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Acquired and Infused Moral Virtue: A Distinction of Ends

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Arielle Harms
Arielle Harms*
Affiliation:
Ave Maria University, Ave Maria, FL
*
arielle.harms@my.avemaria.edu
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Abstract

There is a danger in separating out just a small portion of Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae for a detailed study while neglecting the larger framework from which this section comes. Yet students of Aquinas have failed to recognize the import of Thomas’ discussion of ends, both final and proximate, and how these are related to his later discussion of acquired and infused moral virtue and their relation to charity and prudence in the Prima Secundae of his Summa. In asserting that charity is necessary for all true virtue, the roles of the Church, the state, their members and even the place and role of grace and nature are confused. A proper understanding of the distinction between acquired natural moral virtue and infused moral virtue and their distinct ends assists in a more complete understanding of the position and responsibilities of each of these in building up a more just earthly society and the ultimate attainment of eternal beatitude.

Keywords

acquiredaquinascharityinfusedprudencevirtue
Type
Original Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 95 , Issue 1055 , January 2014 , pp. 71 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

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References

1 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 62.4.

2 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2.

3 Maritain, Jacques, Science and Wisdom (London: The Centenary Press, 1944), 145–154Google Scholar. Maritain takes his reading of St. Thomas from John of St. Thomas.

4 Cf. Shanley, Brian J. OP., “Aquinas on Pagan Virtue” The Thomist 63 (1999): 561–562CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Osborne, Thomas Jr., “The Augustinianism of Aquinas’ Moral Theory” The Thomist 67 (2003): 301CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Although Osborne tends to use the terms grace and charity interchangeably, leading to other difficulties, I limit my own argument to defending the legitimacy of the place of the acquired moral virtues in St. Thomas’ thought which is related to his discussion of proportionate and proximate ends, and to showing that in Thomas’ thought acquired prudence does not depend on charity. Unfortunately, I am unable to examine fully the other large issue Osborne raises concerning the relationship of grace, charity, the acquired and infused virtues, and the development of each, although this would be fascinating to parse out.

6 Osborne, 303.

7 Osborne, Thomas M. Jr., “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas” The Thomist 71 (2007): 39–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 McKay, Angela, “Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue” The Thomist 69 (2005): 535–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar. McKay answers Osborne's problems somewhat indirectly, going to other relevant texts in Thomas’ works to prove the authenticity of the acquired virtues, rather than pointing to Osborne's main difficulty regarding due ends.

9 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 62.1.

10 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 62.2.

11 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 62.3.

12 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 62.4.

13 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2.

14 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2.

15 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2.

16 cf. “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas”, 43–45; and “The Augustinianism of Aquinas’ Moral Theory,” 296–297.

17 cf. Maritain, 145.

18 Maritain, 148.

19 Maritain, 149.

20 “The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas’ Moral Theory,” 292.

21 Cf. “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas,” 48: “The distinction between the acquired virtue of someone who lacks charity and the perfect acquired virtue of someone who has charity rests on the distinction between virtuous acts that are referable to the ultimate end but are not so referred, and the same acts that are referred to the ultimate end. An ‘imperfect’ virtue in this context is a virtue according to which a bad agent performs good acts. This virtue is neither a mere bodily disposition nor a moral virtue that is connected to all the other virtues through prudence.”

22 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 61.1.

23 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 61.5.

24 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 61.5.

25 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 63.2.

26 Shanley and McKay do not make these distinct distinctions explicit either, as both speak of three grades or levels of virtue.

27 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 3.8.

28 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 5.3.

29 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 5.5.

30 cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 55.1: “Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore the power is said to be perfect, according to as is it determinate to act.”

31 Summa Theologiae, I-II 62.1.

32 Shanley, 567, referencing Summa Theologiae, I-II, 1.8; 2.8; 3.8.

33 Osborne, “The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas’ Moral Theory”, 290–291.

34 I do not mean to claim here that these two are not related in a sense, but only to emphasize that acquired natural virtue has a sphere of action that is proper to it.

35 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 62.3.

36 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.1.

37 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.1.

38 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.2.

39 cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2.

40 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.4.

41 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.8.

42 cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 8.1: “Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined.”

43 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 62.3.

44 cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 49.4: “Habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto.” and Summa Theologiae, I-II, 55.4: “virtue is a habit which is always referred to good.”

45 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.8.

46 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.8.

47 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.8.

48 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 114.4: “Human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and chiefly from Divine ordination inasmuch as acts are said to merit the good which is Divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of voluntary acts by acting of himself. And in both these ways does merit rest chiefly with charity.”

49 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

50 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

51 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

52 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

53 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

54 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

55 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

56 “The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas’ Moral Theory”, 284.

57 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 63.2.

58 cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 63.2: “man's virtue perfects him in relation to the good”.

59 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2.

60 This is the position Osborne finally argues, however, his thesis statement is more general, arguing that the natural acquired virtues cannot be had together, and thus prudence cannot be had without an unspecified grace. This thesis is actually corroborated by Thomas’ argument in Summa Theologiae, I-II, 109, if Osborne means grace and not charity specifically, as his later argument suggests.

61 cf. Shanley, 562–563; McKay, 537–538.

62 McKay, 536; Shanley, 563.

63 McKay does answer the specific objection regarding prudence in the third part of her essay using the Secunda Secundae, however there is a more proximate text that answers the question sufficiently, once the main difficulty of ends is clarified.

64 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.1.

65 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 5.4, 5.

66 Here Osborne is correct in thinking that this perfecting of man is only imperfect, because it cannot lead man to his ultimate perfection or perfect happiness, but only imperfect happiness. It is not correct, however, to say that these virtues are imperfect in the sense that they are merely inclinations to do what is good.

67 I do not mean to say that somehow the proximate end is not further ordered to the supernatural end in one with charity, but only that it does not have to be further ordered to make it a true good, as Thomas himself says in Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7.

68 Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2.

69 cf. Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.7: “If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good.”

70 “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas”, 48; “The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas’ Moral Theory”, 301.