We investigate how directors’ positions within board interlocking networks influence their monitoring behaviors from a social network perspective. We argue that the effectiveness of directors’ monitoring of a firm's management depends on their ability to overcome the information barrier and their motivation to develop a public reputation in the directorship market. We further contend that network centrality can supplement directors’ existing information set and facilitate reputation spillover, leading to an increase in the extent of their dissent on boards. We analyze the unique individual-director-level data of Chinese firms and find that directors occupying positions of greater centrality in the board interlock network are more likely to dissent. We then examine the underlying mechanisms of information and reputation through two moderators: firm transparency and media mention of a director. We also find that the effect of network centrality on dissent is weaker for independent directors. Our study advances the corporate governance literature by examining the micro-foundations of board monitoring and providing a social network perspective.

我们从社会网络的角度研究了董事在连锁董事网络中的位置如何影响他们的监督行为。我们认为，董事对公司管理的监督效果取决于他们克服信息障碍的能力以及在董事市场上建立公共声誉的动机。我们进一步指出，网络中心性可以补充董事现有的信息集，并促进声誉溢出，从而增加他们在董事会上投反对票的可能。通过分析中国上市公司董事个体层面的独特数据，我们发现：在连锁董事网络中占据更中心位置的董事更可能进行异议投票。更进一步地，我们通过公司透明度，以及媒体对董事的关注这两个调节变量来检验信息和声誉机制。此外我们还发现，网络中心性对董事异议投票的影响在独立董事身上更弱。本研究检验了董事会监督的微观基础，并提供了一种社会网络研究视角，对公司治理文献做出了贡献。