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Freedom and Destiny in the Philosophy of Technology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

David Lewin*
Affiliation:
School of European Culture and Language, University of Kent
*
Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NF. Email: dave@davidlewin.co.uk

Abstract

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Type
Original Articles
Copyright
© The Author 2006. Journal compilation © The Dominican Council/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2006, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

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References

1 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 2004), p. 6Google Scholar.

2 Lewis, C. S., Studies with Words (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 45Google Scholar.

3 Winner, Langdon, Autonomous Technology (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 53–4Google Scholar.

4 This view is well known. The classic form is expressed for example in Weber's notion of the iron cage of rationalisation (Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Parsons, Talcott (New York, Dover Publications, 2003), p. 181)Google Scholar, and in Ellul's statement that technique has become autonomous (Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society, trans. by Wilkinson, John with an introduction by Merton, Robert K. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964), p. 6)Google Scholar. See also Winner Autonomous Technology, and Feenberg, Andrew, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999)Google Scholar.

5 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, pp. 2–3; Feenberg, Andrew, Critical Theory of Technology (New York: Oxford University Press 1991), pp. 78Google Scholar.

6 See for example; Ihde, Don, Instrumental Realism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991)Google Scholar, chapter 3; Waterhouse, Roger, A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger (New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

7 Ellul, The Technological Society, p. 134.

8 Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, p. 7.

9 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, p. 184.

10 For a comprehensive bibliography of actor-network theory literature, see <http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/sociology/css/antres/antres.htm> (viewed on 24th August 2005).

11 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method, revised trans. by Weinsheimer, Joel and Marshall, Donald G. (New York: Continuum, 2003), pp. 277–99Google Scholar.

12 Ricoeur, Paul, Fallible Man, revised trans. by Kelbley, Charles A. with an introduction by Lowe, Walter J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), p. 26Google Scholar.

13 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, p. 26.

14 Iain Thompson, ‘What's Wrong with Being a Technological Essentialist?’, (viewed on 24th August 2005), <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/feenberg/symp4.htm>.

15 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, p. 15.

16 Heidegger, Martin, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. and with an introduction by Lovitt, William (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 24Google Scholar.

17 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 25. It is interesting to compare the translation of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ by Lovitt with the revised translation by David Farrell Krell. Krell alters the last line to read: ‘For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens, though not one who simply obeys.’ Heidegger, Martin, Basic Writings (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 330Google Scholar.

18 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans. by Stambaugh, Joan (Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1996)Google Scholar.

19 Heidegger, Martin, What is Called Thinking?, trans. by Gray, J. Glenn (New York: Harper and Row, 1968)Google Scholar.

20 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 65.

21 Francis Bacon, ‘Meditationes Sacrae’. De Haeresibus. (1597).

22 See Dupré, LouisPassage to Modernity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), esp p. 40Google Scholar: ‘In the species the real is united with the mind, and turns its potential intelligibility into actual understanding. Being the very union of the mind with its object, it is neither a copy nor a representative of the known object’.

23 Kroker, Arthur, The Will to Technology & the Culture of Nihilism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p. 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Ricoeur, Paul, History and Truth trans., with an introduction by Kelbley, Charles A. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 194Google Scholar.

25 See Hyman, Gavin, ‘Disinterestedness: The Idol of Modernity’ in Hyman, Gavin (ed.) New Directions in Philosophical Theology (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 3552Google Scholar.

26 Dupré, Passage To Modernity, p. 131.

27 In the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger repeatedly uses the term ‘das Umwillen’ which is translated as ‘for-the-sake-of’. See Heidegger, Martin, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. by Heim, Michael (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

28 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 191–2.

29 Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology I (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1956)Google Scholar, ‘Man is man because he has freedom, but he has freedom only in polar interdependence with destiny. The term ‘destiny’ is unusual in this context. Ordinarily one speaks of freedom and necessity. However, necessity is a category and not an element. Its contrast is possibility, not freedom. Whenever freedom and necessity are set over against each other, necessity is understood in terms of mechanistic determinacy and freedom is thought of in terms of indeterministic contingency. Neither of these interpretations grasps the structure of being as it is experienced immediately in the one being who has the possibility of experiencing it because he is free, that is, in man. Man experiences the structure of the individual as the bearer of freedom within the larger structures to which the individual structure belongs. Destiny points to this situation in which man finds himself, facing the world to which, at the same time, he belongs.’ pp. 182–3.

30 While we tend to regard accident and providence as two wholly separate descriptions of how things befall, we might regard the word ‘fortune’ as revealing a complex interaction between these ideas.

31 Ricoeur, History and Truth, p. 308.

32 See Marion, Jean-Luc, Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. by Kossky, Jeffrey L. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002)Google Scholar.

33 Marion, Jean-Luc, The Idol and Distance. Five Studies, trans. by Carlson, T. A. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), p. 199Google Scholar.

34 Heidegger, Martin, Discourse On Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 52.Google Scholar

35 See Feenberg, Questioning Technology, p. 184.

36 Feenberg, Questioning Technology.

37 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, p. 105.

38 See Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology.

39 Guenther Anders, ‘Endzeit und Zeitende: Gedanken ueber die atomare Situation’, translated and quoted by Nordmann, Alfred, ‘Noumenal Technology’, Techne 8:3, Spring (2005)Google Scholar.