Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-27gpq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-28T19:29:26.342Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Why Do Clientelist Brokers Go Rogue? Parties, Politicians, and Intermediaries in Mexico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2022

Abstract

Political scientists working on clientelism have become interested in the relationships between brokers and the politicians and parties for whom they work. In most of this research, brokers are seen as inherently disloyal and normally act against the interests of their patrons, unless monitoring efforts are enacted. In contrast, we argue that territorial brokers have strong incentives to construct long-term, dependent relationships with their patrons, which diminishes the likelihood of cheating, while their patrons also wish to maintain durable ties with brokers to hold an assured voter base. We argue that politicians prefer brokers who have a good reputation for providing their voters with goods and assuring their votes. Still, sometimes brokers go rogue and cheat on their bosses. This study, which is based on more than fifty in-depth interviews with both local politicians and brokers in Mexico City, examines the conditions under which brokers remain loyal and those that promote cheating. We identify two factors that explain this variation—electoral competitiveness and the level of resource autonomy between brokers and politicians. Non-autonomous brokers working under conditions of low competition tend to have high probabilities of remaining loyal, while independent brokers working under high competitiveness will often resort to cheating.

Type
Special Section: Las Américas
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

A list of permanent links to Supplemental Materials provided by the authors precedes the References section.

References

Aguilar, Filomeno V., and Alis, Mary Grace Joyce P.. 2018. “Brokers Courting Voters: The Alliance System in a Rural Philippine Village.” Philippine Political Science Journal 39(2): 7396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ansell, Aaron. 2018. “Clientelism, Elections, and the Dialectic of Numerical People in Northeast Brazil.” Current Anthropology 59(Supplement 18): S128S137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aspinall, Edward. 2014. “When Brokers Betray: Clientelism, Social Networks, and Electoral Politics in Indonesia.” Critical Asian Studies 46(4): 545–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Auyero, Javier. 2000. “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account.” Latin American Research Review 35(3): 5581.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bagchi, Sarthak. 2019. An Ethnographic Exploration of Clientelistic Politics in India. Sage Research Methods Part 2. London: Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526497444CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beltrán, Ulises, and Cornejo, Rodrigo Castro. 2019. “Clientelistic Activation of Mexican Voters.” Política y gobierno 26(2): 171203.Google Scholar
Bennett, Andrew. 2004. “Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages.” In Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, ed. Sprinz, Detlef F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias, Yael, 1955. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Bowles, Jeremy, Larreguy, Horacio, and Liu, Shelley. 2020. “How Weakly Institutionalized Parties Monitor Brokers in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Post-conflict Liberia.” American Journal of Political Science 64(4): 952–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brierley, Sarah, and Nathan, Noah. 2021. “The Connections of Party Brokers: Which Brokers Do Parties Select?Journal of Politics 83(3): 884901.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brusco, Valarie, Marcelo, Nazareno, and Stokes, Susan. 2004. “Vote Buying in Argentina.” Latin American Research Review 39(2): 6688.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calvo, Ernesto, and Murillo, Victoria. 2004. “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market.” American Journal of Political Science 48(4): 742–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camp, Edwin. 2015. “Cultivating Effective Brokers: A Party Leader’s Dilemma.” British Journal of Political Science 47(3): 521–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castro Cornejo, Rodrigo. 2019. “Partisanship and Question-Wording Effects: Experimental Evidence from Latin America.” Public Opinion Quarterly 83(1): 2645.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castro Cornejo, Rodrigo, and Beltrán, Ulises. 2020. “Who Receives Electoral Gifts? It Depends on Question Wording: Experimental Evidence from Mexico.” Political Behavior 1-29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09618-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cruz, Cobilt, Cristina, Elizabeth. 2008. “Entre el Cliente y el Patrón: La Intermediación Política en los Periodos de Latencia.” Master’s Thesis. Mexico City: Flacso.Google Scholar
Cornelius, Wayne. 1975. Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Gans-Morse, Jordan, Mazzuca, Sebastian, and Nichter, Simeon. 2014. “Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 58(2): 415–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
George, Alexander, and Bennett, Andrew. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gerring, John. 2011. “The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. Goodin, Robert E.. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gingerich, Daniel W. 2014. “Brokered Politics in Brazil: An Empirical Analysis.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9(3): 269300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gingerich, Daniel W. 2020. “Buying Power: Electoral Strategy before the Secret Vote.” American Political Science Review 114(4): 1086–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, and Oliveros, Virginia. 2019. “Clientelism in Latin American Politics.” In Oxford Encyclopedia of Latin American Politics, ed. Vanden, Harry and Prevost, Gary. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gottlieb, Jessica. 2017. “Explaining Variation in Broker Strategies: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal.” Comparative Political Studies 50(11): 1556–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greene, Kenneth, and Simpser, Alberto. 2020. “Electoral Handouts during Mexico’s 2018 Elections.” Política y gobierno 27(2): 129.Google Scholar
Hagene, Turid. 2015. “Bridging the Gap between Citizens and the State.” Latin American Politics and Society 57(1): 129–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hagene, Turid, and Fuente, Iñigo González-. 2016. “Deep Politics. Community Adaptations to Political Clientelism in Twenty-First-Century Mexico.” Latin American Research Review 51(2): 323.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hilgers, Tina. 2008. “Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico’s PRD in Comparative Perspective.” Latin American Politics and Society 50(4): 123153.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holland, Alisha, and Palmer-Rubin, Brian. 2015. “Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers and Interest Organizations in Latin America.” Comparative Political Studies 48(9): 1186–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keefer, Phillip, and Vlaicu, Razvan. 2008. “Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24(2): 371406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitschelt, Herbert, and Wilkinson, Steven, eds. 2007. “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction.” In Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koter, Dominika. 2013.“King Makers: Local Leaders and Ethnic Politics in Africa.” World Politics 65(2): 187232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larreguy, Horacio, Olea, Cesar Montiel, and Querubin, Pablo. 2017. “Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents?American Journal of Political Science 61(4): 877–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larreguy, Horacio, Marshall, John, and Querubin, Pablo. 2016. “Parties, Brokers and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers.” American Political Science Review 110(1): 160–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levitsky, Steven. 2001. “Organization and Labor-Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective.” World Politics 54(1): 2756.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mainwaring, Scott. 2018. Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mares, Isabela, and Young, Lauren. 2016. “Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes.” Annual Review of Political Science 19: 267288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mares, Isabela, and Muntean, Aurelian. 2015. “Mayors, Ethnic Intermediaries and Party Brokers: Explaining Variation in Clientelistic Strategies in Rural Settings.” Presentated at the 22nd International Conference of Europeanists, Paris, July 8–10.Google Scholar
Muñoz, Paula. 2014. “An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism: The Case of Peru.” Comparative Politics 47(1): 7998.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Novaes, Lucas M. 2018. “Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 62(1): 8498.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oliveros, Virginia. 2021. Patronage at Work: Public Jobs and Political Services in Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009082525CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oliveros, Virginia. 2016. “Making It Personal: Clientelism, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina.” Comparative Politics 48(3): 373–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oliveros, Virginia. 2021. “Working for the Machine: Patronage Jobs and Political Services in Argentina.” Comparative Politics 53(3): 381427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reyes, Alejandra. 2018. “Housing Access and Governance: The Influence and Evolution of Housing Organizations in Mexico City.” Cities 74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robinson, James, and Verdier, Thierry. 2013. “The Political Economy of Clientelism.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115(2): 260–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robles, Johana. 2010. “Regulan predio de Supervía.” El Universal, December 14.Google Scholar
Rueda, Miguel. 2016. “Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring.” American Journal of Political Science 61(1): 163–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stokes, Susan Carol. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” American Political Science Review 99(3): 315–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stokes, Susan Carol, Dunning, Thad, Nazareno, Marcelo, and Brusco, Valeria. 2013. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Szwarcberg, Mariela. 2014. “Political Parties and Rallies in Latin America.” Party Politics 20(3): 456–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tosoni, María M. 2007. “Notas sobre el clientelismo político en la Ciudad de México.” Perfiles Latinoamericanos 29: 4769.Google Scholar
Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2012. “What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism.” American Journal of Political Science 56(3): 568–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zarazaga, Rodrigo. 2014. “Brokers beyond Clientelism: A New Perspective through the Argentine Case.” Latin American Politics and Society 56(3): 2345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zaremberg, Gisela. 2011. “¿Corporativisimo informal? Organizaciones de ambulantes y partidos políticos a partir de la alternancia electoral en México, Distrito Federal (2000-2005).” CLACSO. Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - CLACSO.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Langston and Castro Cornejo supplementary material

Appendices 1-3

Download Langston and Castro Cornejo supplementary material(File)
File 29.3 KB