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Natural law, Aquinas and the Magisterium
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
The Catholic Church claims that its ethical teaching, especially on sex, is based upon natural law. I first show that natural law theories prior to the Middle Ages provide no authority for the Church's teaching on sex. I then examine Aquinas's teaching on natural functions and natural law in the two Summae. I suggest that he partly anticipates Enlightenment thinking about law and morals. I compare his theory of natural law with that of Germain Grisez and John Finnis. Finally, I examine the notion of a principle of practical reasoning and indicate how such principles could be formulated to correspond to elements in human nature.
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References
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