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Becoming and the Arrow of Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Mauro Dorato
Mauro Dorato*
Affiliation:
University of Rome 3
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Rome 3, Via Magenta 5, 00185, Italy; e-mail: dorato@uniroma3.it.
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Abstract

The conceptual relation between objective becoming and the direction of time is explored by discussing an ontologically asymmetric notion of causation. It is claimed that such a notion, in terms of which Stein defined objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime, has either a purely metaphysical status or is reducible to physical concepts. In the former case, it is adequate for Stein's purpose but irrelevant to physical theories. In the latter, the causal asymmetry can be related to irreversible physical processes only in an extrinsic way. This dilemma creates additional difficulties both to a unified theory of the direction of time and to the project of making room for becoming in the physical world.

Type
Philosophy of Physics and Chemistry
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Sep., 2000 , 2000 , pp. S523 - S534
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Above all I must thank Rob Clifton for his critical comments during the discussion section of our symposium. My response to his criticism is incorporated in the present version, which also takes into account suggestions and advice offered by Eric Curiel, Phil Dowe, Jan Faye, Adolf Grünbaum, Federico Laudisa, and Massimo Pauri.

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