According to the ICTR, Emmanuel Bagambiki is an innocent man. The trial chamber and the Appeals Chamber have each unanimously acquitted the former Prefect of Cyangugu of crimes relating to Rwanda's horrific 1994 genocide. And on 19 July 2007 Bagambiki was reunited with his wife in children in Belgium, having been granted asylum a few days earlier. It is tempting to conclude that justice has been done in Bagambiki's case. That conclusion, however, would be too facile: Bagambiki was acquitted in February 2006, nearly 18 months before his family reunion. In the interim he lived in a safe house in Arusha paid for by the United Nations, wanted by Rwanda for trial on related charges and unable to convince Belgium that he posed no danger to its peace and security. Bagambiki, moreover, is one of the lucky ones: the nightmare of being free but having nowhere to go continues for two of his acquitted roommates in the safe house, Andre Ntagerura and Andre Rwamakuba, Rwanda's Minister of Transport and former Minister of Education respectively. Bagambiki's ordeal and Rwamakuba and Ntagerura's ongoing plight illustrate one of the basic problems facing international criminal tribunals: what to do with the acquitted. An acquitted defendant normally has two options: return to his country of origin, or find a third country that will grant him asylum. Both options, however, have been problematic for defendants acquitted by the ICTR and are likely to prove equally problematic for defendants who may be acquitted in the future by the ICC. This short essay explains why – and identifies what the international community should do about it.

This note evaluates the application of rules on judicial independence and impartiality in two international decisions issued in 2004 – the ICJ Order on Composition in the Wall Advisory Proceedings and the disqualification decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Sesay – and compares them with a code of judicial conduct recently prepared by an ILA study group (the Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary). We assert that the approach taken by the ICJ in Wall is excessively restrictive and is out of step with contemporary tendencies to embrace stricter standards of judicial independence and impartiality.

Taslim Elias's scholarship on the impact of English common law on the growth of African customary law illustrates the intersectionality negotiated between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, universal and subaltern laws. His intellectual portrait is also useful as a heuristic device to excise the doctrines, strategies, imageries, and narratives of progress elaborated about ‘Africa’ and ‘law’. Elias decried the contempt and ignorance exhibited by colonial masters towards native customs and laws; he also vilified judicially crafted ‘repugnancy’ and ‘public policy’ doctrines as instruments of colonial policy to prevent British justice from looking both ways, by ensuring that British standards were the ‘objective’ criteria of abrogation and change. Yet he nonetheless saw these doctrines and English law as a unifying force in the emergence of a unified Nigerian legal system. This article argues that this paradox in Elias's work and his struggle against the asserted dualism between English law and African customary law must be situated in the context of the rise of an African legal consciousness or juridical Negritude, home to various political projects of nation-building, African cultural liberation, and development which strategically intersected in their unstable relationship to law and Western culture. This signals a turn to ‘hybridity’ in legal discourse and Elias's professional trajectory seeking to develop a uniform common law for Nigeria as a way to explicate the workings of this relationship, and how African law is inscribed in the interplay of cultural forces constantly (re)negotiating the boundaries of their engagement with one another. This, in turn, reveals a complex picture of mediating between the simultaneous participation of Third World intellectuals in various struggles and personal or ideological projects within African humanism, which an analysis structured around the stability of centres/peripheries conventionally distorts.

The discontent within legal ranks over the recent judgment of the International Court of Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro can be described as nothing other than poignant. The stylized characterization voiced privately by many critics is that the judgment amounted to ‘bad law’ and ‘good politics’; that the Court's ruling had been profoundly influenced by Serbia's fragile domestic politics and hence this worked silently to constrain the Court's rationale and lawmaking. Sadly, critics opine, this political intrusion into the sanctuary of lawmaking produced a judgment that now denies the ‘universal’ deterrent which the Genocide case could have provided. This article, however, takes direct issue with axiomatic interpretations of what constitutes ‘bad law’ and ‘good politics’ in the Genocide case, and argues instead that an antithetical characterization of law with politics proves fundamentally misleading when analysing the Genocide judgment, overlooking the inherent association between law and politics in complex cases that have now become ‘bread and butter’ for international lawyers. In sum, this article will argue, the judgment should not be written off using the dichotomy of ‘bad law’ and ‘good politics’, but rather should invoke critical reflection within the academic discipline and professional practice on the problems of politics which constitute and hence unavoidably permeate cases that emerge from calamitous failures of international politics. The hardening of the fictional boundary between law and politics may provide a convenient gambit for those advocating the ascendancy of international law. However, it is argued, obfuscating the political swamp which is ‘international justice’ cannot make a juridical pasture no matter how much authoritative or ‘learned’ ink is spent; and this is perhaps the key lesson which should be discerned by legal experts from the Genocide case as a whole.

The editorial board of the Leiden Journal of International Law is pleased to announce a debate on a very important but underexposed topic in international criminal law: witness proofing. Witness proofing is an accepted and well-established practice at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). It entails setting up a meeting between a party to the proceedings and a witness, usually shortly before the witness is to testify in court, the purpose of which is to prepare and familiarize the witness with courtroom procedure and to review the witness's evidence. Recently a trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) prohibited witness proofing. On 30 November 2007, Trial Chamber I held in the Lubanga case that the possibility of witness proofing is not expressly provided for in the ICC Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that no general principle exists in national or international criminal law that would require the ICC to adhere to such a practice. Moreover, and this is the most interesting argument, the trial chamber held that the ICC Statute ‘moves away from the procedural regime of the ad hoc tribunals’ and that as a result witness proofing is not easily transferable to the ICC.

The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR provide for the review of final judgments upon the discovery of a ‘new fact’ that could have affected the judgments. The Appeals Chambers of the two Tribunals interpret the term ‘new fact’ to mean new information related to a matter that was not at issue during the original trial, as opposed to simply meaning new information of a factual nature. The article argues that this interpretation of ‘new fact’ creates a risk that review will be denied on formalistic grounds even in situations where principles of justice would make review plainly warranted. The article proposes several ways in which the Appeals Chambers could alter their case law to ensure against such injustice. Finally, the article considers the implications of this issue for other international criminal tribunals.

This paper was written at the request of the LJIL editorial board as a reply to the article by Karemaker, Taylor, and Pittman published in the previous issue. It is argued that their position starts from incorrect assumptions and that their overall assessment of proofing is flawed, especially with regard to the risks for fair trial. As to the law of the international tribunals it is acknowledged, however, that there is a structural and normative difference between the ICTY (as the most important ad hoc tribunal) and the ICC. While the former still follows, despite some normative changes, a predominantly adversarial procedure, the ICC Statute provides for a mixed adversarial–inquisitorial procedure. Such a procedural model is not compatible with the adversarial origins of witness proofing and it is therefore not surprising that the ICC Statute does not provide for this technique. As a consequence, at the ICC proofing is neither legally admissible nor necessary.

The Bosnia Genocide case dealt with several important matters of international law, apart from the issue of responsibility proper for genocide. The Court began by addressing issues of state succession in order to identify the proper respondent. It then found that the objection to jurisdiction raised by the respondent was res judicata. It held that the Genocide Convention created state responsibility in addition to international criminal responsibility of the individual. The contribution of the judgment to the law of evidence, in particular with reference to the standard and methods of proof, is significant. Finally, the Court applied the codification by the International Law Commission of attribution in state responsibility to the situation before it in deciding that the genocidal acts subject of the case were not attributable to Serbia, while also holding that Serbia was, nevertheless, responsible for omitting to prevent genocide.

This article examines the analytical framework and key arguments used by K. Ambos to conclude that witness proofing is neither a legally permissible nor necessary useful practice before the ICC in his reply to ‘Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Critical Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence’. Contrary to Ambos, the article argues that witness proofing cannot be both acceptable at the UN international criminal tribunals and per se inappropriate at the ICC, given the ICC's procedural regime allowing for trials to be conducted in a form almost identical to those of the UN tribunals. A related argument is that the practice of witness proofing is not prohibited in the law governing the ICC, even if not provided for. Further arguments conclude that reliance upon spontaneity of a witness in court as a guarantee of reliability is misplaced, that the merits of national practices are irrelevant to the overall analysis, and that international judges are competent to manage the negligible risks associated with witness proofing.

Witness proofing – or preparation – is an adjunct of the adversarial criminal trial process. It is also a common practice at the UN international criminal tribunals, where it has been repeatedly challenged, analysed, and endorsed. Recently, a trial chamber at the ICC prohibited the prosecutor from proofing witnesses, seemingly calling upon the institution, at an early stage, to break with the established practice of proofing at the UN international criminal tribunals. This article examines witness proofing in international criminal procedure with the aim of describing and weighing its relative merits, and arguing that proofing – as practised at the UN international criminal tribunals – appears to be a better modality for enhancing the efficiency, integrity, and legitimacy of the truth-seeking function of international criminal trials than does prohibiting the practice.

Co-operation has proved to be one of the greatest challenges in the first practice of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Court cannot fulfil its mandate effectively without co-operation from states, international organizations, and other actors. The Prosecutor requires co-operation and assistance at various stages of proceedings (preliminary examination, investigation, judicial proceedings) in order to conduct investigations and prosecutions. The Court depends on the co-operation of states to execute the warrants of arrest and proceed to trial. In the context of its first practice, the Court has operated in situations of ongoing conflict and/or environments where the security situation is volatile. The level and modalities of co-operation were influenced by the factual and political conditions on the ground and the institutional support of other entities (e.g. the United Nations).

Negotiators of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) did not intend the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) to act as a de facto investigating judge; rather, their intent was that the PTC ensure that the Prosecutor act responsibly and within well-defined limits. Several opportunities have arisen in the Lubanga case before the ICC's PTC and the Appeals Chamber to examine the Prosecutor's duty and performance in disclosing documentary evidence and the identities of witnesses at the pre-trial stage. International criminal tribunals necessarily must bridge the evidentiary magnitude of atrocity crimes with a pragmatic focus on one person's role. The PTC judge should aggressively narrow the charges and focus the Prosecutor on the requirement of minimal evidence to meet the sufficiency standard for the remaining charges, direct the Prosecutor to share existing and emerging evidence with the accused in a timely manner and not wait until 30 days prior to confirmation hearing, and use statutory power to ensure timely non-disclosure requests and determinations.

This article addresses the prosecution of service members by the United States for the commission of war crimes, specifically whether or not the offences charged in such cases can truly be considered ‘war crimes’. The answer has implications in terms of application of the complementarity provision of the Rome Statute, as well as the stigmatic effect that is avoided when the United States prosecutes ordinary criminal offences rather than war crimes.

Article 121(5) Rome Statute provides for a specific regime for amendments to Articles 5–8 of the Statute. Its final clause precludes the exercise of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over a crime covered by an amendment when committed by a national or on the territory of a state party which has not accepted the amendment. This provision has been understood as derogating from the Statute's general rules on jurisdiction. The present article argues that a stringent reading of the clause as well as a systematic and teleological approach warrant an alternative interpretation in conformity with the jurisdictional system of the Statute.

The ICC Statute sets up a system for enforcement whereby the Court's decisions are to be effected by domestic authorities. The article explores the implications of this institutional design in terms of the legal tools at the Court's disposal and the extent to which the ICC can adjudicate issues related to state co-operation. At the same time, it examines the responsibilities assumed by all states parties under the Statute to secure compliance, including in situations where the requested national authorities are unwilling or unable to co-operate. It suggests that to be sucessful, the co-operation regime under the ICC Statute will require a dynamic set of interactions between the individual state and the collective.

The general narrative of international criminal law (ICL) declares that the system adheres in an exemplary manner to the fundamental principles of a liberal criminal justice system. Recent scholarship has increasingly questioned the adherence of various ICL doctrines to such principles. This article scrutinizes the discourse of ICL – the assumptions and forms of argumentation that are regarded as sound reasoning with appropriate liberal aims. This article argues that ICL, in drawing on national criminal law and international human rights law, absorbed contradictory assumptions and methods of reasoning. The article explores three modes by which the assumptions of human rights liberalism subtly undermine the criminal law liberalism to which the system aspires. These modes include interpretive approaches, substantive and structural conflation, and ideological assumptions. The identity crisis theory helps to explain how a system that strives to serve as a model for liberal criminal justice systems has come to embrace illiberal doctrines that contradict the system's fundamental principles.

The Israeli official policy of targeted killing has often been a subject of controversy and criticism. Although still applied by the state of Israel, this cruel practice was recently limited in a courageous decision handed down by the Israeli Supreme Court. The new restrictions on targeted killing represent an important step towards its criminalization. Despite this, the Court's interpretation of the international humanitarian law requirements is still too broad and there is a need for more restrictive safeguards. In addition, the current uncertainties of this field of law, replicated in the decision, exacerbate the problem further. The main difficulty, however, lies in the theoretical assumption that targeted killing is legal. This article proposes instead to view targeted killing as an exception to the presumption of protection of the civilian population. The authors review the recent trends in international humanitarian law in order to assess the impact of the Court's reasoning. Although this landmark case represents an important breakthrough, it will certainly not be the last word on targeted killing.

The Cambodia Tribunal's co-investigating judges' first order, for the provisional detention of Duch, one of the suspects for the atrocities committed by the regime of Democratic Kampuchea in the 1970s, addresses the application of the doctrines of male captus bene detentus and abuse of process. The order, confirmed by the pre-trial chamber, states, relying on those doctrines, that Duch's unreasonably long prior detention, ordered by the Cambodian Military Court, does not bar his provisional detention by the Cambodia Tribunal. This article argues that the order is in accordance with applications of the relevant doctrines by the international criminal tribunals in similar cases, and that, absent involvement of the international or hybrid tribunal, abuse of process can, and should, only be successfully applied in case of torture or serious mistreatment of the suspect.

While much has been written about the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), less attention has been focused on the enforcement capability of the Court. As demonstrated by the history of the ad hoc international tribunals, one of the most pressing problems for international criminal courts is the arrest and the surrender of suspects, which often requires substantial bargaining between the court and the state in which the suspect resides. We develop a classification of the issues which have the greatest impact on the bargaining influence of the ICC to secure the arrest of indictees, and apply this classification scheme to a study of the four ongoing situations at the ICC in order to explore the bargaining environment in which the ICC operates. While many of the cases have features which should assist the ICC in bargaining with the state, the situation in Sudan represents the greatest challenge for the Court.