The question whether external actors have a right of intervention within a sovereign state which is committing grave violations of human rights assumed particular significance in the case of the civil conflict that began in Libya in February 2011. Within the international response to the Libyan regime's attacks on its population, the Arab League, the United Nations and NATO favoured the use of military force, whereas the African Union favoured a political solution to the crisis. This article considers the question of African Union intervention within the framework of the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. It argues that the reason why the African Union did not act militarily in Libya was that it lacks the will to confront incumbent leaders, something which undermines the organization's ability to provide effective solutions to African crises.

Given the importance of the rights at stake (the right to life, the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment and the right of individual petition as such) it is crucial that states respect provisional measures by human rights adjudicators. Many factors play a role in compliance and it is often difficult to disentangle them. Yet it is clear that whatever reasons states may have for occasionally disrespecting provisional measures, in those cases they will try to legitimise their own actions and at times even to undermine the standing of the provisional measures or of the adjudicator ordering them. This article discusses the concept of provisional measures, including their purpose and the convergence in their use by the various adjudicators. It argues that human rights adjudicators, other authorities and NGOs are in the best position to follow up on non-compliance if the provisional measures ordered are as persuasive as possible. For a great part this persuasiveness hinges on the nature of the rights to be protected by provisional measures. ‘Core rights’ play a key role in the decision whether or not to order such measures. Moreover, core rights underlie the convergence in decision-making on the binding nature of provisional measures. In addition, this binding nature in itself obviously enhances the persuasive force of provisional measures. Moreover, it is argued in this article that in most human rights systems maintaining persuasiveness also means maintaining a relation to the claim on the merits. In other words, provisional measures cannot yet be seen as a free-standing tool. This is particularly important in the European system, where certain states appear to be intent on undermining the Court's authority to order provisional measures.

Much has been said about the potential of the World Bank's Inspection Panel to contribute to the normative development of international law. Yet, empirical evidence to contest or affirm this potential has been scarce. This article situates the Panel as a body that operates within a ‘system of quasi-judicial oversight’, and expounds the Panel's development of normative standards in three areas: the compliance review process, international human rights and public participation in decision-making. The article concludes by restating the Panel's normative potential in the light of its institutional realities as a body functioning in a ‘quasi-judicial oversight system’.

This paper examines whether Turkey should be considered under international law as the ‘continuing’ state of the Ottoman Empire or whether it should instead be deemed as a ‘new’ state. This question of ‘state identity’ is central to any discussion on Turkey's responsibility for internationally wrongful acts committed by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian population before its disintegration. We will analyse some of the criteria that have been used in international law to determine whether two entities are in fact ‘identical’. We will focus on one determinant factor: whether what is left of a state's territory following a significant reduction in its size is the ‘essential’ part of the state (or its nucleus) that existed before its disintegration. This paper also analyse the capital role that recognition by other states plays on matters of state identity and continuity. Finally, we will examine several provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, two international arbitration cases (Ottoman Public Debt case, 1925; Lighthouse Arbitration case, 1956) and a Dutch municipal court decision (1925) all dealing with the question of continuity between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.