¹ Kenny, Anthony, Aquinas on Being, hereinafter, AoB(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See Suárez, Francisco. Ed. and tr. Sergio Rábade Romeo. Disputaciones metafísicas[hereinafter cited as Disp. metaphys.] 31. In Disputaciones metafísicas, Vol. 5 Sections 13–14 (p. 186–220). Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1960–1966. 7 v.

³ AoB,p. 146.

⁴ E.g., see De substantiis separatis, 7 [Textum Leoninum Romae 1968 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit]: “Ad huc ultra procedentibus manifestum fit quod tanto aliquid in entibus est altius, quanto magis habet de ratione essendi. Manifestum est autem quod cum ens per potentiam et actum dividatur, quod actus est potentia perfectior, et magis habet de ratione essendi: non enim simpliciter esse dicimus quod est in potentia, sed solum quod est actu. Oportet igitur id quod est superius in entibus, magis accedere ad actum; quod autem est in entibus infimum, propinquius esse potentiae.”–“Moving further, it becomes clear that something in its being is higher according as it shares more in the ratione essendi, the nature of ‘to be’. But it is clear that since being is divided by potency and act, that act is more perfect than potency and has a greater share in the ratione essendi, the nature of “to be”: for we do not say simpliciter(simply) that what is in potency is, but rather only that which is in act. It is therefore necessary that that which is higher among beings approach more closely to act, but that what is lowest among beings, be nearer to potency.” Note also Quaestiones de Anima[Textum Taurini 1953 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit] l ad 17: “dicendum quod licet esse sit formalissimum inter omnia, tamen est maxime communicabile, licet non eodem modo ab inferioribus et superioribus communicetur.”–“it should be said that although existence is the most formal of all perfections, still it is also the most communicable, although it is not received in the same mode by lower and higher beings.”

⁵ De potentia dei[textum Taurini 1953 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit] I.3.1.ad 17: “Ad decimum septimum dicendum, quod Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti.”–“To the seventeenth it should be said that God simultaneously brings forth esse and that which receives esse: and thus it does not follow that something needs to pre‐exist his action.”

⁶ AoB, pp. 117–118.

⁷ AoB, p. 118.

⁸ AoB, p. 119.

⁹ AoB, p. 46.

¹⁰ Compare, for example, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creatures .1 .resp. [Textum Taurini 1953Google Scholar editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit]: “Licet enim in uno et eodem, quod quandoque est in actu quandoque in potentia, prius tempore sit potentia quam actus; actus tamen naturaliter est prior potentia. Illud autem quod est prius, non dependet a posteriori, sed e converso. Et ideo invenitur aliquis primus actus absque omni potentia; nunquam tamen invenitur in rerum natura potentia quae non sit perfecta per aliquem actum; et propter hoc semper in materia prima est aliqua forma. A primo autem actu perfecto simpliciter, qui habet in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis, causatur esse actu in omnibus; sed tamen secundum quemdam ordinem. Nullus enim actus causatus habet omnem.

¹¹ AoB, p. 104.

¹² It also manifests a clear failure to read the words of the text of St. Thomas in De ente et essentia, Chapter Four, ¶ 7: “Everything that receives something from another is potential with regard to what it receives, and what is received in it is its actuality.”–“Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius…”–“But everything that receives something from another is potential with regard to what it receives, and what is received in it is its act…” Now, put this together with the earlier cited lines from De potentia dei.3.1.ad 17: “Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit.”–“God simultaneously produces existence and the subject that receives existence”. This is simply to say that creation is the causing by God of a thing whose perfection of existence is limited to a certain capacity.

¹³ AoM, p. 46.

¹⁴ Here it is worth mentioning the brilliant speculative treatment of the analogy of being in Yves Simon's essay “On Order in Analogical Sets” from Philosopher at Work(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ AoB, p. 59.

¹⁶ AoB, p. 121.

¹⁷ This citation of Frege by Kenny is found in AoB, p. 200, and is taken from The Foundations of Arithmetic, tr. Austin, J. L. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953)Google Scholar, §54.

¹⁸ See Suarez, Disp. Metaphys. 30.2.18, for the assertion that act in some way either limits itself or is limited only by its efficient cause. For the idea that prime matter is not pure potency but is in act, see also Disp. Metaphys. 15.9, as well as all of disputations 30 & 31.

¹⁹ AoB, p. 56.

²⁰ Compendium theologiae[Textum Taurini 1954Google Scholar editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit] 1.18: “Nullus enim actus invenitur finiri nisi per potentiam, quae est vis receptiva: invenimus enim formas limitari secundum potentiam materiae,”–“For no act comes to be limited save through a potency which receives it: as we see that form is limited according to the potency of matter.”

²¹ Of course, Thomas teaches that God produces existence and the subject receiving it simultaneously – e.g. (see note #5), De potentia dei 3.1.ad l7: “Deus simul dans esse, producit quod esse recipit.”– while he also every teaches that existence is the most formal of all perfections – e.g., Quaestiones de anima(cited supra, note 4) l ad 17: “dicendum quod licet esse sit formalissimum inter omnia, tamen est maxime communicabile, licet non eodem modo ab inferioribus et superioribus communicetur.”–“it should be said that although existence is the most formal of all perfections, still it is also the most communicable, although it is not received in the same mode by lower and higher beings.”

²² Of course, esse is not a “principle” in the exact same sense that form and matter are, for esse is not itself what exists nor part of what exists, although it is the most formal and actual principle of being. It is also important to realize that causes may be causes to one another in different respects simultaneously, keeping in mind that what is prior by nature need not be prior in time. Hence in diverse respects one can see that esse actuates the essential nature while the essential nature measures and in finite being limits the perfection of esse; and also that absolutely speaking, within the created being esse is prior (the essence or capacity to be is identified in relation to esse).

²³ And, of course, God as exemplar cause.

²⁴ AoB, p. 89.

²⁵ See AoB, p. 189.

²⁶ Yves Simon, Philosopher at Work, p. 156. Whereas today it is widely thought that metaphysics as scientia requires no more than a logic kit, a few afternoons reading Simon should dispel any such notion, which is one of the better things there are to say about anyone.

²⁷ One can imagine someone saying that “I only checked the encyclopedia, which says that there are Monarch Butterflies – but I know nothing about any particular butterfly and its existence.” But the answer to this is that one may not know to which particular butterfly one's knowledge pertains, but the proposition that “there are monarch butterflies” is true if and only if particular monarch butterflies do exist. If the chain of inference does not end in some real reference to individually existing monarch butterflies, howsoever vague, indeterminate, confused and general the reference may be, then we have no reason to hold it true that “there are monarch butterflies”. Of course, this might be said to be merely a necessary condition. But it is also sufficient: if we know, at whatever degree of remotion and with whatever confusion and indeterminacy, that an individual Monarch butterfly exists, then we know that “There are monarch butterflies” insofar as this latter phrase means that one or more than one individuals (“some”) exist. What does the phrase “some individuals exist” signify other than a quantitatively indeterminate reference to individual existences? And what can count as evidence for it, other than evidence of individual existences? In the ontological order, there is nothing else for “the existence of monarch butterflies” to be about than individuals: species are not, in physical being, subjects of being. It follows that what the proposition “there are monarch butterflies” is about, is individual monarch butterflies. Someone might say, “but the proposition is verified if only one exists, whereas the proposition is in the plural”. Yet the proposition is in the plural because it refers to individual existences indeterminately, generally, and confusedly, such that one or more individually existing butterflies will ratify it. The distinction of specific and individual existence is quo ad nos – we can consider individual existence indeterminately, but this does not mean that there is indeterminate existence.

²⁸ As beings are “fused together” in relation to the common ground of being on the basis of affirmations and negations in the analogy of proper proportionality.

²⁹ Perhaps there is an undiscovered treatise of Frege's on the analogy of being languishing in obscurity somewhere: but, on the evidence, we have no particular reason to suppose that he understood the doctrine of the analogia entis or the limits of univocal accounts with respect to the subject matter of metaphysics.

³⁰ For St. Thomas, even the judgment of separatio at the font of the discovery of being as subject matter for a distinct science is in the most general sense a type of abstraction, although it occurs through judgment rather than through apprehension.

³¹ AoB, p. 44.

³² AoB, p. 44.

³³ Hence, AoB, p. 112: “if a sentence containing a predicate after ‘is’ indicates the subject to be in a certain way, then a sentence containing ‘is’ with no addition indicates the subject to be in no way. Once again, the consideration of pure esse seems to lead us to a void.” But the signification of esse and essence are already incorrect for Kenny at the beginning. His sentence should have read: “if a sentence containing a predicate after ‘is’ indicates the subject to possess the perfection of esse only within certain essential limits, then a sentence containing ‘is’ with no addition indicates the subject to possess the perfection of esse with no essential limits whatsoever.” But this would require a more realistic contact with being than the univocal Fregean schema will permit.

³⁴ One recollects De ente et essentia[Leonine ed.], the first line of the prologue “…parvus error in principio magnus est in fine secundum Philosophum…”–“…a small error in the beginning becomes vast in the end, according to the Philosopher…”

³⁵ AoB, p. 36: “Even among those who regard the real distinction between essence and existence as a fundamental thesis of St. Thomas, there are some who deny that it is meant to be proved by the phoenix argument.” But, he notes on the same page, “It seems clear that Aquinas’ phoenix argument establishes something other than a conceptual distinction.”

³⁶ Passages from De ente et essentia are from the Leonine Edition of St. Thomas's works, vol. 43 Sancti Thomae De Aquino Opera Omnia 376–377 (Rome 1976): “Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentie uel quiditatis, hoc est adueniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla esentia sine hiis que sunt partes essentie intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia uel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia uel quiditate. Nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse, et hec res non potest esse nisi una et prima…”

³⁷ If we view the divine power precisively, that is: but this notion is seriously limited when the divine wisdom comes into play, such that we do not know whether there be some reason why a thing possible in the sense of its lying within the divine power is not possible in a wider sense insofar as something within God's power is contrary to God's wisdom. This is a serious limitation of “possible worlds” thinking insofar as it must be admitted that our natural insight about the divine wisdom (understood as meaning: the extension of the propositions we may validly form that pertain to it, since we do not know God directly) is slight.

³⁸ Kenny seems to find the idea of individual “possibilities” in relation to God to be fantastic. I cannot make sense of this proposition, since clearly in relation to the divine power and antecedent to the existence in actual nature of a thing, there is only the possibility that such a nature may be in relation to God. And clearly Kenny cannot intend to claim about actual natures prior to creation that these are impossible– for the inference from actuality to possibility is a valid inference.

³⁹ Leonine De ente et essentia, Chapter One, ¶ 3: “Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum diuiditur per decem genera, oportet ut essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis per quas diuersa entia in diuersis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis.”

⁴⁰ AoB, p. 35.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Summa theologiae.I.85.6.res p.: “Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit.”

⁴² Ottawa ed. of the Summa theologiae, 1953; 84.7.resp.: “Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit”

⁴³ Ottawa Sth.I.85.6.resp.: “Quia ad proprium obiectum unaquaeque potentia per se ordinatur, secundum quod ipsa. Quae autem sunt huiusmodi, semper eodem modo se habent. Inde manente potentia, non deficit eius iudicium circa proprium obiectum – Obiectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei. Unde circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo, intellectus non fallitur. Sed circa ea quae circumstant rei essentiam vel quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinat ad aliud, vel componendo vel dividendo vel etiam ratiocinando.”

⁴⁴ See also Leonine Summa contra gentiles IIIb.108: “Nulla virtus cognoscitiva circa proprium obiectum decipitur, sed solum circa extraneum: visus enim non decipitur in iudicio colorum; sed, dum homo per visum iudicat de sapore vel de specie rei, in hoc deceptio accidit. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quidditas rei. In cognitione igitur intellectus deceptio accidere non potest, si puras rerum quidditates apprehendat, sed omnis deceptio intellectus accidere videtur ex hoc quod apprehendit formas rerum permixtas phantasmatibus, ut in nobis accidit.”–“No cognitive faculty is deceived about its proper object, but only about one that is outside its purview: thus the sight is not deceived in its judgement about colours; whereas deception may occur if a man judge by sight of taste, or of the species of a thing. Now, the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing. Consequently there can be no deception in the knowledge of the intellect, if it were to apprehend the mere quiddities of things, and all deception of the intellect would seem to occur through its apprehending forms mingled with phantasms, as is the case with us.” The whole of this article continues to the same effect, making the point that falsity enters into our judgment through composition and division but only by accident pertains to our apprehension of quiddity –“In operatione autem intellectus qua apprehendit quod quid est, non accidit falsum nisi per accidens, secundum quod in hac etiam operatione permiscetur aliquid de operatione intellectus componentis et dividentis.”See also Quaestiones disputatae de veritate 1.1.12, Leonine (vol I fasc. 2): “Quiditas autem rei est proprium obiectum intellectus: unde sicut sensus sensibilium proprium semper verus est ita et intellectus in cognoscendo quod quid est, ut dicitur in III De anima. Sed tamen per accidens potest ibi falsitas accidere, in quantum videlicet intellectus falso componit et dividit, quod dupliciter contingit, vel in quantum diffinitionem unius attribuit alteri, ut si animal rationale mortale conciperet quasi diffinitionem asini, vel in quantum coniungit partes diffinitionis ad invicem quae coniungi non possunt, ut si conciperet quasi diffinitionem asini animal irrationale immortale: haec enim est falsa ‘aliquod animal irrationale est immortale’.”–“The proper object of the intellect, however, is the quiddity of a thing. Hence, just as the sensing of proper sensibles is always true, so the intellect is always true in knowing what a thing is, as is said in III On the Soul. By accident, however, falsity can occur in this knowing of quiddities, if the intellect falsely joins and separates. This happens in two ways: when it attributes the definition of one thing to another, as would happen were it to conceive that ‘mortal rational animal” were the definition of an ass; or when it joins together parts of definitions that cannot be joined, as would happen were it to conceive that ‘irrational, immortal animal’ were the definition of an ass.”

⁴⁵ Of course, the claim is not that everyone who makes use of the intellect immediately hatches a hylemorphic theory or will even assent to the same. Rather the claim is that the primordial evidence of physical substances available to and inerrantly known by all includes and entails the generic parts of material essence, providing the firmest possible evidentiary basis for the reasoning whereby form and matter are distinguishable within physical things. I.e., there is no doubt that for St. Thomas, the knowledge of the generic parts of material quiddity is derivative from, and consequent on, serious intellectual contemplation of the primordial evidence of physical things, an evidence which is trustworthy because it flows from the conformitatem intellectus ad rei(Sth.I.16.2.resp.: “Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur.” Hence the argument is as firmly founded as is rationally possible, ensuing from truths directly consequent upon the generically adequated knowledge of material essence.

⁴⁶ Long, Steven A., “On the Natural Knowledge of the Real Distinction of Essence and Existence,”Nova et Vetera, Spring 2003, I, I, pp. 75–108Google Scholar; the quotation is from pp. 85–86.

⁴⁷ Not least in De ente essentia, Chapter 4, ¶7: “Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius; ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas uel forma que est intelligentia sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus”–“But everything that receives something from another is potential with regard to what it receives, and what is received in it is its act; therefore the quiddity or form which is the intelligence is in potency with respect to that esse which it receives from God, and that esse is received as its act.”

⁴⁸ Leonine ed., Chapter 5, §5: “In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipse differentie essentiales ignote sunt; unde significantur per differentias accidentales que ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum: sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis.”

⁴⁹ Chapter 5, ¶5 of De ente et essentia.

⁵⁰ A proposition that Dr. Kenny should have spent some time with, in a work on the metaphysics of Aquinas is: act is not self‐limiting. The thing God ordains to be, is a thing essentially limited by the potency of essence with which it is actuated in creation – esse is, as it were, both the ultimate perfection intended by the Creator in intending that this thing be, while it is also the first perfection of the thing (because without esse there cannot be found real essential limitation).