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The Newspapers, Printers and Reading Rooms Repeal Act 1869: a case for repeal?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Colin Manchester*
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham

Extract

If the reader cares to look at the foot of the back inside cover of this journal he will observe the statement ‘Printed by Kent Paper Company Ltd., London and Ashford, Kent’. He should also find if he looks at any other book or periodical that this too will contain the name of the printer, sometimes as with Legal Studies on the back page and sometimes as, for example, with the Law Quarterly Review and Smith's The Law of Theft on one of the front pages. Why is it that the name of the printer appears thus on publications? The answer is not, as perhaps one may expect, self-advertisement by the printer but because the law so requires.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1982

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References

1. The principal purpose of the 1869 Act was, as its title indicates, to repeal various enactments dealing with printed publications, but this offence is included in a number of saving provisions in Schedule 2 of the Act.

2. See Seditious Meetings Act 1795 (36 Geo. 3, c.8). Newspaper Publication Act (37 & 38 Geo. 3, c.78) and Unlawful Societies Act 1799 (39 Geo. 3, c.79).

3. See s.27 of the 1799 Act.

4. See Parl. Debs. Vol. 19, cots. 441–442 (19 March, 1811). In the latter instance, the omission was apparently made when the printer was absent from the premises.

5. Ibid., cols. 440–441.

6. This question was in fact raised by a printer called Woodfall when an information was laid against him, although only in the absence of his counsel and the matter seems not to have been pressed – see (1808) Times, 17 December.

7. This in effect would have been a reversion back to the previous position under the 1797 Act.

8. Lord Folkestone and Sir Samuel Romilly favoured this approach –see Parl. Debs., Vol. 19. cols. 717–718 (5 April, 1811)

9. Ibid., cols. 715–717.

10. See 5 1 Geo. 3, c.65, ss. 1 and 2 respectively. A right of appeal to Quarter Sessions was also provided by s.4 of this Act.

11. See (1829) Times, 9 February.

12. See Bristow (1829) Times, 20 and 21 February; Peele (1830) Times, 2 July; and Cannon (1830) Times, 11 December and (1831) Times, 1 January.

13. (1830) Times, 2 July.

14. This was certainly the view which the New South Wales legislature took when it incorporated into its Printing Act 1827 a provision based on the English Acts of 1799 and 1811. No reference was made to treason or sedition, the Act being described as one ‘for preventing the printing or publishing of books and papers by persons not known’. This was also the case in New Zealand, where the Printers and Newspapers Registration Act 1868 was described in identical terms.

15. See Meredith (1839) Times. 9 and 27 November.

16. It is difficult to know whether this apparent exclusion was due to an oversight on the part of the draftsman or not. It could be that Parliament intended the penalty to accrue only when printed matter was disseminated and was not concerned with the mere printing itself, but the 1811 amending Act appears to suggest otherwise for it provides that a person shall not be liable for more than 25 penalties ‘for printing or publishing or dispersing’ copies of any one publication. Further a number of Common wealth legislatures e.g. New South Wales and Victoria, which adopted a provision formulated from the English Acts of 1799 and 1811, specified that the penalty was to apply to those who printed or published or dispersed. It seems not to have been determined under the English legislation whether the penalty could be imposed on a printer who did not publish, although the matter has been considered in New Zealand under a corresponding provision (now repealed) in s.19 of the Printers and Newspapers Registration Act 1908. In Te Aroha News Printing and publishing Co Ltd v Murray [1946] NZLR8 the Supreme Court, although not obliged to decide the point, expressed itself as unwilling to hold a printer who did not publish liable by reading into the penalties provision ‘printed or’ before ‘published or dispersed’.

17. See 2 & 3 Vict., c.12, ss.5 and 4 respectively. It is a condition precedent that the proceedings are in the name of the Attorney or Solicitor-General and if that condition is not fulfilled the proceedings are null and void and the court has no jurisdiction to amend the defect: Key v Bastin [1925] 1 KB 650.

18. Section 2.

19. See (1910) Times, 1 October. The books were of an obscene nature and (with others) were also the subject of destruction proceedings under the Obscene Publications Act 1857.

20. See A-G v Beauchamp [1919] 1 KB 650.

21. Ibid., at 655–656. Rowlatt J, whilst prepared to concede that this grammatical interpretation was possible, did not think that this was the natural meaning: ibid., at 656.

22. Unreported, but noted in (1913) 48 LJ 41.

23. It is rather surprising to find the Law Journal also commenting that ‘the mischief aimed at by the statute, of course, is the danger of libellous pamphlets being circulated which contain no indications of the libellor's identity’. This is inaccurate on two counts: (1) ‘libel’ in its modern sense means defamation and defamatory publications was clearly not the mischief aimed at by the statute, and (2) even if one adopts the wider historical meaning of ‘libel’, as also encompassing obscene, blasphemous and seditious publications, again this was not the mischief aimed at. The statute was concerned only with one of these libels, sedition, as well as treason (which is not an aspect of the law of libel). It is even more surprising to find this comment in the Law Journal being cited with apparent approval in Halsbury's Laws of England as though it was some kind of authority on this point (see 3rd ed, vol. 30, p. 459, fn. (s)).

24. See (1910) Times, 1 October.

25. I am indebted to Mr G. J. Adams and Mr C. W. P. Newell of the Attorney-General's department for much of the following information.

26. Cases normally involve references rather than applications to proceed. Most references are by members of the public who have no desire or intention to institute proceedings themselves.

27. See Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘The Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Offences in England and Wales: The Law and Procedure (Cmnd. 8092-1)’ (1981). Appendix 24, Table 24–2. For a further instance of where the Attorney General declined to take action (against The Economist), See 609H. of C. Official Report (5th Series) col. 167 (23 July 1959)).

28. See Sch. 2 of the 1869 Act.

29. The English formula in the 1799 and 1811 Acts (of a £20 penalty per copy, commutable to no less than £5 with a maximum of 25 penalties per one publication) has often been adopted, although sometimes this has been subsequently abandoned, e.g., in New Zealand where there is now a single monetary penalty provided - see Newspapers and Printers Act 1955 (No. 98), ss. 16 and 18. There is also a single penalty in South Africa, although this can take the form of a fine or imprisonment (for a term not exceeding six months) or both - see Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act 1971 (No. 63). ss. 7, 9 and 11.

30. 1974 (1) SA 154 (N).

31. See ante. footnote 23.

32. It will be recalled that in John Heywood Ltd a penalty of B65 15s. was imposed, which was a considerable sum of money at the time (1910). Since proceedings are before magistrates, any penalty imposed would presumably not have to exceed the statutory maximum, which is presently £1,000 (s.32, Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980).

33. It is not clear why the three-month time limit was imposed in the first place. Perhaps it was felt that treasonable and seditious publications would have their most pernicious effect in the period immediately following publication and the public might be encouraged to take prompt action to counter this if a time limit was imposed.

34. See ante.

35. I am grateful to Chief Inspector R. J. Shepherd, Head of the Obscene Publications and Public Morals Squad, New Scotland Yard, for this information.