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Grotius' Methodology and System of International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

B.P. Vermeulen
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Extract

Although Professor Van Eikema Hommes' article “Grotius on Natural and International Law” contains some acute observations, it is submitted that it provides an incorrect view of Grotius' methodology, which results in a one-sided description of his system of international law. The aim of this paper is to criticize this view through a more careful exposition of Grotius' methodology, and from this to derive a broad insight into the basics of his law of nations, in particular the law of war and natural law, which will be assessed in the light of modern conceptions.

Type
Notes and Shorter Articles
Information
Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , December 1983 , pp. 374 - 382
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1983

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References

1. 30 NILR (1983) Issue 1, pp. 61–71. The essence of Hommes, Van Eikema' argument can also be found in his Hoofdlijnen van de geschiedenis der rechtsfilosofie (second, unaltered edition, 1981)Google Scholar (subsequently referred to as Hoofdlijnen), and in his lecture of 18 February 1983 “Hugo de Groot's betekenis voor de rechtsfilosofie”, published in “Hugo de Groot 1583–1645”, Encyclopedie der rechtswetenschap (1983) p. 32 et seq.

2. First formulated in Plato's Eutyphro. On this similarity between Plato and Grotius see Cassirer, E., Die Philosophic der Aufklärung (1932) p. 321 et seqGoogle Scholar.

3. Cf., Crowe, M.B., “The ‘impious hypothesis‘: a paradox in Hugo Grotius”, 38 Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, No. 3 (09 1976) p. 379 et seq.Google Scholar, and the present writer's “God, wil en rede in Hugo de Groots natuurrecht”, 23 Wijsgerig Perspectief, No. 3, (1982/1983) p. 54 et seqGoogle Scholar.

4. Dufour, A., “L'influence de la méthodologie des sciences physiques et mathématiques sur les Fondateurs de L'Ecole de Droit naturel moderne (Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf)”, I Grotiana (1980) p. 43Google Scholar.

5. Grotius probably owes this method to Simon Stevin (1548–1621), the well-known mathematician, physicist and engineer, as shown by the present writer in his “Simon Stevin and the geometrical method in De jure praedae”, IV Grotiana, (1983)Google Scholar.

6. Fruin, R., “An unpublished work of Hugo Grotius”, in: Bibliotheca Visseriana, vol. V (1925) pp. 6, 7Google Scholar.

7. Edwards, C.S., Hugo Grotius, The Miracle of Holland. A Study in Political Thought, (1981) p. 105Google Scholar.

8. Which seems to be in contradiction with what he writes in Hoofdlijnen, p. 77, viz., that Grotius derives his natural law from the Corpus Juris.

9. Diesselhorst, M., “Hugo Grotius and the Freedom of the Seas”, III Grotiana (1982) p. 23Google Scholar: “In essentials he far and away prefers a posteriori proofs… He draws on ancient writers for preference, as evidence for his views – historians especially, but also lawyers”.

10. Roelofsen, C.G., “Some remarks on the “sources” of the Grotian system of international law”, 30 NILR (1983) Issue p. 74 et seqGoogle Scholar. The same is, of course, true of De jure praedae.

11. For an illuminating example see Nussbaum, A., A concise history of the law of nations (1958) p. 155Google Scholar, on Wollf's Jus Gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum.

12. Fruin, , loc.cit., p. 48 sqqGoogle Scholar.

13. In Hoofdlijnen, p. 80, Van Eikema Hommes incorrectly translates bellum solemne as “solemn war”.

14. Remec, P.P., The position of the individual in international law according to Grotius and Vattel (1960) p. 94 et seqGoogle Scholar.

15. Van Eikema Hommes states that Grotius regards this as lawful according to natural law. This appears to be incorrect: Grotius only speaks of permissibility in terms of jus gentium. According to natural law, however, this is unlawful, see Lib. III, cap. 11, and cap. 14, par. 3.

16. 30 NILR (1983) Issue I, p. 71; Hoofdlijnen, p. 80 et seq.

17. Rousseau, Du contrat Social, I, Chap. 2.

18. Remec refers to it as a “lesser evil theory”, op. cit, p. 99 et seq.

19. Unless one interprets it as also meaning intervention by other states on humanitarian grounds.

20. Riphagen is therefore not justified in criticizing Grotius for only treating international law from the idealistic point of view, Riphagen, W., Hugo de Groot 1583–1645, (1983) p. 8Google Scholar.

21. See for example Oppenheim, L., International Law, second edition, (1912)Google Scholar “Since the Law of Nations is based on the common consent of individual States, and not of individual beings, States solely and exclusively are the subjects of International Law. This means that the Law of Nations is a law for the international conduct of States, and not of their citizens. Subjects of the rights and duties arising from the Law of Nations are States solely and exclusively. An individual being… is never directly a subject of International Law” (para. 13, p. 19). “But what is the real position of individuals in International Law, if they are not the subjects thereof? The answer can only be that they are objects of the Law of Nations” (para. 290, pp. 365–366).

22. Communitas perfecta. Grotius even describes the state grown from the association of many families as a perfectissima societas (Lib. II, cap. 5, par. 23).

23. On the unimportance of the individual in the law of war, see Luban, D., “Just war and Human Rights”, in 9 Philosophy and public affairs, No. 2, (Winter 1980) p. 160 et seqGoogle Scholar.