No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Yesterday's Daily Bread: Petitionary Prayer for Past Events
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
The paper's subject is whether one is justified to pray for an event that has already happened from the point of view of the individual who is praying. About this, there are several possibilities, all of which I will consider: a) the past event is not known to the one who prays, b) it is known by them to have happened in a way which is not the desired one by the one praying and c), it is known to have happened according to their wishes. It also deals with two derived problems: if knowledge and ignorance are essential to our possibility of petitioning for something in the past, should we remain willfully ignorant about the past in order to pray to God so that it happened as we desire? Also, once we come to know that the past event did not go about as we desire, is it reasonable to pray to God so that our knowledge about the past is incorrect?
- Type
- Original Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2023 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
1 I am aware that I am ignoring the truth aspect of knowledge. As it will become apparent, this is not important in my argument. It will be enough for the present paper to assume that the person believes their knowledge to be true for it to be relevant in our issues regarding petitionary prayers. I am therefore avoiding the myriad problems relating to the classical justified true belief account of knowledge, such as the Gettier problem, for example.
2 Stump, E., & Kretzmann, N., ‘Eternity’, The Journal of Philosophy, 78/8(1981), pp. 429-458CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 E. Stump, & N. Kretzmann (1981), p. 441.
4 S. Th. II-II, q. 83, a. 2.
5 See Silva, Ignacio, ‘Revisiting Aquinas on Providence and Rising to the Challenge of Divine Action in Nature’, The Journal of Religion, 94/3 (2014), pp. 277-291CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a more detailed exposition of Aquinas’ doctrine of divine causation.
6 See Timpe, Kevin, ‘Prayers for the past’, Religious Studies 41 (2005), pp. 305-322CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a discussion about the relation between different positions regarding God's relation to time and prayers for the past.
7 Brown, G., ‘Praying About the Past’, The Philosophical Quarterly 35/138 (1985), p. 86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 G. Brown (1985), p. 86.
9 Stump, Eleonore, Aquinas, (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 505Google Scholar note 78.
10 K. Timpe, (2005), p. 318.
11 C. S. Lewis (1963: 184), says that ‘It is psychologically impossible to pray for what we know to be unobtainable; and if it were possible the prayer would sin against the duty of submission to God's known will’ (Miracles, (London: Collins, 1963 [1947]), p. 184). As it will become apparent later, I agree that there is something to be said about the place of humility and submission to God's will in this discussion. As Mawson argues that it is not impossible for someone to pray so that something which that person knows did not happen, happened (‘Praying for known outcomes’, Religious Studies, 43/1 [2007], p. 80). Mawson equates the psychollogical disposition of someone who is praying for an outcome known to have not ocurred with that of someone who tries to build a time-machine in order to change the past. Because some people would indeed try to do the second if they think they could, then those same individuals do the first. As I said, it is an interesting counterargument to Lewis’ ‘psychollogical impossibility’ claim. However, from the metaphysical point of view, this makes no difference. Such prayers would not be justified.
12 K. Timpe, (2005), p. 319.
13 K. Timpe, (2005), p. 319.
14 Confessiones, VIII, 17
15 Luke, 22:42.
16 I would like to thank Ignacio Silva, Mariano Asla, Christián Carman, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions to previous versions of this paper.