^{page 140 note 2} The position of stateless persons or of persons with more than one nationality will not be discussed. For the purposes of this articles, the term “aliens” is to be understood as meaning only persons possessing the nationality of a state other than the expropriating state, and possessing only that nationality.

^{page 140 note 3} When Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law I, p. 352Google Scholar, speaks of “cases in which fundamental changes in the political system and economic structure of the State or far-reaching social reforms entail interference, on a large scale, with private property”, such cases may undoubtedly be called nationalisation. A. de La Pradelle speaks of “les cas de grande envergure” (Report, Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 1950, I, p. 60Google Scholar); Konst. Katzarov refers to “cette procédure de grandes réformes sociales comme la nationalisation” (Rev. Trim, de droit commercial, 1957, No. 2, Extrait p. 10).Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 1} Delson, Robert, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Columbia Law Review, 1957, p. 759, note 31.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 2} Conflict of Laws, 7th edn. (1958), p. 666Google Scholar, with a reference to Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law, I, 8th edn. (1955), p. 351, and the authorities cited there.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 3} I will confine myself to mentioning a few sources of bibliographies, citations of cases and references to the practice of states: Basdevant, Suzanne in Répertoire de droit international, T. VIII, voce Etranger (1930)Google Scholar; Schindler, D., Annuaire Suisse de droit international, 1946, p. 84 ff.Google Scholar; Bindschedler, R. L., Verstaatlichungs-massnahmen, etc. (1950), p. 13 ff.Google Scholar; Doman, N. R., I.L.Q. 1950, p. 324 ff.Google Scholar; Erades, L. in Mededelingen No. 32 (05 1954)Google Scholar; Joseph, F. M., Fifth International Conference of the Legal Profession (I.B.A.) 1954, p. 3 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 1} Chargeraud-Hartmann, , Internationale Studien, Vol. I, 1948, p. 352Google Scholar; Les nationalisations en France, 1948 (published under the direction of L. Julliot de la Morandière and Maurice Bye), p. 126.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 2} Rev. trim, de droit commercial, 04–06 1957, offprint p. 12.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 3} pp. 517–518, again citing literature, cases and diplomatic practice.

^{page 144 note 1} A decision which is sometimes cited in this connection, namely that of the President of the District Court at Rotterdam of 31st July, 1939, N.J. 747 (which in any case was not concerned with the nationalisation of alien property), did not imply that the good faith of a foreign government may not be called in question by the Netherlands courts, but merely that in this particular case, which was being tried by a summary proceeding, the court had provisionally no alternative but to accept the lawfulness of the government measure at issue.

^{page 144 note 2} Department of State Bulletin, 2 (1940), p. 381Google Scholar, cited by O'Connell, , I.C.L.Q. 1955, p. 282.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 3} The question whether the courts may judge such a foreign “act of state” at all will be dealt with in the last section of this article.

^{page 145 note 1} La documentation française, 21st 03, 1952, No. 1592, Les nationalisations en Europe Orientale.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 2} Nagorski, Z., The Legislation of the Polish People's Republic 1945–1957, Law in Eastern Europe No. 2 (1958, Leiden), p. 32.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 3} See the survey in Foighel, Isi, Nationalization, pp. 132/133Google Scholar, and also Doman, N. R., Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, Columbia Law Review, 1948, p. 1126 ff.Google Scholar; Viénot, G., Nationalisations étrangères et Intérêts Français (1953)Google Scholar; Les Nationalisations a l'étranger, (Dir. H. Puget), 1958.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 4} Cf. Viénot, , Nationalisations étrangères et intérêts français: “Si nos conventions ont été conclues, ce n'est donc point grâce à un accord sur des principes juridiques…” (p. 275)Google Scholar; Katzarov, , Rapport sur la nationalisation (presented to the New York Conference (1958) of the International Law Association), p. 24Google Scholar: “le plus souvent, en concluant ces accords, les Etats intéressés ont préféré passer sous silence les questions relatives aux principes du droit”.

^{page 146 note 1} Gihl, Thorsten, Liber Amicorum Bagge, p. 62.Google Scholar

^{page 146 note 2} Reproduced from The Weekly Law Reports (W.L.R.), 01 30, 1953, p. 252Google Scholar. See also Correspondence … concerning the Oil Industry in Persia (Cmd. 8425), Doc. No. 10.

^{page 146 note 3} Consisting of members of the two Houses of Parliament and the Minister of Finance or his Deputy.

^{page 146 note 4} If the original has been correctly translated by the word “examine”, the Rome Court in its 1954 judgment (referred to below) was wrong to base its decision (assuming that the French translation in the Revue Critique is correct) on the ground that the Iranian Nationalisation Law had imposed on the Iranian Government the obligation “à reconnaître les prétentions “légitimes” du concessionaire”. (Revue Critique de droit int. privé 1958, 529).Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 1} See previous page, note 3.

^{page 147 note 2} I.C.L.Q. 1955, p. 274.Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 3} Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. a. Jaffrate et al. (1953), W.L.R. 246.àGoogle Scholar

^{page 147 note 4} See the reproduction of the judgment in O'Connell's article, I.C.L.Q. 1955 p. 280 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 5} Bresch, M. H. in I.L.Q. 1953, p. 633.Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 6} Court of first instance at Rome, 13th Sept., 1954, I.L.Q., 1955, 607Google Scholar; Revue Critique de droit int. privé 1958, p. 519 ffGoogle Scholar. De Nova writes in the Rev. Cr. under the judgment: “il me paraît que les juges se sont satisfaits beaucoup trop facilement en considérant comme indemnité congrue la problématique perspective de compensation indiquée par la loi persane.… On ne peut certainement pas se contenter de promesses générales et d'estimations laissées à l'entière discrétion de l'administration”.

The Rome Court invokes a judgment of the Court of Appeal at Arnhem of 12th June, 1939. No such judgment is to be found in the Netherlands law reports; but there is a decision by the President of the District Court at Arnhem of 13th June, 1939 (N.J. 1940 No. 19, upheld by the Arnhem Court of Appeal on 19th September, 1939, N.J. 1940 No. 20), the sense of which, however, is the opposite of what the Rome Court seeks to rely on.

^{page 148 note 1} Gihl, Thorsten in Liber Amicorum Bagge (1955), p. 61Google Scholar. In the same sense cf., for instance, Foighel, Isi, Nationalization (1957), p. 75.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 2} Again: the question whether the “act of state” doctrine forms an impediment to this judgment will be dealt with in section IV.

^{page 150 note 1} Contra, see Seidl-Hohenveldern, , Internationales Konfiskations- und Enteignungsrecht (1952), p. 7.Google Scholar

^{page 150 note 2} François, J. P. A., Grondlijnen von het Volkerrecht, 1957, p. 26.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 1} It is a very common feature of the literature on confiscation that insufficient account is taken of the limitations on sovereignty; see, for instance, de Baat, , Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 1956, p. 56Google Scholar; Seidl-Hohenveldern, op. cit. p. 7Google Scholar: “Danach (sc. nach dem Prinzip der Staatssouveränität) besitzt jeder Staat die ausschliess-liche Zuständigkeit die Rechtmässigkeit des Erwerbes von Eigentum zu entscheiden, das innerhalb seines Gebietes gelegen ist” (“According to the principle of state sovereignty, every state has the exclusive competence to decide on the lawfulness of the acquisition of property located within its territory”); Niederer, , Annuaire Suisse de droit international (XI) 1954, pp. 94/95Google Scholar: “Innerhalb seiner Grenzen kann der fremde Staat also auch nach Belieben in die Eigentumsordnung eingreifen; er kann das Privateigentum ganz aufheben, … er kann … konfiszieren … Zwar können diese Gesetze nicht über seine Landesgrenzen hinaus wirken, aber innerhalb des betreffenden Staates sind sie zweifellos anwendbar. Innerhalb seiner Landesgrenzen ist der konfiszierende Staat somit auch zur entschädigungslosen Enteignung zuständig” (“Within its frontiers the foreign state can therefore interfere at will with the laws of property; it can entirely abolish private ownership, … it can … confiscate … Admittedly these laws will be without effect beyond its frontiers, but within the state concerned they are undoubtedly applicable. Within its frontiers, therefore, the confiscating state is also competent to expropriate without paying compensation”). These writers omit to mention that die “will” and “competence” of every state are restricted by international law.

^{page 152 note 1} International Law I, 8th edn. (1955), p. 268.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 2} See the conclusions reached by Brades, L., Mededelingen No. 32 (05 1954, pp. 8 and 23)Google Scholar and by the Neth. Branch Committee of the I.L.A., New York Conference, 1958 (Report p. 29)Google Scholar, which I have been happy to follow.

^{page 152 note 3} I.C.L.Q. 1955, p. 268.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 4} Judgment of 13th Sept. 1928, P.C.I.J. Series A No. 17, pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 1} SirShawcross, Hartley, Some problems of nationalisation in International Law, 5th Conference International Bar Association, 07 1954, pp. 17–18.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 2} Herz, John H., Expropriation of foreign property, The American Journal of International Law, 04 1941, pp. 253/254Google Scholar; Doman, , Postwar nationalization of foreign property in Europe, Columbia Law Review, 1948, pp. 1138/1139Google Scholar; Doman, , International Law Quarterly, 1950, p. 328Google Scholar; Roth, , The Minimum Standard, 1949, pp. 171/172Google Scholar; Delson, , Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Columbia Law Review, 06 1957, pp. 763/764Google Scholar; idem in his Comments on the occasion of the I.L.A. Conference of September 1958.

^{page 154 note 1} “British Property Abroad”, Current Legal Problems, 1952, p. 316.Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 2} W. F. Smith case, 1929 (2 U.N.R.I.A.A., p. 919)Google Scholar; Junghans case, 1939Google Scholar (3 ibid. p. 1856); Martini case, 1930Google Scholar (2 ibid. p. 1002).

^{page 154 note 3} In 1938 the British Government (notes of 8th and 21st April) adopted the same attitude as the U.S. Government towards the Mexican expropriation of British oil interests and demanded that British property should be returned. Rubin, (Private Foreign Investment, p. 10)Google Scholar, in relating this, adds that in his opinion it can be expected that the British Government “would now agree that the legal power to take does exist but that there is a consequent obligation to pay”. The incorrectness of this supposition is evident both from the 1950 note to Russia, quoted in the text, and from the attitude adopted by Britain in the Iranian oil question.

^{page 155 note 1} President of the District Court at Middelburg, 2nd 08, 1938, N.J. 1938 No. 790, and Supreme Court, 7th February, 1941, N.J. 1941 No. 923Google Scholar. Cf. also Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, 4th November, 1942, N.J. 1943 No. 496, in re the Vladikavkaz Railway Company.

^{page 156 note 1} Cheshire, , op. cit., p. 139.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 2} Freeman, , Denial of Justice, p. 518.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 3} Not yet published at the time of writing. (Now published in N.J. 1959 No. 73.)

^{page 156 note 4} Concerning the nature of this “placing under control”, see the article by the Editors of this periodical in the third issue of 1958, entided “The measures taken by the Indonesian Government against Netherlands enterprises”.

^{page 157 note 1} Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. Jaffrate et al. (1953), 1 W.L.R. 246Google Scholar; Revue Egyptienne de droit international (Vol. 8), 1952, pp. 242–256.Google Scholar

^{page 157 note 2} I.C.L.Q. 1955, pp. 279/280.Google Scholar

^{page 157 note 3} Dicey, 's Conflict of Laws, 7th edn., p. 667.Google Scholar

^{page 157 note 4} I.C.L.Q. 1955, pp. 279/280.Google Scholar

^{page 158 note 1} Cf. Lauterpacht, H., The Cambridge Law Journal, 1956, pp. 20/21.Google Scholar

^{page 159 note 1} Internationales Konfiskations- und Enteignungsrecht.

^{page 159 note 2} op. cit. pp. 35/36; cf. also p. 43.

^{page 159 note 3} “Yet, the obligation to pay compensation should be the only generally recognised sanction for the violation of the rule of international law that foreign property may not be confiscated.”

^{page 159 note 4} “… at any rate, according to prevailing judicial practice the fact that such confiscations are contrary to international law does not entail the nullity of the title of ownership created by them”.

^{page 159 note 5} Raape, , Internationales Privatrecht, 3rd edn. (1950), p. 429.Google Scholar

^{page 160 note 1} “… the foreign state is able to oppose its public policy to such expropriation. The alien rule of law on which the expropriation is based is not applied, thereby denying effect to the expropriation” (op. cit., 3rd edn., p. 429Google Scholar; 4th edn. (1955) p. 620).

^{page 160 note 2} “In international law the prohibited expropriation of the alien is not held to be void ipso jure” (Niederer, , “Der völkerrechtliche Schutz des Privateigentums” in Festschrift Lewald (1953), p. 52)Google Scholar. Cf. also Niederer, 's essay entitled “Einige Grenzfragen der ordre public in Fällen entschädigungsloser Konfiskation” in Annuaire Suisse de droit international XI, 1954, pp. 91–104.Google Scholar

^{page 160 note 3} Running like a thread throughout Seidl-Hohenveldern's book is the idea that, in the interests of commerce, confiscation ought really to be recognised by other states even where it concerns the property of aliens. In my submission, however, the boot is on the other foot. The threat to, and interference with, sound commercial relations comes from the state which has confiscated in violation of international law.

Must it be accepted, out of consideration for this outsider who refuses to play the game, and for those who buy from him in bad faith, that his unlawful act can make him the lawful owner? Cf. Schaumann, in Annuaire Suisse X, 1953, p. 186Google Scholar: “Es ist nicht Sache der Gerichte denjenigen zu helfen, die sich auf Kosten des Beraubten bereichern wollen” (“It is not the business of the court to help those who seek to enrich themselves at the expense of the injured party”).

^{page 161 note 1} “from the point of view of the court of a third state, being contrary to international law, is also contrary to public policy”.

^{page 161 note 2} Art. 25 of the Bonn Constitution. This article gives expression to “die völkerrechtsfreundlichste Lösung aller gegenwärtig geltenden Verfassungen” (“the most pro-international law solution of all present-day constitutions”)—Menzel, as quoted by von Mangoldt-Klein, , Das Bonner Grundgesetz I, 1957, p. 673.Google Scholar

^{page 162 note 1} Op. cit., p. 47 ff.

^{page 162 note 2} (1956) 1 Ch. 323, at pp. 353/354.

^{page 163 note 1} Cheshire, , Private International Law, 5th edn., p. 141.Google Scholar

^{page 163 note 2} Private International Law, p. 141.Google Scholar

^{page 163 note 3} B. A. Wortley, Observations on the public and private international law relating to expropriation, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1956, p. 592.Google Scholar

^{page 164 note 1} There is disagreement as to whether legislation is also covered by the term “act of state”. See Re, Edward D., Foreign Confiscations, p. 19 ffGoogle Scholar. For the purposes of our present argument we shall assume that it is. We cannot, however, enter into a discussion of the question of recognition of foreign judgments.

^{page 164 note 2} See, for instance, Court of Appeal, The Hague, 4th December, 1939, N.J. 1940 No. 27: “the Netherlands courts have to accept the measure of the Mexican Government as serving unreservedly to pass ownership (of the oil) de facto to the Mexican state”.

^{page 164 note 3} Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, I, p. 267.Google Scholar

^{page 164 note 4} Re, , op. cit., p. 21.Google Scholar

^{page 165 note 1} Among recent contributions on this subject, see Naumeyer, in the Makarov issue of Zeitschrift, 1958, pp. 573, 591 ff.Google Scholar, and De Nova, , Rev. Cr. de dr.i.pr. 1958, p. 535 ffGoogle Scholar. Perhaps less well-known outside the Netherlands is the essay by van Panhuys, H. F. in Recktsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 1953, p. 217 ff.Google Scholar, entitled “De beoordeling door de nationale rechter in rechtsgedingen tussen particulieren van handelingen van vreemde staten” (“The judgment by national courts of acts of foreign states in litigation between private parties”).

^{page 166 note 1} For criticism of the grossly exaggerated fear that judicial strictures on the acts of a foreign state might exacerbate relations between states, see Schaumann, Wilfried in Annuaire Suisse de droit international 1953, p. 171 ff.Google Scholar, “Ausländische Konfiskationen, Devisenkontrolle und Public Policy”.

^{page 166 note 2} François, J. P. A., Ned. Juristenblad 1951, p. 343.Google Scholar

^{page 166 note 3} Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1958, p. 542Google Scholar.—When Lauterpacht discusses the question of the act of state in Oppenheim's International Law (I, p. 267), he writes: “the Courts of one state do not, as a rule, question the validity or legality of the officiai acts of another sovereign state”. But he immediately adds: “at any rate in so far as these acts purport to take effect within the sphere of the latter state's own jurisdiction and are not in themselves contrary to International Law” (my italics, K.). Mann, F. A., in his well-known article on “International Delinquencies” in The Law Quarterly Review 1954, p. 198Google Scholar, writes: “if a State commits an international wrong and the court of another state, the forum, refuses recognition to that wrong, the latter does what international law expects it to do and what it must do in order not to become an accessory to the delinquency”.

^{page 168 note 1} Thus, for instance, in the much discussed American case of Ricaud v. American Metal Co. (246 U.S.A. 304, 1918)Google Scholar, which concerned property belonging (at the material time) to an American citizen which had been requisitioned for military purposes in Mexico by the Mexican Government (subsequently) recognised by the U.S.

^{page 168 note 2} L.Q.R. 1954, p. 199.—Cf. McNair, , Legal Effects of War, 1948, p. 322Google Scholar: “It is usual for our Courts to give effect to the acts of foreign Governments within the sphere of their competence … provided that these acts do not conflict with the rules of international law.” Citing these words Lauterpacht, H. wrote in the Cambridge Law Journal 1954, p. 20/21Google Scholar: “The words as here italicised seem to indicate that the general principle in Luther v. Sagor does not apply—and probably was not intended to apply—to such legislative acts of foreign states as are contrary to international law.”

^{page 169 note 1} Ibid. p. 201.

^{page 169 note 2} Circuit Courts of Appeals, 2nd circuit, 10th 07, 1947Google Scholar, Annual Digest 1947, No. 5Google Scholar; Clunet 1950, p. 228.Google Scholar

^{page 170 note 1} For a bibliography of such criticism, see Re, , Foreign Confiscations, p. 150 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 170 note 2} Judge Clark dissented from the majority opinion.

^{page 170 note 3} Letter of 27th April, 1949, Bulletin of the Department of State 1949, pp. 592–593Google Scholar, quoted by Mann, , Law Quarterly Review 1954, p. 201Google Scholar; Domke, , American-German Private International Law, 1956, p. 52Google Scholar; Re, , Foreign Confiscations, p. 152.Google Scholar

^{page 170 note 4} In Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun (Reporter, New York) 599, N.Y. 1876Google Scholar, Judge Gilbert held: “We think that, by the universal comity of nations and the established rules of international law the courts of one country are bound to abstain from sitting in judgment on the acts of another government done within its own territory.” This pronouncement was repeated by the Supreme Court, in slightly different words, in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)Google Scholar. It is usually quoted in the wording of the latter judgment.

^{page 171 note 1} Re, , Foreign Confiscations, p. 158.Google Scholar

^{page 171 note 2} N.J. 1943 No. 340; Annual Digest 1919–1942 No. 75. Seidl-Hohenveldern, , cites on p. 43Google Scholar of his book this judgment as the only judicial precedent in support of his contention that, with respect to the confiscation of the property of aliens, the “Völkerrechtswidrigkeit … keineswegs die Nichtigkeit der Konfiskation (bewirkt)” (“the fact that it is contrary to international law … by no means entails that the confiscation is a nullity”). This decision is also discussed by, for instance, Mann, in L.Q.R. 1954, p. 189Google Scholar; Neumayer, in Rabeis Zeitschrift 1958, pp. 577, 580.Google Scholar

^{page 171 note 3} 14th June, 1941, N.J. 1941 No. 338.

^{page 171 note 4} L.Q.R. 1954, p. 189.

^{page 172 note 1} Another generally worded formula is to be found in the judgment of the Court of Appeal at The Hague of 4th December, 1939, N.J. 1940 No. 27, but only after the Court had first established a nexus between its lack of jurisdiction to pass on the lawfulness and the “acts here at issue” which concerned “measures taken in Mexico by that state with respect to property located in that state and belonging to the Mexican Company”. The decision by the President of the District Court at Middelburg of 2nd August, 1938, N.J. 1938 No. 790, was concerned only with unlawfulness under the foreign municipal law (refusal to test the Mexican expropriation law against the Mexican Constitution).

^{page 172 note 2} President of the District Court at Rotterdam, 1st 09, 1938, N.J. 1939 No. 115Google Scholar; President of the District Court at Arnhem, 13th 06, 1939, N.J. 1940 No. 19Google Scholar; President of the District Court at Rotterdam, 31st 07, 1939, N.J. 1939 No. 747Google Scholar (In summary procedure, the expropriation decree could not be declared “prima facie null and void” and the successors-at-law of the expropriating government could not “without more ado” be said to be in bad faith; so that the lawfulness had “provisionally” to be accepted) (my italics, K.).

^{page 172 note 3} See the enumeration by Brades, in The Netherlands International Law Review 1957, p. 94.Google Scholar

^{page 172 note 4} N.J. 1956 No. 471.

^{page 172 note 5} Now published in N.J. 1959, No. 73.