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Augustine and Divine Simplicity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2024

John P. Rosheger
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Extract

The doctrine of divine simplicity in its denial of any real ontological distinction between God’s substance and His attributes commanded a special place within classical theism, finding a forceful expression within Augustine’s metaphysic. However, the simplicity of God is a relatively neglected doctrine within current metaphysical and theistic considerations. This is somewhat strange considering the profound implications it has for theistic matters. Its tenets are inextricably linked to such theistic concerns as immutability, aseity, sovereignty, divine volition and necessity. As such, it is well worth our effort to devote careful attention to the Augustinian conception of God’s simpleness, confronting head-on its seemingly counter-intuitive assertion that there is not any actual distinction between divine substance and its qualities. We will want to first expound the relevant texts to Augustine’s teaching on divine simplicity. After its main features have been identified, our analysis will measure Augustine’s doctrine against some of the more serious contemporary objections.

We initiate our exposition by asking: What is Augustine’s notion of divine simplicity? Augustine’s doctrine rallies around the claim that God is what He has (hoc est quod habet). He remarks, “What is meant by ‘simple’ is that its [the Godhead] being is identical with its attributes,...” (CD XI.10). To gain a fuller appreciation of this pithy formula, it is necessary for us to consider its wider context.

Within De civitate Dei, Augustine begins the tenth chapter of Book XI by stating, “There is then one sole Good, which is simple, and therefore unchangeable; and that is God. By this Good all good things were created; but they are not simple, and for that reason are changeable.”

Type
Research Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 77 , Issue 901 , February 1996 , pp. 72 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

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References

1 For the Anselmic and Thomistic formulations, consult Monologion XVI‐XVII; Proslogion XVIII; Summa theologiae Ia.3; and Summa contra gentiles 1.18.

2 See, e.g., Mann, William E., “Simplicity and Immutability in God,”International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1983): 267‐76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stump, Eleonore and Kretzmann, Norman, “Eternity,”Journal of Philosophy 78, 1981CrossRefGoogle Scholar: 429‐58; “Absolute Simplicity,”Faith and Philosophy 2,1985: 353‐82;Adams, Robert M., “Has It Been Proved that All Existence Is Contingent?”American Philosophical Quarterly 8, 1971: 284‐91Google Scholar; and “Divine Necessity,”Journal of Philosophy 80, 1983: 741‐752CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 It is rather crucial that we qualify just how the term “simplicity” is employed throughout our study. As David B. Burrell states, “simpleness does not name a characteristic of God, but a formal feature of God as ‘beginning and end of all things.’ It is a shorthand term for saying that God lacks composition of any kind;”Aquinas: God and Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, 18. Simplicity, then, is the negation of composition. It is a doctrine that comes to us through apophatic intellection, by way of remotion (the via negaliva). The simpleness of God denotes an existence that is pure and unalloyed. We should also note, that for Augustine, divine simplicity mainly rises out of philosophic rather than revelational convictions. It is a doctrine drawn not so much from theology as from necessary ontological conclusions.

4 De Civitate Dei XL 10. Translations from this text are taken from Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson, London: Penguin Books, 1984. References to the De Civitate Dei appear within our study under the abbreviation “CD.”

5 De Trinitate V.2, 4. Throughout our study, references to Augustine's De Trinitate are abbreviated with a “T.” We will utilize the translation of McKenna, Stephen, The Trinity, The Fathers of the Church, vol. 45, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963Google Scholar.

6 This would include both the fact of change, as well as the possibility for change. Moreover, the verb form of the term “change” possesses the passive sense within Latin, namely, “to be changed”(mutari). This is to indicate that God cannot be acted upon or modified by anything else. For an insightful elaboration of Augustine's views on God's immutability, see Teske, Roland I., “Divine Immutability in Saint Augustine,”The Modem Schoolman 63 (1986): 233‐49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Cf. De Trinitate V.2; VH.5; XV. 13.

8 It is important to note that for Augustine, even though nothing in God is said to be according to accident, this does not mean that everything that is said of Him refers to His substance or essence. The persons of the Trinity, each equally and fully being identified with the eternal and immutable essence, are in no way to be understood according to accident. But, as will be explained below, the persons of the Trinity, with respect to each other, are spoken of according to relation, not according to essence (T V.5).

9 Within De Trinitate, Augustine relates this point to the issue of “begotten” versus “unbegotten.” Whereas the “begotten” implies a relationship to something else, the “unbegotten does not express a relationship, but refers to him (the Son (unbegotten = Father)] as he is in himself (T V.6).

10 For a fuller discussion on the relationship between the divine ideas and the doctrine of divine simplicity, see Kondoleon, Theodore, “Divine Exemplarism in Augustine,”Augustinian Studies 1(1970): 18195‐96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Teske, Roland J., “Properties of God and the Predicaments in De Trinitate V,”The Modern Schoolman 59 (1981): 4 ‐5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Ibid., 5.

13 It is worth noting that this sort of argument is not original with Augustine. Plotinus, e.g., employed its form within the context of his discussion on absolute freedom. Rather than conforming to some higher, more exalted, principle, the One's nature is due to Himself. Absolute Being cannot be subject to Its nature as it is absurd to look for a cause of that which is First (Ennead VI.8.20; cf. VI.8.9; V.3.17; V.42; VI.7.38). Also, within De Civitate Dei VIII.6, Augustine credits the “Plalonists” for having arrived at the truth of God's simplicity.

14 Echoes of this sentiment are felt in Aquinas when he remarks, “Now in considering the divine substance, we should especially make use of the method of remotion. For by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it is. Yet we are able to have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not” (Summa Contra Gentiles 1.14.2). With respect to the issue of divine simplicity, Aquinas comments, “Now the forms of things God has made receive in a divided and particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way” (Ibid., 1.32.2).

15 For a thematic treatment of Augustine's negative theology, see Lossky, Vladimir, “Elements of ‘Negative Theology’ in the Thought of St. Augustine,”St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 21 (1977): 67‐75Google Scholar.

16 De ordine 11.16. Cf. In Joannis evangelium tractatus 106.17.4. As with Augustine, Aquinas maintains that “reason can know that a simple form is, even though it cannot attain to understanding what it is” (Summa theotogiae Ia.12.12).

17 For some very good discussions on analogical predication with respect to theological language see, W. Norris Clarke, “Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language About God: A Reply to Kai Nielsen,”The Thomisl 40 (1976): 61‐95; Ralph M. Mclnemy, “Can God Be Named by Us? Prolegomena to Thomistic Philosophy of Religion,”Review of Metaphysics 32 (1979): 53‐73; Eric L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949; Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963; Nielsen, Niels C. Jr., “Analogy and the Knowledge of God: An Ecumenical Appraisal,”Rice University Studies 60 (1974): 21‐102Google Scholar; Chapman, Tobias, “Analogy,”The Thomist 39 (1975): 127‐41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Burrell, David B., Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University, 1973)Google Scholar.

18 Croix, Richard R. La, “Augustine on the Simplicity of God,”The New Scholasticism 51 (1977): 453‐69CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a review of his position and a rebuttal, see Wainwright, William J., “Augustine on God's Simplicity: A Reply,”The New Scholasticism 53 (1979): 118‐23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Croix, La, “Wainwright, Augustine and God's Simplicity: A Final Word,”The New Scholasticism 53 (1979): 124‐27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Teske, “Properties of God and the Predicaments in De Trinilate V,” 5‐6.

20 La Croix, “Augustine on the Simplicity of God,” 455‐56.

21 Ibid., 456.

22 Ibid., 460.

23 Ibid., 460‐62.

24 Ibid., 466.

25 Teske, “Properties of God and the Predicaments in De Trinitate V,” 17.

26 Roland J. Teske observes that La Croix's translation of De Civitate Dei XI.10 inappropriately inserts the term “properties” which is not in accord with the original Latin. Teske goes on to say, “since properties occur in statements, his translation would seem to imply that no statement of the form, ‘God is P,’ could be a contingent statement–despite the fact that Augustine does argue that some predicates begin to be true of God in time that were not previously true of God.” Ibid., 6.

27 Ibid., 8. Elsewhere, Teske writes, “it is important to distinguish two sorts of change. There is the first sort of change m which something is intrinsically modified; there is another sort of change by extrinsic denomination where something new is said of something without that thing being intrinsically changed. Divine immutability does not mean that we cannot truly say new things about God. That something new begins to be truly said of God need not entail a change in God's substance, since the newness can be on the part of some creature with respect to which God is said to begin to be something. Teske, “Divine Immutability in Saint Augustine,” 235.

28 Teske, “Properties of God and the Predicaments in De Trinitate V,” 13‐14.

29 As Teske indicates, such a formulation is limited to the issue of “relations” as it pertains to finite creatures, and not to the “relative” predicates of God that are eternally true for the persons of the Trinity. Ibid., 12‐13.

30 Ibid., 16.

31 Ibid., 18.