This paper investigates optimal capital taxation in an innovation-driven growth model. We examine how the optimal capital tax rate varies with externalities associated with R&D and innovation. Our results show that the optimal capital tax rate is higher when (i) the “stepping on toes effect” is smaller, (ii) the “standing on shoulders effect” is stronger, or (iii) the extent of creative destruction is smaller. The optimal capital tax rate is more likely to be positive when there is underinvestment in R&D. Moreover, the optimal capital tax rate and the monopolistic markup exhibit an inverted-U relationship. By calibrating our model to the US economy, we find that the optimal capital tax rate is positive, at a rate of around 6.6%. Finally, we consider a number of extensions and find that the result of a positive optimal capital tax is robust.

This paper investigates the impact of the introduction of inflation-linked bonds, which incur transaction costs when traded, on the monetary economy with sunspots. This paper shows that there always exists a certain range of positive transaction costs, where both monetary and bond markets are active. This implies that on top of governments, profit-seeking financial entrepreneurs also have the incentive to issue these bonds. This paper also displays how financial innovation on the indexed bond can be Kaldor improving, even if not necessarily Pareto improving. This finding indicates that together with lump-sum tax policies, the government can attain consensus among consumers on bond issuance.

In response to the recession brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, EU-wide macroeconomic policy has launched an unprecedented coordinated fiscal expansion across the EU (Next Generation EU or NGEU), financed by issuing common debt. Given NGEU’s nature, it is essential to take fiscal spillovers into consideration when assessing the overall macroeconomic effects of this fiscal expansion. We quantify the effects of the additional public investment for all Member States in a rich macro-model with a trade structure. Our model suggests that, on average, GDP effects are around one-third larger when explicitly accounting for the spillover effects from individual-country measures. For small open economies with smaller NGEU allocations, spillover effects account for the bulk of the GDP impact. We also quantify key transmission channels.

Economists have long been interested in the effect of business sentiment on economic activity. Using text analysis, I construct a new company-level indicator of sentiment based on the net balance of positive and negative words in Australian company disclosures. Company-level investment is very sensitive to changes in this corporate sentiment indicator, even controlling for fundamentals, such as Tobin’s Q, as well as controlling for measures of company-level uncertainty.

The high sensitivity of investment to sentiment could be due to several mechanisms. It could be because of animal spirits among managers or because of sentiment proxies for private information held by managers about company prospects. Overall, I find mixed evidence of the underlying causal mechanism. The effect of sentiment on investment is relatively persistent, which is consistent with managers having private information about company fundamentals. But the sensitivity of investment to sentiment is not any stronger at opaque companies in which managers are likely to be better informed than investors. Further, investment is sensitive to sentiment even when investors have an information advantage over managers by lagging the sentiment indicator by a year. Overall, the sensitivity of investment to sentiment appears to reflect both animal spirits and fundamentals.

Corporate investment has been weak since the global financial crisis (GFC) and demand-side factors, such as lower sales growth, explain more than half of this weakness. Low sentiment and heightened uncertainty weighed on investment during the GFC but have been less important factors since then.

This article quantifies the aggregate effects of firing costs in a model of firm dynamics where firm-level productivity is determined by innovation. In the model, the productivity distribution is endogenous, and thus, potentially affected by policy changes, allowing the model to capture both the static (allocative efficiency) and dynamic effects (changes in the distribution of firms’ productivity) of firing costs. The model is calibrated to match key features of firms’ hiring and firing behavior using firm-level data from Spanish nonfinancial firms. I show that firing costs equivalent to 2.5 monthly wages produce a 4% loss in aggregate productivity relative to the frictionless economy. The aggregate productivity losses rise to more than 10% when firing costs are equivalent to 1 year’s wage. I show that a model with a standard AR(1) productivity process can only generate between 45 and 50% of these losses. Overall, the results suggest that ignoring the effects of frictions on the dynamics of firms’ productivity can substantially underestimate their effects.

We assess the effects of financial shocks on inflation, and to what extent financial shocks can account for the “missing disinflation” during the Great Recession. We apply a Bayesian vector autoregressive model to US data and identify financial shocks through a combination of narrative and short-run sign restrictions. Our main finding is that contractionary financial shocks temporarily increase inflation. This result withstands a large battery of robustness checks. Negative financial shocks help therefore to explain why inflation did not drop more sharply in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our analysis suggests that higher borrowing costs after negative financial shocks can account for the modest decrease in inflation after the financial crisis. A policy implication is that financial shocks act as supply-type shocks, moving output and inflation in opposite directions, thereby worsening the trade-off for a central bank with a dual mandate.

I develop a dynamic model of consumption variety in status goods by introducing a realistic aspect that is new in the existing literature—that a good will not carry status appeal unless it is advertised. As advertisements will divert resources from new product research, growth in new products will be reduced. However, status-good advertisements also enhance distinctiveness of a good and increase a firm’s profit. This will motivate more researches. With the two effects offsetting each other, the original market bias in a standard product-development model—insufficient research due to a general knowledge spillover—cannot be overcome. While introducing advertising into models of this kind does not reverse the original welfare implication of suboptimal growth, this makes available a new and better intervention option—taxing advertisements. This tax is superior to consumption tax, the conventional solution to inefficient status competition, as consumption tax is found to be ineffective in the present model. It is also superior to research subsidies, the conventional solution to suboptimal growth, as subsidies must be financed and is not a self-sufficient policy.

This paper demonstrates that, in a large class of linear-quadratic models with rational expectations, losses due to time-inconsistency problems can be avoided, as the commitment solution can be implemented by a policy-maker who acts under discretion. We focus on two approaches. First, we show that a non-Markovian, reputational equilibrium that implements the commitment solution always exists. Second, we show how delegation to a policy-maker with an additional objective for the policy instrument can be used to implement the commitment solution via a standard discretionary Markov equilibrium. Implementation is facilitated by the fact that the commitment outcome can be attained irrespective of the weight that the policy-maker assigns to the additional target. Using the standard new Keynesian model as an example, we study the dynamics of the economy under optimal additional output targets as well as optimal interest-rate targets for central banks.

This paper studies the impact of immigration on the US macroeconomy. I identify structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) with time-varying parameters (TVPs) and stochastic volatility (SV) using a novel set of restrictions. The TVP-SV-SVARs are estimated on a quarterly sample including average labor productivity (ALP), hours worked, immigration, consumption, and term spread from 1953 to 2017. An immigration supply shock increases domestic ALP and hours worked over the business cycle horizons. Movements in immigration are explained by its own shock and to a lesser extent by the productivity and news shocks. IRFs driven by these shocks vary over the sample, especially around changes in immigration policy such as the Immigration Act of 1990. In contrast, the forecast error variance decompositions exhibit little change over the sample. Immigration plays an important role in the US macroeconomy.

Credibility is elusive, but Blinder [(2000) American Economic Review 90, 1421–1431.] generated a consensus in the literature by arguing that “A central bank is credible if people believe it will do what it says.” To implement this idea, we first measure people’s beliefs by using survey data on inflation’s expectations. Second, we compare beliefs with explicit (or tacit) targets, taking into account the uncertainty in our estimate of beliefs (asymptotic 95% robust confidence intervals). Whenever the target falls into this interval we consider the central bank credible. We consider it not credible otherwise. We apply our approach to study the credibility of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) by using a world-class database—the Focus Survey of forecasts. Using monthly data from January 2007 until April 2017, we estimate people’s beliefs of inflation 12 months ahead, coupled with a robust estimate of its asymptotic 95% confidence interval. Results show that the BCB was credible 65% of the time, with the exception of a few months in the beginning of 2007 and during the interval between mid-2013 throughout mid-2016.

Income drops permanently after an involuntary job displacement, but it has never been clear what happens to long run wealth in the USA. Upon displacement, wealth falls 14% relative to workers of the same age and similar education from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Their wealth is still 18% lower 12 years after the event. A standard life cycle model calibrated to US data with permanent decreases in income after displacement behaves differently than these findings. The agents in the model also experience a large drop in wealth but they recover. The biggest culprit for these differences is small and statistically insignificant changes to consumption in the PSID whereas agents in the model decrease their consumption considerably. Extending the model to include habit formation reconciles some of these differences by generating similar long run effects on wealth. This allows for the examination of wealth at death through the lens of the model.

This paper develops a network economy model to study the propagation of the COVID lockdown shock. Firms are related to each other through buyer–seller relations in the market for intermediate inputs. Firms choose production levels and input combinations using prices that emerge from local interactions. Nothing forbids trade at out-of-equilibrium prices. In such a setting, disequilibrium spills over from one market to another due to the interconnections between markets. These disequilibrium dynamics are capable of generating unemployment when workers released by contracting firms are not frictionlessly absorbed by expanding firms. We calibrate the model to the US economy using a data set with more than 200,000 buyer–seller relations between about 70,000 firms. Computational experiments on the calibrated economy suggest that the COVID lockdown generates a sizeable decline in GDP. The endogenously generated unemployment dynamics is a primary determinant of the cost of the lockdown.

We study the effects of taxation on the growth rate of the real per capita GDP in a sample of 21 OECD countries, over the period 1965–2010. To do this, we estimate a version of the model proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil [(1992) Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 407–437.] augmented to consider both direct and indirect effects of taxation on investment share parameters. We employ a semi-parametric technique—namely, a Finite Mixture Model—which combines features from mixed effect models for panel data and cluster analysis methods to account for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Our results suggest that taxes have a negative impact on growth: in the baseline model, the coefficient estimates indicate that a 10% cut in personal income tax rate (respectively corporate income tax rate) may raise the GDP growth rate by 0.6% (respectively 0.3%).

This article examines if professional forecasters form their expectations regarding the policy rate of the European Central Bank (ECB) consistent with the Taylor rule. In doing so, we assess micro-level data including individual forecasts for the ECB main refinancing operations rate as well as inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the Euro Area. Our results indicate that professionals indeed form their expectations in line with the Taylor rule. However, this connection has diminished over time, especially after the policy rate hit the zero lower bound. In addition, we also find a relationship between forecasters’ disagreement regarding the policy rate of the ECB and disagreement on future GDP growth, which disappears when controlling for monetary policy shocks proxied by changes in the policy rate in the quarter the forecasts are made.

We estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill workers using panel data from 32 countries during 1970–2015. Most existing estimates, which are based only on US microdata, find a value close to 1.6. We bring international data together with a theory-informed macro-approach to provide new evidence on this important macroeconomic parameter. Using the macro-approach, we find that the elasticity of substitution between tertiary-educated workers and those with lower education levels falls between 1.7 and 2.6, which is higher than previous estimates but within a plausible range. In some specifications, estimated elasticity is above the value required for strong skill-bias of technology, suggesting strong skill-bias is possible.

This paper addresses an employer’s decision to invest in firm-specific training for temporary workers within a search-matching framework with two-tier employment contracts. Based on the fact that opportunities to receive firm-provided training are significantly limited in temporary jobs, we examine whether policies aimed at inducing employers to provide training for temporary workers improve labor market performance. Our quantitative analysis produces the following results: first, reducing the cost of training temporary workers, which aims to directly increase their participation in firm-provided training, improves social efficiency but increases the unemployment rate, and decreases the share of permanent workers. Second, relaxing firing regulations on permanent jobs decreases the unemployment rate and increases the proportion of temporary workers who receive training and social welfare. Thus, a spillover effect of reforming employment protection legislation associated with permanent jobs is observed on training provision in temporary jobs.

We estimate a logit mixture vector autoregressive model describing monetary policy transmission in the euro area with a special emphasis on credit conditions. With the help of this model, monetary policy transmission can be described as mixture of two states, using an underlying logit model determining the relative state weights over time. We show that a widening of the credit spread and a tightening of credit standards directly lead to a reduction of real GDP growth, whereas shocks to the quantity of credit are less important in explaining growth fluctuations. The credit spread and—to some extent—credit standards are also the key determinants of the underlying state of the economy; the prevalence of the crisis state is more pronounced in times of adverse credit conditions. Together with a stronger shock transmission in the crisis state, this provides further evidence for a financial accelerator in the euro area.

This paper constructs a two-period general equilibrium model with the effective lower bound of nominal interest rates and describes price competition among monopolistically competitive firms as a coordination game. While the model has multiple equilibria with different levels of inflation (positive or zero), the equilibrium selection in line with global games implies that the economy with high expected productivity growth moves into the positive inflation equilibrium. The policy analyses indicate that monetary policy measures such as an increase in the target inflation can prevent the economy from moving into the zero inflation equilibrium even with low productivity growth.

This paper extracts housing boom-bust cycle signals from metropolitan statistical area (MSA)-level housing prices using a Markov-switching dynamic factor model. To mitigate the estimation bias, it utilizes high-frequency housing prices that follow the methodology of the monthly Case–Shiller house price indices. The housing bust phases specified from weekly and daily housing prices precede those based on monthly prices by approximately 2 years. MSAs with top signal-to-noise ratios offer greater marginal contributions to improvements in forecasting housing cycles than MSAs with bottom ratios for all frequencies. The results highlight the importance of indicator quality and provide evidence against “The more, the better” since incorporating more MSA-level housing prices into housing factors does not guarantee more satisfactory housing cycle forecasts.

This paper explores the effect of fiscal policy on the welfare of heterogeneous agents with different income sources over the business cycle. Policy experiments allow the government to choose the cyclical properties of fiscal policy instruments conditional on long-run levels to separately maximize the welfare of entrepreneurs and workers. This policy choice creates welfare conflicts between the two groups, which is confirmed by empirical evidence. The government maximizes workers’ welfare by choosing procyclical capital income tax rates and countercyclical labor income tax rates while it optimizes entrepreneurs’ welfare with countercyclical capital income tax rates and strongly countercyclical labor income tax rates. The socially optimal policy is a tradeoff between the welfare of entrepreneurs and workers. The welfare conflict holds when the government modifies the cyclical behavior of policy in a crisis, or it adjusts the long-run level and cyclical behavior at the same time.