This article considers the systemic effects of the electoral reform approved by the centre-right in December 2005, and the factors that led to the crisis of the Prodi government, highlighting the way in which the issue of electoral reform and the likelihood of an electoral referendum contributed decisively to the breakdown of the fragile coalition maintaining the Prodi government in office. The article then analyses the ‘game’ surrounding possible electoral reforms, examining the interweaving of the preferences and vetoes of the various political actors, showing how these were influenced by the strategic aims of each actor and by the process of re-structuring of the party system. Finally, the new configuration of the political supply as it took shape in the run up to the 2008 general election is analysed, showing how this new format derives from the actors’ strategic adaptation to the electoral rules in force, and how the election may signal the end of a period of Italian politics marked by ‘fragmented bipolarity’.

Among his varied publications, Nuto Revelli (1919–2004) produced three collections of oral testimonies gathered from the contadini (peasants) of Piedmont: La strada del davai, Il mondo dei vinti and L’anello forte. This article argues that these collections were the product of the same specific impegno del dopo (‘obligation of afterwards’) as his initial autobiographical writings, which had arisen from his experiences as an officer on the Russian Front during the Second World War. From this premise, the article then examines the interaction of Revelli's sense of impegno del dopo with the methodology he developed. The article concludes with an assessment of Revelli's stated aims and his actual achievements.

The general question underlying this article is how much have parties changed in Italy in the transition from the First to the Second Republic? The disintegration of the Christian Democrats (DC) in the early 1990s created a large opening on the centre-right of the political spectrum, which was promptly occupied by Forza Italia (FI). A totally new party organisationally speaking, FI, with its centralisation, its personalisation and its charismatic leadership, marked a clear break with all that the DC had represented in terms of its unrestricted pluralism based on strong factions. However, the franchise model adopted by Berlusconi's party, characterised by the co-existence of unity of command at the top, and differentiated and quasi-autonomous bodies locally, may facilitate the convergence of the parties representing the various interests and outlooks on the centre-right in the new rassemblement party that is the PdL. Through the latter, and given the new systemic conditions, Italy may achieve a transformation in the nature of the centre from Christian Democratic to conservative, enabling it to integrate most of the political right as well.

This article explores the attitudes of Italy's ruling and opposition parties towards the European Union (EU) enlargement process in Central and Eastern Europe. It shows that during both left (1996–2001) and right (2001–2006) governments there was a convergence between conservative and constructivist political platforms. In the first case, support for the Balkan countries (i.e., Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) and Turkey was based on their economic (penetration of Italian firms) and political (stabilisation of a difficult area) potential. In the second case, support was justified for both economic (i.e., redistributive policy towards Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) and cultural (i.e., pursuing a ‘plural’ Europe by including Turkey) reasons. Some liberal criticism based on Turkey's partial compliance with the political requirements for accession were raised by individual politicians of moderate right and left parties, and cultural biases against Islamic Turkey were stressed by the Lega Nord. Neither view, however, had a significant impact on the decision-making process.

The Italian futurist movement and its founder, F.T. Marinetti, have stimulated a vast historiography. Why has futurism fascinated so many and how, in particular, have the futurism-fascism and Marinetti-futurism relationships been conceived? To answer such questions, this article surveys nearly five decades of scholarship on futurism. It shows how futurism's fascist trajectory has polarised it and led scholars to a wide variety of positions. Some scholars limit themselves to the ‘heroic years’ up to 1916; others focus on ‘second futurism’ after 1915 without much reference to Marinetti; and still others treat futurism's ‘multiplicity’ using a centre-periphery model with Marinetti at the centre. Similarly, some insist on futurism's continuously ‘revolutionary’ character, others limit that claim, and still others deny it altogether. It is argued that recent biographical work on Marinetti has helped to clarify how one ought to approach and resolve these differences, but that scholarship on futurism nonetheless remains intensely politicised.

Italians and politics, edited by Marco Maraffi

Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007

332 pp., €26.00 (paperback), ISBN-978-88-15-11491-4

Where is the victory? Voting in 2006, described by Italians, edited by ITANES

Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006

241 pp., €13.00 (paperback), ISBN-88-15-11486-6

Left and right: Psychological roots of political differences, edited by ITANES

Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006

182 pp., €12.00 (paperback), ISBN-88-15-10911-0

‘Incomplete’ is the adjective usually used to qualify the Italian political transition that started in the early 1990s. Fifteen years is a long time in politics: as has been noted (Calise 2006, 3), political episodes that have left an indelible mark on history, such as the Nazi regime or the Napoleonic campaigns, had a similar duration. The political elections held in Spring 2006, however, showed that Italy was still not out of the woods, with a centre-left coalition prevailing over the centre-right by less than 30,000 votes in the Chamber of Deputies, while the centre-right won the larger number of Senate votes, but gained fewer seats because of the bizarre electoral system, which was forcibly introduced three months before the election. The division of seats faithfully echoed the division of the electorate into two equal parts – a division that had existed since 2001, but had been obscured by the electoral system and the mechanics of coalition formation (D'Alimonte and Vassallo 2006, p. 28). The election gave rise to two broad coalitions, both very diverse internally, and a government paralysed by the narrowness of its majority in the Senate. If it is true that Italy can now consider itself a solidly bipolar system – in fact more so than the United Kingdom, which is frequently quoted as an ideal model – it is also true that the best description of our party system is that of “fragmented bipolarism” (D'Alimonte & Vassallo 2006, 19). This is eloquently illustrated by the fall of the Prodi Government in January 2008 and the resulting record brevity of the XVth legislature, which lasted less than two years. Some 15 years on from restructuring the party system, Italian politics has not moved from the starting line, condemned to highly fragmented politics and party systems that result in instability, ungovernability and inability to reach decisions.

This article analyses the experience of the second Prodi government from the standpoint of its political communication. The opening part contextualises the case by placing it within the broader framework of coalition governments generally, and briefly outlines the critical elements that, in Italy, prevent any majority from making a genuinely strategic use of communication in the policy-making process. The second part focuses on Prodi's poor communication, highlighting both its limits and the attempts at improvement made by the leader and his staff in 2007. Finally, the third part examines the journalistic coverage of the centre-left majority and considers the trend in public approval for the premier and the government, emphasising the problems that emerged on each side.