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The Early Aquinas on the Question of Universal Salvation, or How a Knight May Choose Not to Ride His Horse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Franklin T. Harkins
Franklin T. Harkins*
Affiliation:
Department of Theology and Religion, Durham University, Abbey House Palace Green, Durham, DH1 3RS
*
franklin.harkins@durham.ac.uk
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Abstract

This article considers how the young Thomas Aquinas treats the question of universal salvation by examining his reading of 1 Timothy 2.4, God wills that all humans should be saved, in two of his early works, the Scriptum on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and the sixth Disputed Question on Truth, both dated to the period 1252–1257. Drawing on John Damascene's distinction between God's antecedent and consequent will, Thomas here teaches that whereas God wills antecedently in a unimodal way that all humans should be saved, He wills consequently in a bimodal way based on foreknown merits. Though foreknown merits are not a cause of predestination itself, they are a cause of glory, one of predestination's temporal effects. On Thomas's account, then, reading 1 Tim 2.4 as a straightforward statement of what God has done eternally—namely, predestine or save every individual human—would undermine the freedom of the human will that is necessary in order to attain to beatitude.

Keywords

Aquinasuniversal salvationpredestinationprovidencedivine will
Type
Original Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 95 , Issue 1056 , March 2014 , pp. 208 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 The Dominican Council

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References

1 For Albert's commentary on d. 40 of Bk. I, see B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. 26, ed. Augustus Borgnet (Paris, 1893), pp. 303–336.

2 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sententiarum d. 40 q. 1 a. 2 sol., ed. R. P. Mandonnet, O.P., vol. 1 (Paris, 1929), p. 945: . . . praedestinatio importat providentiam, secundum quod est ordinata ad executionem operis per voluntatem. All subsequent references to Thomas's Scriptum on Bk. I will be to the Mandonnet edition and cited according to page number(s) in vol. 1. All translations will be my own.

3 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 40 q. 1 a. 2 sol., p. 945: . . . . Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, licet non omnes salventur: non autem ab ordine praedestinationis. Dicit enim praedestinatio intentionem divinam de salute istius cum praescientia ejus quod salvabitur; et ideo dicitur, quod est praescientia et praeparatio.

4 For Albert, see his treatment of the question “whether all humans are predestined, or only certain ones” in Commentarium in I Sententiarum (hereafter: Comm. in I Sent.) d. 40 a. 8 obj. 1 and ad 1, in B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. 26, pp. 315–16.

5 On the dating and chronology of the disputed questions, see Questiones Disputatae, vol. 1: De veritate, ed. Raymund Spiazzi, OP (Turin: Marietti, 1948), pp. xiii-xvi. On the date and context of the Sentences lectures, see James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Oxford, 1974), pp. 53–92.

6 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 113).

7 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 113): Sicut igitur se habet providentia ad impositionem ordinis, ita se habet praedestinatio ad ordinis exitum vel eventum: quod enim aliqui finem gloriae consequuntur, non est principaliter ex propriis viribus, sed ex auxilio gratiae divinitus datae. Cf. ST I-II.109.5c and 6c.

8 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 114).

9 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 114).

10 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4; ST I.20.3.

11 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4 obj. 1.

12 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4 c.

13 ST I.20.3 c; see also a. 4 c.

14 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4 ad 1.

15 ST I.20.3 ad 1.

16 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1.

17 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1 obj. 1, 2, 3.

18 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1 sc 1, 2.

19 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1 c.

20 Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, I d. 46 ch. 1, ed. Ignatius Brady (Rome, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 312–13.

21 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 obj. 1, p. 1050.

22 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 obj. 4, p. 1050.

23 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sed contra, pp. 1050–51.

24 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051: . . . et hoc contingit non ex aliqua diversitate voluntatis divinae, sed propter diversas conditiones ipsius voliti.

25 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051: Potest enim in unoquoque homine considerari natura ejus et aliae circumstantiae ipsius, ut quod est volens et praeparans se ad salutem suam, vel etiam repugnans et contrarie agens.

26 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051.

27 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051: . . . et hoc dicitur voluntas consequens, eo quod praesupponit praescientiam operum non tanquam causam voluntatis, sed quasi rationem voliti.

28 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1, p. 1051.

29 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 ad 4, p. 1052: Ad quartum dicendum, quod sapiens artifex non vult quod opus suum finem attingat nisi secundum rationem finis; si enim aliquam habeat contrariam dispositionem ad formam quam inducere intendit, non inducit in eo formam, nisi forte illa indispositione remota; sicut aedificator non vult quod lapides conveniant ad constitutionem domus ruditate in eis manente; et ita etiam est de Deo.

30 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2.

31 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 obj. 2: Sed voluntas consequens, ut dicit Damascenus [libro II Orthodoxae Fidei, cap. XXIX], est ex nostra causa, scilicet inquantum nos habemus vel damnationem.

32 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117); ST I-II.114, esp. a. 5; cf. ST I-II.109.

33 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117): sed gratiae causa non potest esse actus humanus per modum meriti, sed dispositio naturalis quaedam, inquantum per actus praeparantur ad gratiae susceptionem. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod actus nostri, sive gratiam praecedant, sive sequantur, sint ipsius praedestinationis causa.

34 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117).

35 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117).

36 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117): Perfectio autem gratiae et gloriae sunt huiusmodi bona quod sine eis natura esse potest, excedunt enim naturalis virtutis limites; unde quod Deus velit alicui dare gratiam et gloriam, hoc ex mera liberalitate procedit.

37 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117): In his autem quae ex liberalitate procedunt tantum, causa volendi est ipsa superabundans affectio volentis ad finem, in quo attenditur perfectio bonitatis ipsius. Unde causa praedestinationis nihil est aliud quam bonitas ipsius Dei.

38 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 ad 2 (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117).

39 For Albert's explanation, see his Comm. in I Sent. d. 40 a. 8, esp. ad 1 and ad 2, in B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. 26, pp. 315–16.

40 For one contemporary consideration of these issues, see Ralph Martin, Will Many Be Saved? What Vatican II Actually Teaches and Its Implications for the New Evangelization (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), ch. 6, esp. Wainwright's critique of von Balthasar's position in n. 24 on pp. 265–66.