The article aims at studying the reasons for the new way of looking at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the Italian political world: the mutual recognition of Israel and the Vatican, the visit to Jerusalem by the leader of the formerly fascist party, Mr. Gianfranco Fini, and the beginnings of a movement of interest towards the Jewish State also within the political left. From a historical viewpoint, anti-Semitism in Italy found its origins in the Church's attitude toward the ‘deicide people’. Beginning with WWI, to this position was added the worry that the Holy Places might fall under Jewish control. From those times dates the Holy See's evermore manifest liking for the Arab populations of Palestine. Nowadays the line of conduct of the Church has as its basic objective the defense of Christian minorities in the Middle East, and for this reason it maintains dialogues with all actors in the region. The weight of the Church influenced also the attitude of the Italian State, even though from its inception the latter had to make adjustments because of other international requirements. This multiple subordination caused the different republican governments to always keep an official equidistant stance among the conflicting parties in the Near East. Behind this apparent neutrality, however, the feelings of benevolence for the Arab countries and the Palestinians have gradually intensified. Italian leaders have been trying to conduct a Mediterranean policy on the borders of the Western alliance, and their feelings have been oriented in consequence. During the 1970s, the governments went as far as to conclude a secret pact with Palestinian terrorists, to avoid terror acts on the Peninsula in exchange for some freedom of action. And in the mid-eighties the Craxi government did not hesitate to challenge the US in order to guarantee the continuity of that line of conduct. On that occasion Craxi, speaking in Parliament, compared Arafat to Mazzini. The end of the Yalta-established order has modified the traditional data of Italian foreign policy. However, the increased attention paid to Israel has also other causes: the changed attitude of the Church after the civil war and the Syrian occupation in Lebanon, events which both caused difficulties for the consistent Christian minorities; the hope that the Oslo process could reward the Italian ‘clear-sightedness’; last, but not least, the quarrelsome internal politics that make the Palestine conflict a mirror of the Roman conflicts. Lastly, the article connects the recent goodwill for Israel with the threats of Islamic terrorism in Italy. A political opinion trend would revisit the Middle Eastern conflict as the upturned perspective of a ‘clash of civilizations’ already existent nowadays. And a possible act of terrorism in Italy might give to this opinion a mass basis.

Although the 50th anniversary of World War II led to some noteworthy new publications it could be argued that, in terms of the historiography in Italian, the cinquantennale represented something of a missed opportunity. This would appear not to be the case with the 60th anniversary, which has led to the publication of a great deal of innovative and impressive research, much of which is based on archival material. In most cases new research has not been the result of sensational discoveries, but the fruit of long years of research in existing archives. This special issue of Modern Italy aims to reflect the vibrant state of current scholarship by bringing together adaptations of six papers delivered at the 2005 Association for the Study of Modern Italy conference dedicated to the theme of ‘Italy at War, 1935–2005’, together with a seventh article by Philip Cooke. The articles reflect the broad thematic interests of the conference (see Modern Italy, vol. 11, no. 3, 2006 for a detailed conference report) as well as its chronological span.

The idea for this special issue of Modern Italy emerged from the Association for the Study of Modern Italy's annual conference ‘The Second Italian Republic Ten Years On: Prospect and Retrospect’, which was held at the Italian Cultural Institute, London, in November 2004. The conference afforded an opportunity for scholars and observers of contemporary Italy to reflect on one of the most eventful decades in the history of the Italian Republic and to offer an appraisal of how political, economic, social and cultural life had fared since the first election based on the new majoritarian voting system which first brought Silvio Berlusconi's coalition to power in April 1994.

Using Italian and Albanian archive sources, this essay analyses the effectiveness of Italian policy in Albania, during the years of its union with Italy (1939–1943), in the creation of a model Fascist state and in the generation of support for Italy among the Albanian population. Through the creation of party and state structures similar to those in Italy, Fascism intended to give voice to Albanian Nationalist demands, but Italian policy was undermined by a basic defect which helped to cool any initial enthusiasm: the loss of all semblance of Albanian independence and the exploitation of local resources to the benefit of the Italians alone. The Italy-Greece conflict cast a shadow on the Fascist fighting ability which not even the creation of ‘Great Albania’ (thanks to the help of the Germans) removed. As Italy's military fortunes changed for the worse, they were forced to address a growing resistance until the tragic conclusion of 8th September 1943 and the end of the occupation.

The Italian Second Republic was meant to have led to a bipolar polity with alternation in national government between conservative and progressive blocs. Such a system it has been claimed would undermine the geographical structure of electoral politics that contributed to party system immobilism in the past. However, in this article I argue that dynamic place configurations are central to how the ‘new’ Italian politics is being constructed. The dominant emphasis on either television or the emergence of ‘politics without territory’ has obscured the importance of this geographical restructuring. New dynamic place configurations are apparent particularly in the South which has emerged as a zone of competition between the main party coalitions and a nationally more fragmented geographical pattern of electoral outcomes. These patterns in turn reflect differential trends in support for party positions on governmental centralization and devolution, geographical patterns of local economic development, and the re-emergence of the North–South divide as a focus for ideological and policy differences between parties and social groups across Italy.

A central debate in political science centres on the origins of political parties and specifically on the question as to whether they emerged as a result of the rise of parliamentary institutions. Regarding the Italian party system, the commonly held view is that Italian parties emerged as a consequence of national unification and the establishment of parliament. This article contributes to the debate on the origins of Italian parties by presenting empirical evidence on the timing of their initial formation, analysing data regarding the social base, membership, organisational articulation and policy-making accomplishments of the two major political movements active before and after the establishment of the national parliament. The article argues that, at least in the Italian case, parties did not originate in the legislature; rather, similar to countries such as Germany and Spain, Italian parties developed as a result of a major national crisis.

In recent years two populist regionalist parties have emerged in the alpine region, the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) in Switzerland and the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy. However, while typical populist themes such as the constant attacks against professional politicians and appeals to the ‘people’ resonate in the rhetoric of both movements, what differentiates them is the style of their propaganda, as the LDT's paper, Il Mattino della Domenica, constantly strives to shock its readers in ways that are alien to the Italian leghisti. Following a discussion of the strength, organisation and rhetoric of the two parties, this articles addresses the reasons why they have adopted different strategies of communication by considering the parties’ constituencies, the nature of their media and the personalities of their leaders.

The article presents the results of a research group which has, over the last few years, carried out a careful contextualization of the massacres of civilians in four Italian regions (Apulia, Campania, Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna) during World War II. The research enables us to go beyond references to the irrationality of evil, the unchangeable core of violence in human nature or terror as an end in itself, which do not contribute much to an analytical interpretation. The aim has been to place these massacres in a more precise historical context by reconstructing the power structures, the logic and the cultural conditioning which made them possible, the behaviour and aims of the various protagonists, the complex evolution of the survivors’ memories and the ways in which the community memory has been taken up, or expelled, by the anti-Fascist paradigm of Republican Italy.

Between 1994 and 2006 Berlusconi has been the dominant figure of Italian politics. Following his electoral defeat in the April 2006 elections, it is possible to begin an initial evaluation of the many roles he has played as well as to assess his overall accomplishments in politics. This article focuses on five roles—party builder, coalition maker, institution builder, Prime Minister, and opinion leader. The article briefly explores Berlusconi's achievements and inadequacies and attempts to explain the reasons for his failures. Because Berlusconi has been unable fundamentally to institutionalize his politics and to reform Italian institutions, the article comes to the conclusion that his legacy will be of limited duration. All this notwithstanding, Berlusconi's political trajectory may not yet have reached its conclusion.

Scholars argue that the realignment of the electorate which took place with the transition to the so-called Italian Second Republic followed mainly a traditional partisan pattern, with electors of the former centre ruling parties (the Christian Democrats and the Socialists) turning to vote for the new centre and right parties (Forza Italia and the National Alliance), while left-wing voters continued to hold their traditional allegiance. Behind this apparent electoral turmoil there would appear to be little in the way of voter mobility. Such a reading implies continuity in the motivations of voters who behaved according to their previous ‘personal electoral history’ and in accordance with their sub-cultural political identification. Here an alternative interpretation is proposed in which it is argued that as a result of the 1994 realignment elections voters who deserted the centre (the heirs of the Christian Democrats) did so also according to their class interest and in response to the policy proposal of the centre-right. Since that time a ‘valence model’ of electoral behaviour has begun to emerge where ‘reasoning voters’ react to the performance of the incumbent, and voting also depends on an assessment of leadership, policy performance and issues.

About 2,000 Jews were deported from Rome during the nine months of German occupation, half of them after the infamous German razzia of 16 October 1943. Who took part in their identification and arrest? Italian historiography has most commonly focused on a few ardent Fascist collaborators, while the majority of Italians were proclaimed to be engaged in rescue operations for persecuted Jews. Due to the long-standing hegemony of the notion of ‘italiani brava gente’ and the taboo against discussing Italian collaboration, almost no studies of the Jewish persecution during the German occupation in Italy have been undertaken. The analysis of over 50 trials against Fascist collaborators offers insight into the caccia all'ebreo on the micro-level of occupied Rome. Elaborating on different forms of denunciations characterizing the persecution as well as the diverse motives of the Italian perpetrators, this article presents a comprehensive picture of the collaboration between German occupation forces and the population of Rome.

With the removal of Khrushchev in 1964 the Soviet Union adopted—at the level of the secret service—a more aggressive policy towards western countries, with a more intensive recourse to so-called ‘covert operations’. These operations regarded even western communist parties, such as the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which were close to being viewed as ‘orthodox’ by the Soviet leadership. The so-called ‘active measures’ which resulted were realised through the infiltration of agents, the training of (usually young) extremists, and (through them) the sending of warnings to the PCI leadership about its divergence from the Soviet line. This context helps us to understand better than before three key events of the years 1968–1973: the emergence of the first terrorist groups in Italy (the Partisans Action Groups and the Red Brigades); the bombing of the electric mains line where Giangiacomo Feltrinelli lost his life; and the car crash in which Enrico Berlinguer was involved in 1973 during an official visit to Bulgaria. An analysis of the Cold War context in which Italian terrorism (and specifically the Red Brigades) developed reveals origins and patterns that are different to those usually identified in the literature.

The general election of April 2006 marked a further milestone, and possibly a turning point, in the recent trajectory of Italian politics. Unexpectedly narrow, the election outcome brought to government a coalition which, in the immediate aftermath of the campaign, appeared to face one of two possibilities: that either it would find the very precariousness of its position to be, paradoxically, its strength, giving it a degree of cohesion it might otherwise not have had, or that it would succumb to opposition attempts to exploit the divisions in its ranks and therefore fail to last for any length of time. Early indications pointed in both directions. In the second place, if the immediate consequence of the outcome appeared to be a strengthening of the position of Berlusconi (since he had been expected to lose by a wide margin and had instead apparently staged a dramatic comeback) then the 2006 defeat appeared to create the need for a redefinition of the Casa delle libertà, with a reduction in the role of Berlusconi himself and a new prime-ministerial candidate. Third, in bringing about the second alternation in government since the party-system upheavals of the early 1990s, the outcome appeared to represent the consolidation of a bi-polar party system based on fragmented coalitions. However, precisely because of the system's fragmentation and the seeming precariousness of the in-coming government's position, there appeared to be room for considerable doubt about the likely direction of future party-system developments. In short, if the election appeared to represent the confirmation of past trends, in other respects it looked as though it might also represent the start of a new period of uncertainty in Italian politics.

Considering the increasing quantitative usage and expanding qualitative scope of instruments of delegated legislations as the predominant means of enacting welfare reforms, this article investigates the consolidation throughout the Second Italian Republic of a new interpretation of executive prerogatives in the exercise of legislative functions. This is not only a problem in relation to the constitutional balance defining the relationship between the executive and legislature, but also an issue for executive policy leadership and capacity to steer the legislative process. It is argued that since the 1990s the usage of legislative decrees has become a sui generis and the predominant means of decision-making, adopted in particular for welfare reforms. In particular, delegated legislation to the executive has changed the impact that interest groups, such as trade unions, have on the policy process. Two case studies are presented by way of illustration, namely the health care reforms of the early 1990s and the education reform in 2003.

A study of the history of the Italian Social Republic (1943–1945) reveals the importance of the experience of Fascist Syndicalism and above all National Syndicalism. During the preceding 20 years of Fascist rule, Fascist Syndicalism had faced notable difficulties, divided as it was between the need to defend workers and that of obeying the dictatorship; but following the fall of Mussolini and the military defeat of Fascist Italy, new opportunities appeared to present themselves. In 1943 Mussolini had called for ‘socialization’ as a means of fighting the anti-Fascist democratic forces. In this context, the ideology of National Syndicalism became the key feature of a project for the construction of a totalitarian state. In spite of the inevitability of defeat, the final phase of Fascism thus involved an attempt to win over the working classes in the industrial centres of northern Italy in order to establish them as the basis for a possible revival.

In the last two decades, the extreme right has experienced a dramatic rise in electoral support in many West European democracies, achieving more parliamentary and even governmental power. Despite extensive interest in this phenomenon and a myriad of academic publications about it, both in sociology and political science, little consensus has been reached about the reasons for the observed growth of right-wing extremism. Three books; The Extreme Right in Western Europe by Elisabeth Carter, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe by Piero Ignazi and Radical Right by Pippa Norris, try to overcome this lack of consensus through up-to-date analyses of the current situation of extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe and (in Norris’ case) even beyond. All three authors try to go beyond the existing analyses which mainly concentrate on socio-demographic characteristics of extreme right voters. However, they focus on partly different research questions and, consequently, are based on slightly different research designs.

The article sheds light on the power struggles at the heart of the Italian Resistance movement. From June 1944, as the movement grew rapidly, the leadership positions, both at national and local level, became ever more important and contested. The most significant roles in the Resistance, such as the national and regional leadership, but also the provincial commands, depended on the military strength of the various formations and on the power of the anti-Fascist parties. The re-formed political parties attempted to occupy important positions in the Resistance movement, hoping that these roles would help them out in any future settlement. In fact the rules of the game turned out to be far more complex and the political role played by any particular party did not determine its future success. The Anglo-Americans' influence over the power balance within the Resistance movement was to be decisive. The Allies managed to orchestrate the appointment of Raffaele Cadorna, who was not looked on favourably by the parties of the left and the Action Party, as military commander. In this way the Allies fostered the growth of moderate military formations frequently linked to Christian Democracy. In order to understand the Resistance in all its complexity, it is therefore necessary to return to the concept of internal conflict. The power struggles were better managed at national rather than local level, where they frequently led to violence.

The birth of the ‘Second Republic’ was at least partially due to the changes in international relations in Europe and the rest of the world. The instablity in the Balkans forced Italy to face security issues close to home, while instability in the Middle East meant that Italy had to reconsider its energy security policy as well as military security in the region. The change in the form of government in Italy under both the centre-right and centre-left has involved the Prime Minister taking on a much more important role in foreign policy. The two traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy—Atlanticism and an attachment to the European institutions—have remained largely unchanged, but their relative importance and emphasis have altered markedly with the alternation of administrations. During the course of the Second Republic we can therefore conclude that Italy has moved from being a ‘consumer of security’ to being a ‘producer of security’ due to a combination of external necessities and internal reforms.