This is a study of three authoritative instruments that promote a common idea: economic activities and development should be conducted with respect for human rights. The World Bank Framework, the International Financial Corporation Performance Standards and the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights are examined to get clarity on how human rights risk management differs from more conventional management approaches. The focus here is on prevention of human rights impacts. Do the three instruments employ approaches adequate for handling human rights risks? To understand prevention, one needs to reflect on what makes human rights a particular type of impact and account for the regulatory context of protecting human rights transnationally. The analysis identifies four ‘offsets’ through which economic decision-makers can distort their human rights performance and place causal observers at a disadvantage. Prevention becomes an issue of how to relate to ‘residual impacts’ on human rights. This article finds that the ‘hierarchy or mitigation’ and even ‘human rights due diligence’ under illuminate the challenge. The proposal here is to add ‘reduction at source’ as a parameter of human rights risk management. The sources for this analysis are the three instruments, and the practice of implementing organizations, particularly IFC projects, CAO cases, impact assessments, and CSR reports. In conclusion, the potential for cross-fertilization among instruments is genuine. Increased clarity on prevention of human rights impacts should assist economic decision-makers in their risk management task and casual observers in assessing their performance.

The international criminal courts and tribunals have heard thousands of witnesses in cases of extreme complexity and breadth. Their evidentiary record is overwhelming, with live witness testimony standing out as one of its defining features. Keeping in mind the arguments and policies of judicial efficiency and fairness, this article empirically examines the trends and patterns in viva voce witness numbers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). We observe clear differences between institutions and individual cases, and discuss the underlying reasons for such divergences. As well as providing a general overview, we demonstrate the complex interaction between case-related characteristics, institutional and situational contexts, and the number of witnesses called at trial.

The drafters of the Rome Statute sought to accord human rights a central place within the legal framework of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This was done not only through numerous provisions on the rights of the accused, victims, and witnesses, but also through the inclusion of the overarching Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Article 21(3) Rome Statute requires that the interpretation and application of all ICC law be consistent with internationally recognized human rights. While this provision has been employed on numerous occasions to bolster human rights protection in the ICC legal framework, it is not without its limits. In a series of decisions over the past few years, ICC judges have placed limits on the protections that can be read into the ICC legal framework on the basis of Article 21(3). Beyond stating that the ICC ‘is not a human rights court’, the decisions in question articulate no clear justification for the limitations imposed on Article 21(3). The present article analyses these decisions and identifies the underlying rationale for the Court’s approach: the principle of speciality. However, the picture is further complicated by the judges’ willingness to overlook the principle of speciality when particularly serious violations of human rights are involved. This leaves the precise contours of human rights protection in the ICC legal framework undefined.

This article analyses the World Bank’s environmental and social Safeguards against the backdrop of changing paradigms of global legal order. In January 2017, a new ‘Environmental and Social Framework’ (ESF) entered into force and replaced older ‘Safeguard Policies’ that had incrementally emerged since the 1980s in response to harmful impacts of investment projects financed by the Bank. The Safeguards reform epitomizes the changing structures and geopolitical shifts that shape international law in the twenty-first century and provides a fascinating looking glass on the evolution of global order since the end of the cold war. In this perspective, we see the first generation of Safeguards, introduced since the late 1980s, as an element of incremental legalization in the emerging global governance regime, a regime characterized by unipolar multilateralism and geopolitical dominance of ‘the West’. The 2016 reform not only reflects the increased politicization of global governance by civil society but also the emergence of a more competitive multilateralism, characterized by counter-institutionalization on the part of emerging powers like China. A comparison of the old and new Safeguards thus allows us to analyse different forms of contestation and resulting normative evolution in the key area of global governance of development and finance.

Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice attributes limited legal authority to judicial and arbitral decisions. They are not formal sources of law and are described as only subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. However, the continuing validity of this characterization is challenged not only by the Court’s practice of referring to its own jurisprudence, a phenomenon that has been empirically and theoretically analysed elsewhere, but also its relatively new practice of relying on external case law. This article seeks to draw attention to one aspect of this new practice, namely the marked increase in the Court’s citation of inter-state arbitral awards since the 1990s. It is argued that the Court refers to inter-state arbitral awards in its decisions for three principal reasons – (i) to determine the existence of a given rule, (ii) to supplement its legal reasoning or its own case law on a particular issue, and (iii) to distinguish an arbitral award from the case before it. More ambitiously, the article argues that the way the Court relies on inter-state arbitral awards shows that the Court attributes legal authority to these awards that goes beyond that of a subsidiary means for determining a given rule of law, bringing it closer to what might be qualified as persuasive but non-binding precedent.

As the glow that accompanied the kinetic judicialization of the field of international criminal justice has faded over time, scholars have increasingly turned to expressivist strands of thought to justify, assess, and critique the practices of international criminal courts. This expressive turn has been characterized by a heightened concern for the pedagogical value and legitimating qualities of international criminal courts. This article develops a unique typology of expressivist perspectives within the field of international criminal justice, distinguishing between three strands of expressivism: instrumental expressivism, which concerns the justification of different practices of international criminal courts in terms of the instrumental value of their expressive qualities; interpretive expressivism, which concerns the identification of expressive avenues for improving the sociological legitimacy of international criminal courts; and critical expressivism, which concerns the illumination of the expressive limits of international criminal courts, as well as unveiling the configurations of power that underpin the messages and narratives constructed within such courts in different institutional contexts. Reflecting on the limitations of these perspectives, the article elaborates a nascent strand of expressivism – strategic expressivism – which concerns whether and how different actors in the field may harness the expressive power of international criminal justice in line with their strategic social and political agendas.

The International Criminal Court is empowered by its constituent instrument to request its states parties to identify, trace, freeze, and seize assets ‘after a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued … having due regard to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned’. This article critically examines the approach adopted by the Court to requesting such protective measures at the pre-trial phase, reflecting on how the rights and interests of the primary stakeholders implicated by this process: (i) accused persons, (ii) the Prosecutor, (iii) victims, and (iv) bona fide third parties, are safeguarded and balanced.