² Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 20, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1992 (1979), p. 109Google Scholar f. “Philosophische Forschung ist und bleibt Atheismus.” These lectures were originally given in the Summer Semester of 1925.

³ Cf. Paul, John II, Fides et Ratio in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vatican, Typis Vaticanis, Vol. 91, 1999, pp. 1–88Google Scholar, §97. Translated by Meredith SJ, A. and Hemming, L. P. in Hemming, L. P. and Parsons, S. F. (eds.), Restoring Faith and Reason, London, SCM Press, 2002Google Scholar: “intellectus fidei postulat ut philosophia essendi partes quae in primis sinant…”

⁴ John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, §44: “eius vere est philosophia essendi et non apparendi dumtaxat”.

⁵ Cf. for a fuller discussion of this, Jordan, M., The Alleged Aristotelianism of St. Thomas Aquinas in The Étienne Gilson Series, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediæval Studies, no. 15, 1990, esp. p. 6. “For Thomas, membership in a school of philosophy does not befit Christians. […] Thomas speaks about philosophy, of course, as a habit of knowing necessary for an educated believer […] I cannot find that the epithet philosophus is ever applied by Thomas to a Christian.” See also pp. 32–37.

⁶ Aquinas traces two modes of contemplation, one belonging to the contemplation of the philosophers, which is concerned with the self, the other with an end exterior to the self and with an object in view. Interestingly enough the very warrant he takes for making this distinction is not itself philosophical, but scriptural, so that the eye which contemplates could only be given life and raised to the full insofar as it was fixed on its end in God. Cf. Aquinas, In III Sententiarum, DS. 35, Q. 1, art 2, resp. “Uno modo inquantum est perfectio cognoscentis; et talis affectatio operationis cognitivae procedit ex amore sui: et sic erat affectio in vita contemplativa philosophorum. Alio modo inquantum terminatur ad objectum; et sic contemplationis desiderium procedit ex amore objecti: quia ubi amor, ibi oculus; et matth. 6, 21: ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum; et sic habet affectionem vita contemplativa sanctorum, de qua loquimur.”

⁷ M., Heidegger, Seminare in Gesamtausgabe vol. 15, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1986, p. 436Google Scholar. “Dürfen Sein und Gott identisch gesetzt werden?” I have written at length on this question and Heidegger's reply to it: cf. Hemming, L., Reading Heidegger: Is God Without Being? in New Blackfriars, Vol. 76, No. 895 (July/August 1995); Hemming, L. P., Heidegger's Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice, Indiana, Notre Dame University Press, 2002Google Scholar, esp. the whole of chapter 8.

⁸ Heidegger, M., Seminare, p. 436 f. “Europäisierung der Geschichte […] Sein und Gott sind nicht identisch, und ich würde niemals versuchen, das Wesen Gottes durch das Sein zu denken. […] Ich denke über das Sein im Hinblick auf seine Eignung, das Wesen Gottes theologisch zu denken, sehr bescheiden.”

⁹ Marion, J.-L., Dieu sans l’être(1982), p. 95. “Une seule indication nous parvient: le mot l’être ne doit pas intervenir dans un discours théologique”(Marion's italics).

¹⁰ Possenti, V., Filosofia e Rivelazione: Un contributo al dibattito su ragione e fede, Rome, Città Nuova, 1999Google Scholar, Appendix I, Translated by Paparella, E. L. as Philosophy and Revelation: A Contribution to the Debate on Reason and Faith, Farnborough, Ashgate, 2001Google Scholar. Appendix II, p. 83. “La critica verso l’ontoteologia e l’analogia, divenuta quasi un luogo comune in numerose scuole, viene in genere condotta ispirandosi ad Heidegger.”

¹¹ Possenti, V., Filosofia e Rivelazione, p. 145. “Solo pensando Dio come Esse si può percepire l’essere nella sua differenza dall’essente. Questo grandioso sviluppo è sfuggito ad Heidegger, che anche Dasein tale lato non è riuscito ad evadere dall’oblio d’essere.”

¹² von Balthasar, Cardinal H. U., Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie Cologne, Johannes Hegner Verlag, 1951, p. 44Google Scholar. Translated by Oakes, E. SJ as The Theology of Karl Barth San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1992Google Scholar. “Wir werden bald hören, daß dieses Prinzip auf den Namen analogia entis getauft worden ist, in Übernahme aber auch einer Bewertung dieser analogia entis als eines ausdrücklichen Formalprinzips, zu welchem Przywara [und erst er!] es in seinen Schriften erhoben hat.” See especially note 2 on this page, pointing out that Przywara's work Analogia entis was published as late (for this doctrine) as 1932. (cf. Przywara Analogia entis Munich, Kösel and Pustet, 1932. “Here for the first time the analogia entis is described as a formal ≪Prinzip≫”, pp. 149–154.)

¹³ Cf. Lotz, J. B., Martin Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin, Pfullingen, Neske, 1976Google Scholar; Caputo, J. D., Heidegger and Aquinas, New York, Fordham University Press, 1982Google Scholar.

¹⁴ John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, §69. “philosophia […] ex Graecia orta est quaeque Eurocentrica dicitur”.

¹⁵ Cf. Fides et Ratio, §49. “Suam ipsius philosophiam non exhibet Ecclesia, neque quamlibet praelegit peculiarem philosophiam aliarum damno.” Cf. also Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Humani generis in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. 42, 1950, p. 566. “Liquet etiam Ecclesiam non cuilibet systemati philosophico, brevi temporis spatio vigenti, devinciri potest: sed ea quæ communi consensu a catholicis doctoribus composita per plura sæcula fuere ad aliquam dogmatis intelligentiam attingendam, tam caduco fundamento procul dubio non nituntur. Nituntur enim principiis ac notionibus ex vera rerum creaturam cognitone deductis…”. The point here is that Pius XII is already distinguishing that knowledge drawn from things because they are created (and in their being-created, this profoundly alters the way in which they are already disclosed to thinking) and therefore from God, which frees them from the vicissitudes of philosophical fashion. Although the point is here being made negatively, or perhaps in reverse, it is the same point – the Church's thinking, though related to philosophy and borrowing from it when necessary, is not thereby either authenticated by, or authenticating, philosophical thinking.

¹⁶ Cf. Heidegger, M.; Die Gefahr in Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 79, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1994, pp. 46–67Google Scholar; Beiträge zur Philosophie: vom Ereignis in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1989. References to die Not, notschaft throughout, and especially §53.

¹⁷ Possenti, V., Filosofia e Rivelazione, p. 147. “Nella causalità onnipervadente della Causa prima, che instante per instante attiva ogni esistente creato.”

¹⁸ Einführung in die Metaphysik in Gesamtausgabe vol. 40, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1983 (1953), p. 9Google Scholar. “Glaube, wenn er sich nicht ständig der Möglichkeit des Unglaubens aussetzt, [ist] auch kein Glauben.”

¹⁹ Cf. Heidegger, M., Beiträge zur Philosophie, p. 110. “Die Seinsverlassenheit ist am stärksten dort, wo sie sich am entschiedensten versteckt. Das geschieht da, wo das Seiende das Gewöhnlichste und Gewohnteste geworden ist und werden mußte. Das geschah zuerst im Christentum und seiner Dogmatik, wonach alles seiende in seinem Ursprung erklärt ist als ens creatum und wo der Schöpfer das Gewisseste ist, alles Seiende die Wirkung dieser seiendsten Ursache. Das Ursache-Wirkung-Verhältnis aber ist das Gemeinste und Gröbste und Nächste, was alle menschliche Berechnung und Verlorenheit an das Seiende sich zuhilfe nimmt, um etwas zu erklären, d.h. in die Klarheit des Gemeinen und Gewohnten zu rücken”(Heidegger's italics). Heidegger's point here is made with regard to causality as a philosophical topic, and therefore as a procedure of demonstration or proof, rather than as a topic in faith.

²⁰ Aquinas, Quæstiones disputatæ: de Veritate, Q. 2, art. 12, resp. “sed semper ordo divinæ cognitionis ad rem quacumque est sicut ordo præsentis ad præsens”.

²¹ Aquinas, De æternitate mundi, §1. “Supposito, secundum fidem catholicam, quod mundus durationis initium habuit.”

²² John Paul II, Fides et ratio, §46.

²³ Heidegger, M., Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus in Nietzsche, vol. 2 (Gesamtausgabe vol. 6.2), Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1997 (1961), p. 309Google Scholar. “Die Metaphysik Platons ist nicht weniger nihilistisch als die Metaphysik Nietzsches”

²⁴ Cf. Heidegger, M., Beiträge zur Philosophie, §50. Heidegger suggests that it is working thoroughly to its very end the ‘first’ beginning from the Greeks to Nietzsche (and Hegel) that the ‘other’ or ‘new’ beginning itself begins at all, and takes up again “das Seyn in die Wahrheit seiner Wesung bringen”(p. 108).

²⁵ Cf. Heidegger, M., Beiträge zur Philosophie, p. 119. “Die Seinsverlassenheit ist der Grund und damit zugleich die ursprünglichere Wesenbestimmung dessen, was Nietzsche erstmals als Nihilismus erkannt hat.

²⁶ Cf. Heidegger, M., Beiträge zur Philosophie, §2, p. 6.

²⁷ Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, VII (1072b30).

²⁸ Cf. Hemming, L. P., Heidegger's Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice, chapter 8.

²⁹ Possenti, Filosofia e Rivelazione, p. 156. “A chi?”

³⁰ Possenti, Filosofia e Rivelazione, p. 158. “Tuttavia la natura di tale ponte non venne attinta.” The entire passage is most interesting in its radical inability to read Heidegger at all. Taking as its guiding position Heidegger's 1930 lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit(in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe vol. 9, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1996 [1967]), pp. 177–202 and some remarks in Sein und Zeit(Gesamtausgabe vol. 2, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1977 [1927]) he attempts to force a distinction between truth as unconcealment***** and truth as Wahrheit and adæquatio. Such a distinction is without foundation in any of Heidegger's works. In fact in Sein und Zeit there is a strong implicit critique of Aquinas’ notion of truth as adæquatio, most particularly in the reference to Question 1 – de veritate – of the Quæstiones disputatæ: de veritate. Even a cursory glance at the first few articles of St. Thomas’ question reveals its primary concern to be the being of truth. Thus the respondeo to Article 1 has almost at the very beginning “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens…”. Heidegger has a full critique of the correspondence understanding of truth – the adæquatio intellectus et rei– in his 1937 lecture course Grundfragen der Philosophie(in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 45, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1992 [1984]). Here (§§6–9), and with explicit reference to Kant as the one who takes for granted the adæquatio and common ground upon which both realism and idealism stand (Possenti's stock-in-trade), Heidegger argues that what must be done as far as the adæquatio is concerned is ask the question with regard to its ground. The lectures take off from the following ‘prospectus’: “Was dies [Grund] nun eigentlich ist, das der Richtigkeit zugrunde liegt, wo und wie diese vielfache und doch einige Offenheit selbst ihr Wesen und ihren Bestand hat, bleibt dunkel (p. 22).” The lectures then unfold as a way of bringing light to this very thing that lies in darkness – the ground of the adæquatio as the essence of the being of being-human. It is clear from the remarks from the first outline for the lectures at the end of the published text (pp. 195–223) that the ground is Da-sein, the being of being-human. For reasons which are made clear in the outline, the words Da-sein and Dasein, are, however, never mentioned in the course of the lectures themselves.

³¹ Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit(Wegmarken[GA9]), p 226. “Wodurch sind das Gesehene und das Sehen, was sie in ihrem Verhältnis sind? Worin besteht die Bogenspannung zwischen beiden? Welches Joch () hält beide zusammen?” Cf. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit(GA34), p. 111 f.

³² Cf. Plato, Republic, VI, XIX (508a, 508b).

³³ Heidegger, M., Beiträge zur Philosophie, §67, p. 132. “In der Machenschaft liegt zugleich die christlich-biblische Auslegung des Seienden als ens creatum mag dieses nun gläubig oder verweltlicht genommen werden”(Heidegger's italics).

³⁴ Descartes, R., Meditationes de Prima Philosophia in Adam, C. and Tannery, P, œuvres de Descartes, Paris, Vrin, vol. 7, III, p. 40Google Scholar. “Nam proculdubio illæ quæ substantias mihi exhibent, majus aliquid sunt, atque, ut ita loquar, plus realitatis objectivæ in se continent, quàm illæ tantum modos, sive accidentia, repræsentant; &rursus illa per quàm summum aliquem Deum, æternum, infinitum, omniscium, omnipotentem, rerumque omnium, quæ præter ipsum sunt, creatorem intelligo, plus profecto realitatis objectivæ in se habet, quàm illæ per quas finitæ substantiae exhibentur.”

³⁵ Heidegger, M., Parmenides in Gesamtausgabe vol. 54, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1992 (1982), p. 113Google Scholar. “’Zeit’ ist in ‘Sein und Zeit’, so befremdlich das klingen muß, der Vorname für den Anfangsgrund des Wortes”(Heidegger's italics).

³⁶ Heidegger, M., Platon: Sophistes in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 19, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1992, p. 580Google Scholar. “the sempiternal”

³⁷ Heidegger, M., Platon: Sophistes, p. 579 f. “So sehen Sie, daß in diesem Begriff der Ständigkeit, des Immer, faktisch, obzwar unausdrücklich, aber der Sache nach, für Plato das Phänomen der Zeit auftaucht, als das Phänomen, das das Seiende in seinem Sein bestimmt: die Gegenwart, , was oft verkürzt einfach als gefaßt wird. Und das , das ansprechende Aufschließen des Seienden, ist nichts anderes als das Gegenwärtig-machen der Sichtbarkeit des Seienden selbst und damit dieses in dem, was es ist; es bringt als gegenwärtigendes Erschließen die Gegenwart zur Aneignung”(Heidegger's italics).

³⁸ Plato, Sophist, 266c 5–7. .

³⁹ Heidegger, M., Platon: Sophistes, p. 594. “Das in dem die Möglichkeit des Sprechens liegt, ist eine konstitutive Bestimmung des Daseins selbst, die ich durch das In-der-Welt-sein, das In-sein zu bezeichnen pflege”(Heidegger's italics).

⁴⁰ Cf. Eckhart, , Prologi in opus tripartitum, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer Verlag, 1987, §12, p. 31Google Scholar; Quæstiones Parisiensis, Stuttgart-Berlin, Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936Google Scholar, Question 1, “Utrum in Deo sit idem esse et intelligere”, p. 40. “Tertio ostendo quod non ita videtur mihi modo, ut quia sit, ideo intelligat, sed quia intelligit, ideo est.”

⁴¹ Aquinas: In I Sententiarum, DS 2, Q. 1, art. 1, resp. ad 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Cap. 26, n. 6; Summa Theologiæ, Ia, Q. 14, art. 1, resp. ad 1.

⁴² Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Ia: Q. 2, art. 1, resp; Q. 3, art. 4, resp.

⁴³ For Aquinas the common being of things is always described as esse commune which is entirely distinct from the esse of God. For a full discussion of this see te Velde, R., Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1995, p. 188 f. “esse commune coincides with created being. The commune is added in order to distinguish the being that all beings have in common from the divine being that is self-subsistent and therefore radically distinct from all other things. The reason for making this distinction is to exclude the pantheistic error which might arise from the thesis that God is ‘being’ without any addition”; te Velde supplies an extended discussion of the problematic term esse commune in Chapter Ten of this book.

⁴⁴ In this, and especially with regard to the Eucharist, St. Thomas adverts to the form of truth discussed in Aristotle's De anima which does not have to do with the dialectic of truth and falsehood, but is understood as simply true through ‘seeing’. Clearly the seeing at issue is a reflective visuality, the seeing of the mind, of Greek, Latin intellectus. (Cf. Aquinas: Summa Theologiæ, IIIa: Q. 76, art. 7, resp. “duplex est oculis: scilicet corporalis, proprie dictus: et intellectualis, qui per similitudinem dicitur”; Q. 76, art. 7, resp. “Substantia autem, inquantum huiusmodi, non est visibilis oculo corporali, neque subiacet alicui sensui, neque imaginationi, sed soli intellectui, cuius obiectum est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III de Anima.” Aristotle, De anima, III, VI, 430 b 27. .

⁴⁵ Cf. John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, §11, citing John 3³⁴.

⁴⁶ Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa, Q. 77, a. 1, resp. “per infinitam [Dei] virtutem.”

⁴⁷ Cf. Gilson, É., God and Philosophy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992 (1941), p. 40Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Heidegger, M., Seminare, p. 437. “Ich glaube, daß das Sein niemals als Grund und Wesen von Gott gedacht werden kann, daß aber gleichwohl die Erfahrung Gottes und seiner Offenbarkeit (sofern sie dem Menschen begegnet) in der Dimension des Seins sich ereignet, was niemals besagt, das Sein könne als mögliches Prädikat für Gott gelten.”

⁴⁹ Anselm, Proslogion, II. “Qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut quantum scis expedire intelligam, quia es sicut credimus, et hoc es quod credimus.”