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Gender Identity, Analogy and Virtue: A Response Newton and Watt
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
William Newton and Helen Watt have both criticised the attempt to draw an analogy between gender recognition and adoption. Newton argues that recognition of adoptive fatherhood rests on an “analogy of proportion” whereas to use the word “woman” of someone whose natal sex is male is, at most, “a weak form of analogy”. However, the definition of woman provided by Newton excludes those who are infertile and neglects the cultural dimension of gender. The case of Casimir Pulaski shows that someone could participate in many of the cultural aspects of being male, as these were expressed in his society, irrespective of the facts of his internal anatomy. Watt thinks the analogy, if modified, shows that there is an onus against transitioning. She does not regard cross-dressing or taking cross-sex hormones or use of pronouns to express gender incongruence as being intrinsically wrong but argues that transitioning is potentially misleading and can have harmful consequences. Watt's practical arguments are weak as they do not include a broad range of considerations, especially considerations about inclusion and discrimination. On the other hand, Watt's concession is significant as it implies that, at least in some circumstances, transitioning could be virtuous.
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1 Two moves by which people seek a quick resolution of this conundrum are (1) by saying that such a person is simply in the grip of a false belief about what sex he or she is or (2) by claiming that there is no incongruence as gender has nothing to do with the body and anyone can know his or her gender incorrigibly. However, some beliefs are so basic that it is difficult to understand how someone could be mistaken. The expression of an apparently false belief about what sex or gender one is, is itself perplexing, and raises questions about how we understand sex and gender. The second move is problematic philosophically as it threatens to rob the term “gender” of any public meaning. It also fails to account for the person's often intense desire to change his or her bodily appearance to ameliorate distress over this incongruence.
2 Jones, David Albert, “Gender Reassignment Surgery: A Catholic Bioethical Analysis,” Theological Studies 79.2 (2018): 314-338CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jones, David Albert, “Truth in transition? Gender identity and Catholic anthropology,” New Blackfriars 29 May 2018Google Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1111/nbfr.12380.
3 In the concrete case it is possible to be mistaken both as to apparent sex and apparent parenthood. Nevertheless, biological sex and biological parenthood have a conceptual, and hence essential, link to natal identity. It may of course be that the adopted child or the adult who transitions also has a claim to this legal identity on the basis of his or her biology. The analogy is not intended as denying this possibility but as highlighting the possibility of an adopted social identity abstracting from the specifics of natal biological identity.
4 This argument does not address the possibility of gender identities outside the binary of male and female.
5 I am grateful to William Newton and Helen Watt for taking the trouble to respond carefully and in detail to my argument. One of the most problematic aspects of political, clinical, religious and philosophical discussion of transgender is the paucity of cordial but critical engagement between academics who hold different views.
6 Newton, William, “Adoption as an analogy for gender transitioning: A reply to David Albert Jones” NCBQ 18.4 (2018): 603-610, at 610Google Scholar.
7 Newton, “Adoption as an analogy,” 605.
8 Newton, “Adoption as an analogy,” 609.
9 Ibid.
10 Newton, “Adoption as an analogy,” 606.
11 Newton, “Adoption as an analogy,” 605.
12 Newton, “Adoption as an analogy,” 608.
13 Newton does not provide a reference for the idea that the female sex is the one “who generates within itself” but it can be traced back to Aristotle (Generation of Animals 1.2, 716a 14-15). It is also reflected in modern biology but has to be qualified to accommodate seeming exceptions such as sea horses: the female of the species generates the egg (including the genotype and most of the matter) while the male fertilises the egg (contributing to the genotype but contributing very little matter) see Jones, David Albert “The other woman: Evaluating the language of ‘three parent’ embryos” Clinical Ethics 10.4 (2015): 97-106CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14 It may well be that a biological definition of femaleness, which seems to be what Newton is offering, could be refined so that it was about the potential for generation in a more radical sense. Nevertheless, the fact that not everyone is fertile and not everyone is capable of sexual union, is philosophically and theologically significant as it illustrates the existence of exceptions to the duty to generate (Matthew 19.12).
15 The Equality and Human Rights Commission in the United Kingdom found that significantly more people expressed openly negative feelings towards transgender people (16%) than towards gay, lesbian or bisexual people (9%) and only 52% of people when asked stated that they would feel comfortable if their neighbour was transgender compared to 63% if they were gay, lesbian or bisexual (Dominic Abrams, Hannah J. Swift, and Diane Houston, Developing a national barometer of prejudice and discrimination in Britain (London: EHRC, 2018)). Such hostility is, of course, exacerbated by the media but it plays upon unease that is related to the transgression of deeply entrenched cultural norms.
16 Kajencki, Francis C., Casimir Pulaski, Cavalry Commander of the American Revolution (El Paso, TX: Southwest Polonia Press, 2001)Google Scholar.
17 Wytrwal, Joseph A., “Memorials to General Casimir Pulaski in the United States,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 44.3 (1960): 245-262Google Scholar.
18 Pienkos, Angela, “A Bicentennial Look at Casimir Pulaski: Polish, American and Ethnic Folk Hero,” Polish American Studies (1976): 5-17Google Scholar.
19 As it was also believed that, after the battle, he had died aboard the United States Brig Wasp and had been buried at sea, reported for example Lewis, John Frederick, “Casimir Pulaski,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 55.1 (1931): 1-23, at 22Google Scholar.
20 Jessica Glenza “Polish general who fought with Washington may have been a woman” Guardian 6 April 2019; Sarah Mervosh “Casimir Pulaski, Polish Hero of the Revolutionary War, Was Most Likely Intersex, Researchers Say” New York Times 7 April 2019.
21 Where someone's physical sex is ambiguous it is preferable, from a biological perspective, to take the internal organs as more significant than external appearance and especially to consider the form and function of the gonads, see Austriaco, Nicanor, ‘The Specification of Sex/Gender in the Human Species: A Thomistic Analysis’, New Blackfriars 94.1054 (November 2013): 701-715CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 The Guardian in reporting this story initially stated that Pulaski may have been “a woman or intersex”. In a subsequent edition online (11 April 2019) it corrected this to “female or intersex”. Pulaski may have been predominantly female biologically but he never lived as a woman and neither thought of himself as a woman nor shared the experiences common to women of his society.
23 Helen Watt, “Gender transition: The moral meaning of bodily and social presentation,” New Blackfriars 18 April 2019, https://doi.org/10.1111/nbfr.12465, 3.
24 Ibid.
25 Watt, “Gender transition,” 5. According to Watt this purported duty applies, prima facie, even for those with intersex conditions such as may have been the case with Casimir Pulaski. “Intersex people… share some of the same dilemmas regarding identification or non-identification with one's biological sex and the associated social gender…” (Watt, “Gender transition,” 3).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 In defence of Watt's extension of the analogy it may be argued that the simple analogy with adoption does not address the issue of change in bodily appearance and the use of hormones or surgery to facilitate gender reassignment. However, the question of which bodily modifications are compatible with a Catholic understanding of medical ethics (addressed in Jones, “Gender Reassignment Surgery”) is secondary to the question of whether the concept of gender identity has validity. It is generally a mistake to try to get too much from a single analogy and in seeking to stretch the analogy so it covers both gender identity and bodily appearance Watt renders it more obscure.
29 Watt, “Gender transition,” 12.
30 Adoption and Children Act 2002 Part 3, Chapter 2, Section 144 (5).
31 Fronek, Patricia and Cuthbert, Denise. “Apologies for forced adoption practices: Implications for contemporary intercountry adoption,” Australian Social Work 66.3 (2013): 402-414CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 Though a version of the analogy has been defended by the philosopher Sophie-Grace Chappell, who is transgender, see Philip Goff, “Transwomen and Adoptive Parents: An Analogy,” Conscience and Consciousness 11 July 2018, https://conscienceandconsciousness.com/2018/07/11/transwomen-and-adoptive-parents-an-analogy/.
33 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, Book II. Lecture 7. 329.
34 John Paul II Veritatis Splendor (August 6, 1993), 80.
35 Watt, “Gender transition,” 3, emphasis in the original.
36 Watt, “Gender transition,” 21.
37 Watt, “Gender transition,” 9.
38 Watt, “Gender transition,” 5, emphasis in the original.
39 Watt, “Gender transition,” 17, emphasis in the original.
40 Watt, “Gender transition,” 18, footnote 34.
41 Watt, “Gender transition,” 17-18.
42 These considerations, equivalent to the advice to count the bricks needed before building a tower (Luke 14.28), seem to imply that transition away from one's assigned gender identity demands serious thought and justification, even though there is no similar requirement to justify maintaining one's assigned gender identity. On the other hand, they do not imply a duty to detransition, The situation after the fact is quite different.
43 Such as the potential impediment to any future marriage and such as the effect upon an existing spouse or on children or indeed parents. There are people who delay transition for such reasons.
44 Such as the repeated invocation of “detransition” (29 times in 22 pages) as the lens through which to understand transition, without acknowledging that the great majority who transition do not express regret (for example 2.2% of all cases in Sweden over a fifty year period, Dhejne, Cecilia, Öberg, Katarina, Arver, Stefan and Landén, Mikael, “An analysis of all applications for sex reassignment surgery in Sweden, 1960–2010,” Archives of sexual behavior 43.8 (2014): 1535-1545)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. While they often find that transitioning has not solved all their problems, they rarely regret the decision itself (thus a follow up study of 201 cases in The Netherlands found 6% with minor regrets or dissatisfaction but none regretted transitioning van de Grift, Tim C., Elaut, Els, Cerwenka, Susanne C., Cohen-Kettenis, Peggy T., and Kreukels, Baudewijntje PC, “Surgical satisfaction, quality of life, and their association after gender-affirming surgery: A follow-up study,” Journal of sex & marital therapy 44.2 (2018): 138-148.)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
45 Such as the repeated use of the term “contagion” (page 16, twice; page 17, four times) in relation to possible social influences on gender transition. This term is used in other clinical and sociological contexts, but it carries the real danger of reinforcing prejudice and discrimination against people who transition. A similar concern might be raised about the linking of gender incongruence with paedophilia, twice (page 9) without careful qualification. There can be no more stigmatising association.
46 Watt, “Gender transition,” 3.
47 The extent of intimidation and violence against people on the basis of their gender identity is difficult to quantify but it is certainly widespread and underreported. A large national survey in the UK gauged it at roughly twice the level of intimidation and violence against people on the basis of sexual orientation (48% vs 26% for some act of harassment in the last 12 months, and 5% vs 2% and 2% vs 1% for physical or sexual violence in the last 12 months). These figures echo the data on public attitudes towards different protected groups (see above, footnote 15).
48 For example, a study conducted in prisons in California found that 59% of transgender inmates reported having been sexually assaulted while in a correctional facility in contrast to 4.4% of the random sample of inmates (Jenness, Valerie, Maxson, Cheryl L., Matsuda, Kristy N., and Macy Sumner, Jennifer, “Violence in California correctional facilities: An empirical examination of sexual assault,” Bulletin 2.2 (2007): 1-4Google Scholar; See also Sexton, Lori, Jenness, Valerie, and Macy Sumner, Jennifer, “Where the margins meet: A demographic assessment of transgender inmates in men's prisons,” Justice Quarterly 27.6 (2010): 835-866)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
49 This conclusion relates to social and legal transition and to at least some bodily modification but abstracts from the ethics of those elements of gender reassignment surgery that compromise sexual or procreative function (considered in Jones, “Gender Reassignment Surgery”) and abstracts from questions of marriage and of sexual ethics in the narrow sense.