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The SS Division ‘Galicia’: Its Genesis, Training, Deployment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Basyl Dmytryshyn
Basyl Dmytryshyn*
Affiliation:
Portland State University
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Extract

It is an indisputable historical fact that between 1933 and 1945 groups and individuals in many countries of Europe, as well as in other parts of the world, sympathized (for different reasons and motives) with Nazi public pronouncements, especially those critical of the post-World War I settlement. It is also an indisputable historical fact that other groups and individuals in many European countries resisted (for different reasons and motives) Nazi domination, policies and practices. Unfortunately, current historical literature does not reflect clearly this dichotomy. Some nations, because of the activities of a few, are portrayed as Nazi collaborators, regardless of the human losses they suffered under Nazi rule; and, conversely, others are presented as anti-Nazi resisters, regardless of their actual contributions.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 21 , Issue 2: Special Issue - The Ex-Soviet Nationalities Without Gorbachev , Fall 1993 , pp. 53 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Association for the Study of the Nationalities of the USSR and Eastern Europe, Inc. 

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References

Notes

1. There is a substantial literature on Nazi intentions in Eastern Europe in general and in Ukraine in particular. For representative samples of pronouncements by high-ranking Nazi leaders, see Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (München, 1940), pp. 750–755. See also Hitler's statement of September 12, 1936 at the Nürnberg Party gathering, as fully reproduced by Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922 - August 1939 (London, 1942), I, p. 929, and Alfred Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussepolitik (München, 1927), pp. 97–98. For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of Nazi policy towards Ukraine, see Roman Ilnytsky, Deutschland und Ukraine, 1934-1945: Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik (München, 1955) 2 vols.; Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism (Milwaukee, 1956); and Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945 (New York, 1957), pp. 107–167.Google Scholar

2. The most comprehensive study of German military intelligence in English is Paul Leverkuehn, German Military Intelligence (New York, 1954).Google Scholar

3. For a brief comment about this matter, see Kost Pankivskii, Roky nimetskoi okuipatsii, 1941-1944 (New York-Toronto, 1965), pp. 215–217.Google Scholar

4. Literature on Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia is voluminous. For a sound introduction, see J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (New York, 1948), and Namier, L. B., Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939 (New York, 1948).Google Scholar

5. For additional information on contacts between the Abwehr and the OUN from 1939 to 1940, see John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Littleton, 1980), pp. 26–72; Leverkuehn, op. cit., pp. 158–166; and Dallin, op. cit., pp. 114–116.Google Scholar

6. In 1940 the OUN split into two hostile groups: radical, headed by Stefan Bandera, and moderate, led by Colonel Andrii Melnyk. Because Western powers (France, England and the United States) were not interested in “the Ukrainian problem,” both factions of the OUN sought German support and both fought each other with suicidal energy. There is a wealth of polemical partisan literature in Ukrainian on the OUN and the split. For a non-partisan Ukrainian view, see Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 133–151. For a thoughtful, scholarly discussion in English, see Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 46–72.Google Scholar

7. Information contained in this paragraph is based on my personal recollections of events in Barvinok, my home town, where some of the units of the Nachtigall were trained.Google Scholar

8. See Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 147–14?.Google Scholar

9. For additional information on the Nachtigall and Roland units, see Druzhyny ukrainskykh natsionalistiv u 1941-1942 rokakh (Munich, 1953), pp. 11–126; Lev Shankivskii, Pokhidni hrupy OUN (Munich, 1958); Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 73–100; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 119–122; and Pavlo Shandruk, Arms of Valor (New York, 1959), pp. 181–184.Google Scholar

10. Pankivskii, , op. cit., p. 227.Google Scholar

11. Shandruk, , op. cit., p. 185.Google Scholar

12. Literature on World War II is overwhelming in practically all major languages. This applies to documents, memoirs and special studies. The latest comprehensive summary in English is by Robert Leckie, Delivered From Evil: The Saga of World War II (New York, 1987), 998 pp.Google Scholar

13. Pankivskii, , op. cit., pp. 221–223. For additional information on diverse formations of the SS, see George H. Stein, The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945 (Ithaca, 1966); Klietmann, K. G., Die Waffen SS: Eine Dokumentation (Osnabrück, 1965); Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head (New York, 1971); Roger J. Bender and Hugh P. Taylor, Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS, 1st ed., 2nd printing (San Jose, 1982); and Dallin, op. cit., pp. 587–612.Google Scholar

14. Information concerning Wächter's attempt to organize the SS Division ‘Galicia’ is based on documents contained in Himmler's Papers, Orange Folders, Drawer #7, Folder 263, held in the Hoover War Memorial Library, Stanford, California. I used these documents in preparing my article “The Nazis and the SS Division ‘Galicia,’” The American Slavic and East European Review, XV, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp,. 1-10. Since then, several new works have appeared confirming Wächter's involvement. See Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 223–228; Volodymyr Kubijovych, Meni 70 (Paris-Munich, 1970), p. 59; Wolf-Dietrich Heike, Ukrainska Diviziia “Halychyna”: Istoriia formuvaniia i boiovykh dii u 1943-1945 rokakh (Toronto-Paris, 1970), pp. 15–17 and 215-224.Google Scholar

15. Kubijovych, , op. cit., p. 58.Google Scholar

16. Himmler to Wächter, March 28, 1943, as cited in Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 4.Google Scholar

17. Wächter's formulation in German read “…das war der ukrainischer Tradition dieses Landes zugehört, aber kein Symbol der grossukrainischen Bestrebungen ist.” See ibid., p. 5.Google Scholar

18. These figures are based on information contained in an eight-page summary of the April 12, 1943, meeting of top Nazi officials presided by Wächter. For summary of this document, see ibid., pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

19. Kubijovych, , op. cit., p. 58.Google Scholar

20. Ibid., pp. 60–61, and Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 223–224.Google Scholar

21. For details, see ibid., pp. 225–227, and Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 5Google Scholar

22. Loc. cit.Google Scholar

23. For a summary of Ukrainian counter-proposals, see Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 225–227.Google Scholar

24. According to Pankivskii, ibid., pp. 229–230, originally the Military Board consisted of the following members: Alfred Bisanz, Osyp Navrotskii, Evhen Pyndus, Stefan Volynets, Father Vasyl Laba, Mykhailo Khronoviat, Volodymyr Bilozor, Ivan Rudnytskii, Mykhailo Kushnir, Zenon Zelenii, Liubomyr Makarushka, Andrii Palii and Iurii Krokhmaliuk. Subsequently these were joined by: Severin Bayger, Rudolf Müller, V. Malets, Bohdam Hnatevych, Varfolomii Evtimovych, D. Mandzenkio, Mykhailo Ostroverkha, Petro Pikulskii; Iurii Piasetskii and Anna Hachkovych.Google Scholar

25. For complete texts of these proclamations, see Heike, op. cit., pp. 225–228. See also Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 228–229.Google Scholar

26. For a brief discussion of the motives for volunteering, see ibid., pp. 232–235. It should be noted that neither Bandera nor Melnyk endorsed the idea of the Division ‘Galicia.’ Their opposition was doubtless based on their past experiences with Nazi promises, as well as on their belief that the Allies and not the Axis would win the war. Pankivskii, states that both Bandera and Melnyk opposed the Division because Nazi officials failed to consult them, ibid., pp. 224–225. That statement is in error. Both men were approached, and both refused to cooperate.Google Scholar

27. For details, see Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 6; Pankivskii, op. cit., p. 241; Heike, op. cit., pp. 24–25; Klietmann, op. cit., Pp. 194 and 915; Bender and Taylor, op. cit., pp. 22–24; Stein, op. cit., pp. 185–186; and Höhne, op. cit., p. 570. During its training the official name of the Division was SS Freiwilligen Division ‘Galizien.’Google Scholar

28. Himmler to all Company Commanders, July 14, 1943, as cited in Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 7.Google Scholar

29. Wächter to Himmler, July 30, 1943, as cited in ibid., pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

30. Bender and Taylor, op. cit., p. 24; Heike, op. cit., p. 47; and Ivan Tyktor, ed., Istoriia ukrainskoho viiska, 2nd ed. (Winnipeg, 1953), p. 607.Google Scholar

31. Heike was a Major of the Wehrmacht and served as Chief of Staff of the Division ‘Galicia.’ In his recollections he offers a valuable and balanced account on the Division's problems and personnel (both German and Ukrainian). For some assessments concerning these matters, see Heike, op. cit., pp. 15–54.Google Scholar

32. Loc. cit. See also Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 244–247.Google Scholar

33. For an assessment of Freitag and his immediate associates, see Heike, op. cit., pp. 19–22, 37, and 43-44.Google Scholar

34. Ibid., pp. 24–25,31,55-61, and 229. According to Heike, on December 31, 1943, the SS Division ‘Galicia’ had 256 officers, 449 noncommissioned officers, and 11,929 enlisted men. See also Tyktor, op. cit., pp. 609–616; and Iu. Tys-Krokhmaliuk, “Orhanizatsiia 1 UD UNA,” in Visti Kombatanta, No. 3 (New York, 1963), pp. 15–19.Google Scholar

35. Heike, , op. cit., Pp. 17 and 55-61; Klietmann, op. cit., p. 183; and Pankivskii, op. cit., pp. 248–250.Google Scholar

36. For a German account of the Battle of Brody, see Heike, op. cit., pp. 62–89. For Ukrainian accounts, see Oleh Lysiak, ed., Brody: Zbirnyk statei i narysiv (Munich, 1951), pp. 7–164; and Tyktor, op. cit., pp. 629–634. For Soviet assessments, see Istoriia velikoi otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow, 1962), Vol. 4, pp. 210–218; and M. A. Polushkin, Na sandomirskom napravlenii (Moscow, 1969), pp.Google Scholar

37. For details concerning the reorganization and training of the Division ‘Galicia’ after the Battle of Brody, see Heike, op. cit., pp. 105–118.Google Scholar

38. For an account of the Division's activity in Slovakia, see ibid., pp. 119–144, and Tyktor, op. cit., pp. 619–620. Other German military units involved in the suppression of the Slovak uprising were: the 18th SS Division ‘Horst Wessel’; the 178th ‘Tatra’ Wehrmacht Division; a Moslem Regiment of the Vlasov Army; the SS Brigade of Dr. Otto Dirlewanger; the Schill Brigade; the Crimean Tatar military unit; and the 208th and the 209th Divisions of Volks-grenadiers, Heike, op. cit., pp. 143–144.Google Scholar

39. For a brief account concerning the Division's transfer to Yugoslavia, see ibid., pp. 147–150.Google Scholar

40. For details concerning this episode, see ibid., pp. 164–167. For an account leading to the appointment of General Shandruk as Commander-in-Chief of all Ukrainian military units within the German armed forces, see Shandruk, op. cit., pp. 193–239.Google Scholar

41. See Heike, op. cit., pp. 169–177; Klietmann, op. cit., p. 195; and Stein, op. cit., pp. 185–187.Google Scholar