Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-5d6d958fb5-jlrq2 Total loading time: 0.288 Render date: 2022-11-29T09:23:08.786Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "displayNetworkTab": true, "displayNetworkMapGraph": false, "useSa": true } hasContentIssue true

The Political and Legal Force of the Prohibition of Force: Assessing State Behaviour

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2008

Extract

Recent political developments on the global scene have shed new light on established rules concerning the employment of military force while giving rise, among other things, to a reappraisal of the scope and limits of the right of self-defence. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 raised the question of whether actions by non-state actors can fall within the concept of ‘armed attack’. Those attacks were defined by UN Security Council Resolution 1368, under Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as ‘a threat to international peace and security’, but the ambiguous formulation left sufficient scope for upholding the prevailing view that Article 51 may only be invoked in the case of conflict between states. According to this view, which meanwhile has been contested, any resort to self-defence for legally justifying unilateral military action against terrorist organizations operating in other countries needs to be supported by evidence or argumentation that attacks perpetrated by those organizations can be attributed to a state. In defending the military campaign conducted to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the US government could credibly argue that this regime, exercising effective control over the country, was to be held accountable since it was harbouring members of al Qaeda on its territory and was actively supporting them.

Type
REVIEW ESSAYS
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 ‘After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers’, The Economist, 25 October 2007.

2 J. J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001).

3 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (1979); McDougal, M. S., ‘Some Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry’, (1960) 4 Journal of Conflict Resolution 337CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moravcsik, A., ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, (1997) 51 International Organization 513CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 R. A. Falk. ‘The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order’, in R. A. Falk and C. E. Black (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order (1969), 32.

5 T. M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990).

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

The Political and Legal Force of the Prohibition of Force: Assessing State Behaviour
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

The Political and Legal Force of the Prohibition of Force: Assessing State Behaviour
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

The Political and Legal Force of the Prohibition of Force: Assessing State Behaviour
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *