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The Necessity of Design

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Abstract

In Jeff McMahan's The Ethics of Killing, an example involving a congenitally retarded child and a dog of similar cognitive ability is used to attempt to show that arguments about the potential to manifest traits are morally irrelevant to the abortion debate. McMahan argues that our intuition to enhance the child rather than the dog may be irrational. I explain that the only way to maintain common-sense ethics and strongly held intuitions about function and dysfunction is to accept a theory of design and to think, not in terms of “species” but, in terms of kinds of things that are designed to function in specific ways, where the failure of an individual of the kind to manifest characteristic functions is indicative of a privation rather than evidence that the individual is not – or not yet – a member of that kind and thus not as morally significant as members of the kind.

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The author 2008. Journal compilation © The Dominican Council/Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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References

1 This example is found in section 6.3 of McMahan's The Ethics of Killing.

2 “Speciesism” is generally regarded as a bad thing due to its arbitrariness. For a full discussion of “speciesism,” see Singer's, Peter Animal Liberation (The New York Review, 1975)Google Scholar.

3 Lee, Patrick Abortion and Unborn Human Life, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996, p. 4Google Scholar.

4 Though some might speculate about the possibility of us genetically engineering something that is human but did not have human parents, via cloning or some other method, the source of the materials used for this kind of thing would be an individual, or individuals, that fit our definition and, therefore, this new being could be said to ultimately come from human parents though it was developed in a laboratory setting.

5 For example: God and angels are persons but are not human beings.

6 For example: injury, Alzheimer's disease, retardation, etc.

7 It could be said that I am assuming that which I seek to prove, namely that there is something wrong with the retarded child.

8 Boorse, ChristopherHealth as a Theoretical Concept,” in Philosophy of Science vol. 44, no. 4 (Dec. 1977), 542CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 IBID, Boorse 542.

10 “Human Papilloma Virus” is the sexually transmitted disease that causes genital warts and cervical cancer. Approximately 75% of sexually active Americans have HPV. (source: Koutsky LA, Kiviat NB. Genital human papillomavirus. In Holmes KK, Mardh PA, Sparling PF, et al., eds. Sexually Transmitted Diseases. 3rd ed. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, CO; 1999: 347359Google Scholar.)

11 IBID Boorse, p. 556.

12 IBID Boorse, p. 559.

13 IBID Boorse, p. 562

14 This idea comes from David Hull's article A Matter of Individuality.

15 This idea comes from Philip Kitcher's article Species.

16 I am indebted to David Hershenov for this idea.

17 David Hull A Matter of Individuality, p. 353.

18 IBID, Hull p. 349.

19 IBID, Hull p. 354.

20 IBID, Hull p. 358.

21 Philip Kitcher Species, p. 312–3.

22 IBID, Kitcher p. 316

23 IBID, Kitcher

24 IBID, Kitcher

25 IBID, Kitcher

26 IBID, Kitcher

27 IBID, Kitcher

28 IBID, Kitcher

29 IBID, Kitcher p. 331

30 I am indebted to David Hershenov for these last two examples.

31 John, PollockHow to Build a Person” in Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics, ed. Tomberlin, James, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1988Google Scholar.

32 Millikan, , Ruth Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Bigelow, , John, and Pargetter, , Robert, Functions,” in Journal of Philosophy (1987) 189–94Google Scholar.

34 Alvin, Plantinga Warrant and Proper Function. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 221Google Scholar.

35 All of the Plantinga material is found in Chapter 11 of: Plantinga, Alvin Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 Nor do I think that these things actually posses the intellective powers that human beings posses.

37 I.e.: that we are members of the species Homo Sapiens.

38 Aquinas, Thomas St. The Aquinas Catechism. Edited by McInerny, Ralph. Manchester, New Hampshire: Sophia Institute Press, 2000.Google Scholar