New York: 1963.Google Scholar
[21] Smart, J. J. C. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: 1963.Google Scholar
[22] Suppe, F. “On the Structure of Scientific Theories,” forthcoming.Google Scholar
[23] Suppes, P. “What is a Scientific Theory?” Philosophy of Science Today. Edited by S. Morgenbesser. New York: 1967.Google Scholar