1. On June 24, 1976, Air France flight 139 from Tel Aviv to Paris was hijacked by three men and a woman, who identified themselves as members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (a splinter group within the Palestine Liberation Organization), approximately eight minutes after a scheduled stop in Athens, where they had boarded the plane. See Smith, & Shuster, , “Drama in Hijacking of Jet to Uganda: A Long Week of Terror and Tensions”, N. Y. Times (07 11, 1976)Google Scholar § 1, at p. 1, col. 4 (hereinafter cited as Smith & Shuster). The jet was then flown to Benghazi, Libya for refueling. See id., at p. 16, col. 1; “The Rescue: ‘We do the Impossible’”. Time (July 12, 1976) at p. 21, p. 22 (hereinafter cited as “The Rescue”). After the release of a pregnant woman at Benghazi, the Airbus continued on to the Entebbe airport in Uganda, where it landed at 3:00 a.m. on June 28. Smith & Shuster, at p. 16, col. 2. Nine hours later, the passengers disembarked and were transferred to a seldom-used airport terminal. Id.; “The Rescue” at p. 22.

The hijackers demanded the release of 53 imprisoned “freedom fighters” (40 held in Israel, with the rest scattered among France, Switzerland, Kenya, and West Germany) by the afternoon of July 1 in exchange for the safe return of the 241 passengers and 12 crew members of the hijacked plane “The Rescue”, at p. 22. Otherwise, they threatened to kill all the hostages. Id. at p. 23. On June 30, the hijackers released 47 non-Israeli women and children. Smith & Shuster, at p. 16, col. 4. Shortly before the expiration of the July 1 deadline, Israel agreed to negotiate. “The Rescue”, at p. 23. The hijackers subsequently released another 101 captives, keeping only Israelis, those believed to be Jewish, and the Airbus crew. Id. The deadline was extended to July 4. Id.

At 11:30 p.m. on Saturday, July 3, the Israeli Defense Forces conducted a military raid which rescued the hostages. Smith & Shuster, at p. 16, cols. 5–8. During the ensuing battle, three captives, one Israeli soldier, at least twenty Ugandan soldiers, and all of the hijackers were killed. Id. One other hostage, Dora Bloch, who held dual British and Israeli nationalities, died in Uganda, though not in the raid. She had been hospitalized in Kampala prior to the time of the raid after she began to choke on a piece of meat that had lodged in her throat while she was eating. She was left behind and later killed on Idi Amin's orders. Kyemba, H., A State of Blood (1977) pp. 166–78Google Scholar. (hereinafter cited as Kyemba). See also Porat, Y. Ben, Haber, E. & Schiff, Z., Entebbe Rescue (1977)Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as Entebbe Rescue); Rabin, Y., The Rabin Memoirs (1979) pp. 282–89Google Scholar; Stevenson, W., 90 Minutes at Entebbe (1976) (hereinafter cited as Stevenson)Google Scholar.

2. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done September 14, 1963, 20 UST 2941, TIAS No. 6768.

3. See Lissitzyn, , “Hijacking, International Law and Human Rights”, in McWhinney, E., ed., Aerial Piracy and International Law (1971) p. 116 at pp. 117–18Google Scholar.

4. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), done December 16, 1970, 22 UST 1641, TIAS No. 7192.

5. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), done September 23, 1971, 24 UST 565, TIAS No. 7570. See Ambramovsky, , “Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft Part II: The Montreal Convention”, 14 Col, J.Transn, L. (1975) p. 268 at pp. 286–87Google Scholar.

6. See Ambramovsky, , “Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft Part III: The Legality and Political Feasibility of a Multilateral Air Security Enforcement Convention”, 14 Col, J.Transn, L. (1975) p. 451 at pp. 466–70Google Scholar.

7. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature, April 29, 1958, Art. 15, 13 UST 2312, 2317, TIAS No. 5200.

8. See e.g., the comment made by Israeli Ambassador Herzog in the Security Council Entebbe debates: “The act of hijacking can well be regarded as one of piracy”. 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 53–55Google Scholar, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976).

9. Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Art. 34, 6 UST 3516, 3540, TIAS No. 3365.

10. Id., Art. 147, 6 UST 3516, 3618, TIAS No. 3365.

11. Id., Art. 146, 6 UST 3516, 3616, TIAS No. 3365.

12. First Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Art. 3, 6 UST 3114, 3118, TIAS No. 3362; Second Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Art. 3, 6 UST 3217, 3222, TIAS No. 3363; Third Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Art. 3, 6 UST 3316, 3320, TIAS No. 3364; Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Art. 3, 6 UST 3516, 3520, TIAS No. 3365.

13. UN Charter Art. 2, para. 3, provides: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”.

14. UN Charter Art. 33, para. 1, provides: “The parties to any dispute, the contunance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”

15. UN Charter Art. 2, para. 4, provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

16. UN Charter Art. 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

17. As definitively stated by Secretary of State Webster in the case of The Caroline, self-defence is justified when the “necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”. See The Caroline, 2 Moore, J., Digest of International Law (1906) p. 409 at p. 412Google Scholar; Bishop, W., International Law (3d ed. 1962) pp. 916–17Google Scholar.

18. See e.g., Bowett, D., Self-Defence in International Law (1958) p. 13Google Scholar.

19. See Letter of July 9, 1976, from McDougal, Myres S. and Reisman, Michael to the Editor, N. Y. Times (07 16, 1976) at p. A20Google Scholar, col. 3 (hereinafter cited as McDougal & Reisman Letter). Yet fifteen years earlier, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was branded “amorphous” in McDougal, M. & Feliciano, F., Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961) p. 536Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as M. McDougal & F. Feliciano).

20. Judgment in the Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Rep. (1949) p. 4.

21. Id. at pp. 34–35.

22. Id. at p. 108.

23. Id. at p. 47.

24. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965). Art. 1 states unequivocally: “No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements, are condemned.”

25. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).

26. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974).

27. This section is based in substantial part upon an interview with MrYaakobi, Gad, Israeli Minister of Transportation during the Entebbe crisis, in Boston on 10 19, 1977Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as Yaakobi Interview). I would like to thank Mr. Yaakobi for his time and co-operation.

28. Id.

29. Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at p. 30Google Scholar.

30. Id. at viii–ix, at p. 38.

31. Yaakobi Interview, supra n. 27.

32. Id.

33. See Bilder, , “The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs”, 56 AJIL (1962) p. 633Google Scholar.

34. See e.g., Berger, , “The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty”, 75 Nw. ULRev. (1980) p. 577Google Scholar.

35. Zadok had been Minister of Justice since 1974, and before that, Minister of Commerce and Industry from 1965 to 1966. A graduate from Jerusalem Law School, he joined the Hagana and Jewish Settlement Police, and fought with the Israeli Defense Forces in the War of Independence. He was Deputy Attorney General from 1949 to 1952, Lecturer in Law at Tel-Aviv Law School from 1953 to 1961, and among other positions had been Chairman of the key Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and member of the Knesset Constitutional, Legal and Judicial Committee. See generally Ben, I. (Benditer) and Grünberg, M., eds., Who's Who in Israel, (18th ed. 1978) p. 401Google Scholar.

36. See Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at pp. 39–40Google Scholar.

37. “Preface” to id., at viii.

38. Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. l, at p. 175Google Scholar.

39. Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at pp. 28–29Google Scholar.

40. Yaakobi Interview, supra n. 27. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim originally called the Entebbe raid “a serious violation of the sovereignty of a State Member of the United Nattions”. 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 7–8Google Scholar, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976); UN Press Release SG/SM/2343 (July 8, 1976) at 2, para. 9.

41. Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at p. 11Google Scholar; Yaakobi Interview, supra n. 27. Despite Israeli allegations to the contrary before the Security Council, Amin did not have prior knowledge of the hijacking plan. Yaakobi Interview, supra n. 27.

42. 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 59–60, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976); Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at pp. 99–100Google Scholar.

43. Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at p. 89Google Scholar.

44. Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at pp. 66–69Google Scholar.

45. Yaakobi Interview, supra n. 27.

46. Laqueur, W., Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (1974) pp. 162–63Google Scholar; Allon, , “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders”, 55 Foreign Aff. (1976) p. 38 at pp. 52–53Google Scholar.

47. 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 16, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976); “Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution after Considering Uganda Hijacking Issue”, UN Chronicle (August-September 1976) at pp. 15, 16Google Scholar.

48. Yaakobi Interview, supra n. 27.

49. Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at p. 31Google Scholar.

50. UN Charter Art. 35, para. 1, states: “Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation [which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute] to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.”

51. Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at p. 29Google Scholar.

52. See nn. 89–94 and accompanying text infra.

53. Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at p. 265Google Scholar.

54. Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at p. 56Google Scholar.

55. UN Charter Art. 25 provides: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

56. Compare American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 3.02 (1962). Justification Generally: Choice of Evils.

(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this Section in unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. See also Machiavelli, N., The Prince (Musa, M. trans. & ed. 1964) p. 191 (prince must choose the least bad as good)Google Scholar.

57. Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at pp. 253–1954Google Scholar.

58. Yaakobi Interview, supra n. 27. Compare Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C., Information Background: Legal Aspects of Israel's Rescue Action in Uganda (n.d.) with Department of State Briefing Memorandum from Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh to the Secretary of State, Legal Aspects of Entebbe Hijacking Incident, July 8, 1976 (released in 1978 pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request), excerpts reprinted in 73 AJIL (1979) pp. 122–24.

59. Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at pp. 290–92Google Scholar; N. Y. Times, July 4, 1976, § 1 at p. 1, cols. 7–8.

60. Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at p. 269Google Scholar.

61. Yaakobi, Interview, supra n. 27Google Scholar.

62. Contra, , Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at p. 121Google Scholar.

63. See Rescue, Entebbe, supra n. 1, at p. 324Google Scholar.

64. 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 16, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976); Kyemba, , supra n. 1, at p. 169Google Scholar.

65. N. Y. Times, July 6, 1976, at p. 4, col. 1.

66. See Mogadishu Notebook, West Africa, 06 24, 1974, at pp. 750, 751Google Scholar.

67. AHG/Res. 83/XIII (1976).

68. Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Art. 8.

69. UN Charter Art. 24, para. 1.

70. See 31 UN SCOR, Supp. (July–September 1976) 6, UN Doc. S/12126 (1976).

71. Their exclusion from the proceedings was purposeful. See nn. 89–94 and accompanying text infra.

72. 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 4–5, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976).

73. See e.g., 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 88, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976) (French delegate).

74. See e.g., 31 UN SCOR (1940th mtg.) 6, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1940 (prov. ed. 1976) (Libyan delegate).

75. See “Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution after Considering Uganda Hijacking Issue”, UN Chronicle (August–Septemper 08–09 1976) at p. 15.

76. 31 UN SCOR, Supp. (July–September 1976) 15, UN Doc. S/12139.

77. Id., UN Doc. S/12138.

78. See 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR 1940th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1940 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1941st mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1942d mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1942 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1943d mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1943 (prov. ed. 1976).

79. “Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution After Considering Uganda Hijacking Issue”, UN Chronicle (August–September 1976) at p. 15.

80. See 31 UN SCOR (1943d mtg.) 81, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1943 (prov. ed. 1976).

81. See e.g., 31 UN SCOR (1943d mtg.) 78–80, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1943 (prov. ed. 1976) (Guyana delegate).

82. See e.g., 31 UN SCOR (1942d mtg.) 13, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1942 (prov. ed. 1976) (Panamanian delegate).

83. See 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 32, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976).

84. See 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 106, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976).

85. See e.g., UN Doc. S/12136 (1976) (telegram from Siad Barre to Amin circulated as a Security Council document).

86. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, 123–24, UN Doc. A/8028 (1971) states in relevant part: The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their action against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

87. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, 144, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974). Art. 7 provides: “Nothing in this Definition … could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist régimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned declaration.” See Stone, , “Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Defintiion of Aggression”, 71 AJIL (1977) p. 224 at pp. 231–239Google Scholar.

88. See Palestinian National Charter Arts. 2, 8, 15, 22, reprinted in 3 The Arab-Israeli Conflict(J. Moore, ed. 1974) p. 706. Compare Deuteronomy 20:16–18.

89. The Security Council met eight times between June 9–29, 1976, to consider the Palestinian issue. See 31 UN SCOR (1924th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1924 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1928th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1928 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1933d mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1933 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1934th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1934 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1935th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1935 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1936th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1936 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1937th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1937 (prov. ed. 1976); 31 UN SCOR (1938th mtg.) 1, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1938 (prov. ed. 1976).

90. 31 UN SCOR (1938th mtg.) 62, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1938 (prov. ed. 1976). The text of the draft resolution can be found in 31 UN SCOR, Supp. Capr.-June 1976) 73, UN Doc. S/12119 (1976).

91. See e.g., 31 UN SCOR (1938th mtg.) 63, UN Doc. S–p.v. 1938 (prov. ed. 1976).

92. 31 UN SCOR (1924th mtg.) 6–7, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1924 (prov. ed. 1976).

93. Rule 37, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/96/Rev. 6 (1974) provides: “Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35(1) of the Charter.”

94. See “Proposal for Israeli Withdrawal from Occupied Territories by June 1977 Fails”, UN Chronicle (July 1976) at p. 22.

95. For Uganda's argument see 31 UN SCOR (1939th mtg.) 11–25, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1939 (prov. ed. 1976). For Israel's argument that Uganda had co-operated with the terrorists, see id. at pp.32–50.

96. Id. at pp. 13–15, 16.

97. On Friday, July 2, Dora Bloch, a hostage who held dual British-Israeli nationality, was taken from Entebbe to Mulago Hospital when she began to choke on a piece of meat she had been eating. In the evening of Sunday, July 4, after the Entebbe raid had been completed, four men from Amin's State Research Bureau (the secret police) dragged her out of the hospital in plain view to all who were present and subsequently killed her. See Kyemba, , supra n. 1, at pp. 170–78Google Scholar.

98. Compare with a New York Times editorial of July 6, 1976, at p. 24, col. 1, which blithely asserted that in such situations “the ordinary rules of international law simply cannot apply”. In a press conference of July 9, 1976 President Ford drew a parallel between the Entebbe raid and the American intervention into Cambodia to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez, See 75 Dep't State Bull. (August 2, 1976) at p. 161. Perhaps somewhat inadvisably he implied that both actions stood or fell on the same legal grounds. See Paust, , “The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez”, 85 Yale LJ (1976) p. 774Google Scholar.

99. See e.g., 31 UN SCOR (1941st mtg.) 41–53, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (prov. ed. 1976).

100. Support for this absolute interpretation of Art. 2(4) can be found in its travaux preparatoires. See Stone, J.. Aggression and World Order (1958) pp. 92–103Google Scholar.

101. 31 UN SCOR (1941st mtg.) 23–25, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (prov. ed. 1976).

102. G.A. Res. 31/103, 31 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 186, UN Doc. A/31/39 (1976); “35- Member Group Established to Draft Convention Against Taking Hostages”, UN Chronicle (January 1977) at p. 81.

103. See “Convention Against Hostage-Taking Approved; Call for Appropriate Penalties”, UN Chronicle (January 1980) at p. 85.

104. N. Y. Times, July 15, 1976, at p. 1, col. 1.

105. 31 UN SCOR (1943d mtg.) 87, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1943 (prov. ed. 1976).

106. 31 UN SCOR (1943d mtg.) 76, UN Doc. S/p.v. 1943 (prov. ed. 1976).

107. See e.g., “Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Recommending Expulsion of; South Africa”, UN Chronicle (November 1974) at p. 9 (triple veto by US, UK and France of proposed Security Council resolution to recommend the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations).

108. See generally Kyemba, , supra n. 1, at pp. 238–48Google Scholar; Deming, , Sullivan, & MacPherson, , “Idi Amin's Rule of Blood”, Newsweek (03 7, 1977) at p. 28Google Scholar; Kaufman, , “Amin Cuts a Broad but Erratic Swath and People Love Him or Hate Him”, N. Y. Times (07 10, 1976) at p. 3, col. 1Google Scholar.

109. Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at p. 199Google Scholar.

110. See e.g., Kyemba, , supra n. 1, at p. 256 (1976 threat to invade Kenya)Google Scholar; N.Y. Times (July 9, 1971) at p. 3, col. 4; id., (December 26, 1971) at p. 19, col. 1 (threat to attack Tanzania and subsequent border skirmishes); id. (January 31, 1971) at p. 2, col. 3; id. (February 1, 1971) at p. 6, col. 1 (threat to counterattack Sudanese forces alleging that Sudan was the original aggressor).

111. See nn. 42–44 and accompanying text supra.

112. “An Idi-otic Invasion”, Time(November 13, 1978) at p.51; N.Y. Times(April 12, 1979) at p. Al.col. 1.

113. See Introduction to Stevenson, , supra n. 1, at iiiGoogle Scholar.

114. See e.g., Middleton, , “1979 Terrorist Toll Put at a Record 587”, TV. Y. Times (05 11, 1980) at p. 14, col. 1Google Scholar; Wieseltier, , “The Sabbath Ambush”, The New Republic (05 24, 1980) at p. 18Google Scholar. See also “Through the Barrel of a Gun”, The Middle East (July 1980) at pp. 8, 10–11.

115. In a letter addressed to the president of the Security Council, Amin declared that “Uganda reserves her right to retaliate in whatever way she can to redress the aggression against her”. 31 UN SCOR Supp. (July–September 1976) 4, 5, UN Doc. S/12124 (1976).

116. Kyemba, , supra n. 1, at p. 250Google Scholar; Kaufman, Amin Cuts a Broad but Erratic Swath, and People Love Him or Hate-Him”, N.Y. Times (July 10, 1976) at p. 3, col. 1, at p. 3, col. 5.

117. Bowett, D., Self-Defence in International Law (1958) p. 13Google Scholar; “Resort to War and Armed Force: Reprisals”, 73 AJIL (1979) pp. 489–92Google Scholar.

118. Nations known to maintain anti-terrorist commando units include the US, Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy. Willenson, & Nater, , “Getting Tough”, Newsweek (10 1977) at p. 51Google Scholar.

119. N. Y. Times(October 18, 1977) at p. Al, col. 6, at p. 12, col. 1.

120. Two German Soldiers were wounded but no hostages were harmed in the raid. Id., at p. Al.col. 6.

121. Willenson, , Jenkins, , Schmidt, , & Clifton, , “Debacle in Cyprus”, Newsweek (03 6, 1978), at p. 33Google Scholar.

122. Fifteen Egyptian soldiers died, though the hostages were released unharmed. The hostage-takers had agreed to surrender prior to the action. Id.

123. Seen. 101 supra.

124. See UN Doc. A/31/242 (1976).

125. Id. at annex p. 1.

126. See UN Doc. A/C.6/31/L.10 (1976), reprinted in UN Doc. A/31/430 (1976) at 2.

127. See UN Doc. A/C.6/32/L.11 (1976); UN Doc. A/C.6/31/L. 1O Rev. 1 (1976); UN Doc. A/31/430 (1976), at 3. See also N.Y. Times(December 16, 1976) at p. 3, col. 3; Grose, “UN Assembly's Achievement: A Quiet Session”, id. (December 24, 1976) at p. A6, col. 1.

128. G.A. Res. 31/103, 31 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 186, UN Doc. A/31/39 (1976), UN Doc. A/RES/31/103 (1976).

129. Pursuant to para. 2 of resolution 31/103, the president of the UN General Assembly appointed thirty-four states as members of the Hostages Committee. Of the fifteen members of the Security Council at the time of the Entebbe debates, all six of those which had voted in favor of the US–UK draft resolution (France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, US, UK) and three which had not participated in the vote on the US–UK draft resolution (Libya, USSR, Tanzania) were appointed to the Hostages Committee. In addition, five non-members of the Security Council which had participated in the Entebbe debates were also appointed to the Hostages Committee (Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Kenya, Somalia, Yugoslavia). There was thus a carryover of fourteen states from the Security Council Entebbe debates to membership on the Hostage Committee.

130. The official name of this resolution is: Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes. G.A. Res. 31/102, UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 185, UN Doc. A/31/39 (1976), UN Doc. A/RES/31/102 (1976).

131. GA Res. 3034, 27 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 119, UN Doc. A/8730 (1972).

132. See 28 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc. A–9028 (1973).

133. Id. at 6, paras. 14–17, at 7, paras. 22–24, at 8, para. 24, at 11–12, paras. 35–38, at 13–14, paras. 41–44, at 15, paras. 48–49, at 17, para. 54, at 18, para. 62.

134. See e.g., Draft proposal submitted by the Non-Aligned Group in the Ad Hoc Committee (Algeria, Congo, Democratic Yemen, Guinea, India, Mauritania, Nigeria, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia), id. at 21, para. 3, UN Doc. A/9028 (1973).

135. During the Sixth Committee debates over the establishment of the Hostages Committee, the Soviet delegate suggested that it might be preferable to refer the matter of drafting a hostages convention to the Terrorism Committee. See Nanda, , “Progress Report on the United Nations' Attempt to Draft an “International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages”, 6 Ohio NUL Rev. (1979) p. 89 at p. 97Google Scholar. Moreover, a desire by the several Third World countries to have the Hostages Committee first study the causes of international terrorism also bore no fruit. Id.

136. See 28 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), at 9, para. 29, at 14, para. 44, at 17, para. 56, UN Doc. A/9028 (1973). The United States submitted a comprehensive draft convention against international terrorism, but it has not been adopted. Id. at 28–33, UN Doc. A/9028 (1973). See Franck, & Lockwood, , “Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism”, 68 AJIL (1974) p. 69Google Scholar.

137. See e.g., 28 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 9, para. 29, at 14, para. 44, at 17, para. 56, UN Doc. A/9028 (1973); Draft proposal submitted by Uruguay, id. at 33–34, para. 1, UN Doc. A/9028 (1973).

138. N. Y. Times (August 2, 1976) at p. 4, col. 1; id. (August 8, 1976) § 1, at p. 4, col. 1; id. (February 23, 1977) at p. A2, col. 3. But see Kyemba, , supra n. 1, at pp. 126–27Google Scholar.

139. N. Y. Times(February 25, 1977) at p. A8, col. 3; id. (February 27, 1977) § 4, at p. 4, col. 5.

140. “Hostages Committee Recommends That Work Be Continued during 1978”, UN Chronicle (August–September 1977) at p. 45.

141. UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.3 (1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 106–10, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977). For a critique of the German Draft Convention, see Kaye, , “The United Nations Effort to Draft a Convention on the Taking of Hostages”, 27 Am. UL Rev. (1978) p. 433Google Scholar.

142. See e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (8th mtg.) 3, para. 6, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.8 (prov. ed. 1977) (hereinafter cited as First Hostages Report), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 30, at 31, para. 6, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977); First Hostages Report (14th mtg.) 3 para. 9, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.14 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 74, at 75, para. 9, UN Doc.

143. First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (7th mtg.) 3, para. 5, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.7 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 26, at 27, para. 5, UN Doc. A/32/ 39(1977).

144. First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (8th mtg.) 5, para. 15, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.8 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 32, at 32–33, para. 15, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

145. See e.g., First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (7th mtg.) 45, para. 12, UN Doc. A/AC. 188/SR.7 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 26, at 28, para. 12, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977); First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (9th mtg.) 3, para. 11, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.9 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 38, at 39, para. 11, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977); First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (11th mtg.) JO, para. 43, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.11 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 51, at 58, para. 43, UN Doc A/32/39(1977); First Hostages Report, supran. 142 (15th mtg.) 3, para. 6, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR. 15 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 83, at 84, para. 6, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977); First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (8th mtg.) 2, para. 2, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.8 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 30, at 30, para. 2, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

146. First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (1st mtg.) 2, para. 3, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.1 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 10, at 10, para. 3, UN Doc. A/32/ 39 (1977); First Hostages Report, supra n. 142 (5th mtg.) 3, para. 5, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR. 5 (1977), reprinted with additions in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 19, at 20, para. 5, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977); First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (5th mtg.) 5, para. 12, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.5 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 19, at 22, para. 12, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977); First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (8th mtg.) 5–6, para. 19, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.8 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 30, at 33, para. 19, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

147. First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (12th mtg.) 4, para. 11, UN Doc. A/AC.188/ SR.12 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 60, at 62, para. 11, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977). See also First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (5th mtg.) 3, para. 5, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.3 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted with additions in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 19, at 20, para. 5, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

148. In June of 1977, that Conference had adopted two protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Art. 1(4) of the First Protocol applied the entirety of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to wars of national liberation. This would include the prohibitions against the taking of hostages contained in Art. 3 common to all four conventions and in Art. 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Art. 75(2)(c) of the First Protocol specifically affirmed the prohibition against the taking of hostages during national liberation struggles. And Art. 4(2)(c) of the Second Additional Protocol reiterated this prohibition for armed conflicts not of an international character. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), reprinted in 16 ILM (1977) p. 1391 (hereinafter cited as Protocol I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed conflicts (Protocol II), reprinted in 16 ILM (1977) p. 1442 (hereinafter cited as Protocol II).

149. First Hostages Report, supra n. 141, (10th mtg.) 3, para. 8, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.10 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 46, at 47, para. 8, UN Doc. A/32/ 39(1977).

150. Id.

151. Id.

152. See nn. 9–12 and accompanying text supra.

153. First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (12th mtg.) 7, para. 21, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR. 12 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 60, at 64, para. 21, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

154. First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (16th mtg.) 4, para. 16, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR. 16 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 88, at 90, para. 16, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

155. UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.7 (1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 111, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977); UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.11 (1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 112, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

156. The Mogadishu hostages crisis had also exerted a profound influence upon progress in the negotiation of a hostages convention throughout the Fall of 1977.

157. 33 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 5, para. 17, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978).

158. First Hostages Report, supra n. 142, (8th mtg.) 9, para. 31, UN Doc. A/AC.188/SR.8 (prov. ed. 1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 30, at 36–37, para. 31, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

159. UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.6 (1977), reprinted in 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 111, UN Doc. A/32/39 (1977).

160. 33 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 5–6, para. 19, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978).

161. UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.20 (1978), reprinted in 33 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 6, para. 20, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978). See also 33 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 63, para. 2, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978) (French proposal).

162. Id. at 58, para. 5, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978).

163. Id. at 58, para. 6, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978).

164. Id. at 57, para. 2, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978). See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature January 27, 1977, Art. 13, reprinted in 15 ILM (1976) p. 1272 at p. 1275.

165. 33 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 66, 74, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978).

166. N. Y. Times (February 19, 1978), at p. 1, col. 6; id. (February 20, 1978) at p. Al, col.

167. See e.g., 33 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) at 82, paras. 78, 79, UN Doc. A/33/39 (1978).

168. 34 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 2, para. 3, UN Doc. A/34/39 (1979).

169. Id. at 28, Art. 12, para. 1, UN Doc. A/34/39 (1979) (emphasis added): “In so far as the Geneva Convention of 1949 for the protection of war victims or the Additional Protocols to those Conventions are applicable to a particular act of hostage-taking, and in so far as States Parties to this Convention are bound under those Conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker, the present Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” In the final version of Art. 12 adopted by the General Assembly the word emphasized above is spelled with a lower case “c” so that the phrase now refers to both the Geneva Conventions and the Geneva Protocols. See Letter from Anthony C.E. Quainton, Director of the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism, to Israel Singer (December 11, 1979), reprinted in 74 AJIL (1980) p. 420 at p. 421.

170. See id.; American Branch, International Law Association, “Report of the Committee on Armed Conflict”, Proceedings and Committee Reports p. 38 at p. 44”.

171. 34 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 7–8, para. 22, UN Doc. A/34/39 (1978).

172. Id. at 15–16, paras. 59–61, UN Doc. A/34/39 (1978).

173. Id., UN Doc. A/34/39 (1978).

174. N.Y. Times (November 5, 1979) at p. Al, col. 6. See Boyle, , “Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba and SALT II: The lessons of international law”, 1982 Yale J. World Pub Order (forthcoming)Google Scholar.

175. UN Doc. A/34/819 (1979) at 4, para. 16.

176. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in an annex to Resolution 34/146 of December 17, 1979. A text of the Convention, reprinted from Report of the Sixth Committee, UN Doc. A/34/819 (1979), at 5, which contains the draft resolution, id. at 4, can be found in 74 AJIL (1980) pp. 277–83.

177. See Boyle, , “The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics”, 10 Cal. W ILJ (1980) p. 193Google Scholar; Boyle, , “The law of power politics”, 1980 Univ. III.L. Forum 901Google Scholar.